Since the attacks initiated by Hamas on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s retaliatory counter-offensive, many observers have wondered about the role of Iran in this conflict. Although the Iranian authorities did not spell out their role in the Gaza conflict, and Hamas leaders have been careful not to mention Iran in the context of the October 7 operation, Tehran likely knew about Hamas’ plans. Iran did not acknowledge or support Hamas and showed no willingness to fight for the Palestinians in Gaza.
The Hamas attack, of course, was of no help to the Palestinian cause, but only created an anti-Israeli (not to say anti-Jewish) public sentiment in many Arab countries. As for Iran’s position towards the war in Gaza, it is clear that the chaos in West Asia has strengthened the position of the Ayatollahs while delivering a severe blow to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor project formulated during the G20 summit in New Delhi. Consequently, the Hamas attack has also complicated Israel’s normalisation agreement with Saudi Arabia and greater economic cooperation with some other Arab nations. On a different note, the international attention drawn to the war in Gaza provided Iran with the possibility of diverting global public opinion from the urban unrest of 2022-2023 and the political oppression inside the country.
The Iranian authorities have neither the military power nor popular backing to destroy the State of Israel. But the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could instigate its proxy militias to target Israeli citizens in the region or beyond. Israel and the United States have been dealing with Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Yemen. While the Houthis are no more in a position to win the conflict in Yemen, Hezbollah will be destroyed if it enters a war with Israel. Therefore, it seems clear that despite its apparent posture to destroy the State of Israel, the Iranian leadership prefers that the current conflict remain limited to Gaza.
Clearly, at this stage, Tehran does not support any widening of the fighting with Israel beyond Gaza. Yet, from Iran’s point of view, the damaged image of the Benjamin Netanyahu government could tie up Israel’s resources in its indirect confrontations with Iran.
As for Tehran, it is trying to profit from the international focus on the Gaza war to cover up the long list of its crises. The Iranian authorities are expecting the lowest turnout ever in the March elections to elect a new parliament as well as the assembly of experts, an 88-seat body of Islamic jurists that will likely determine the successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This is understandable. There is massive alienation of Iranians from the political system of the Islamic republic. The economic and political discontents of the Iranian population are reflected in the social tensions arising over efforts to impose the hijab. The “morality police” that was dispersed after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in September 2022 has been re-established in a new form. There is also an alarming rise in the emigration of young, educated and professional Iranians to Europe and North America.
All these developments may be influencing Iranian officials to shift their stance from a policy of calling for Israel’s destruction to joining a regional consensus in favour of a two-State solution. On October 31, 2023, Tehran voted in favour of a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly that declared that a two-State solution is the only way to resolve the Palestine-Israel conflict. Though the vote was rejected by the Iranian hardliners and criticised by Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan newspaper and a close associate of Ayatollah Khamenei, it shows that Tehran does not want to stand apart from the consensus in the Muslim world on the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Finally, how the situation in Gaza evolves is important for the Iranian government given the fact that the conflict risks uncertainties and difficulties for Tehran. It is also critical for the Iranian regime to remain vigilant and not cross the red line with Israel. The conflict in Gaza has revealed the complexities and contradictions of the political situation in West Asia. Though both the Iranian and Israeli authorities are looking for ideological victories in the Gaza war, they also want to avoid any direct clash that could harm their interests and security in the long run. Both countries have been careful that the conflict in Gaza does not spill over to Lebanon, despite the daily exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah across the Lebanon-Israel border.
As for Israel, it can continue the war in Gaza for the next several months without worrying about a direct military engagement with Iran. Iran is strategically comfortable as long as Israel does not attack its nuclear facilities even while supporting its proxies in the region. What this Great Game in West Asia also teaches us is that sometimes in history, even enemies need to agree upon a set of disagreements.
Ramin Jahanbegloo, a dissident Iranian philosopher, is director, Mahatma Gandhi Centre for Nonviolence and Peace at OP Jindal Global University. The views expressed are personal
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