A stout denial of “doing Hindu-Muslim” is followed by a claim that the UPA government wanted to set aside 15 per cent resources for Muslims. The statements by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his interviews and public rallies stir up heat and dust in the campaign. But how do we decode this inconsistency?

A lacklustre campaign has turned into an acrimonious one. An election that seemed to have a limited element of uncertainty as to whether the ruling party will retain its 300-plus strength or better it, has become somewhat open over the past weeks. Admittedly, much of the noise about the BJP on the back foot might simply be an overenthusiastic reading by its detractors. But even so, there are signs that the nature of competition has altered slightly.

Irrespective of the outcome, the campaign saw one major change: For quite some time, the BJP seems to be losing the initiative and is instead busy responding to its critics — both within the party system and outside it. Instead of publicising its achievements, it has gone back to what it does best — exploiting social prejudices against the minorities and exacerbating the assertion of the majority. This itself has led observers to wonder whether in the war of perceptions the BJP has incurred losses. The PM’s interview, where he clarifies that he is averse to “doing Hindu-Muslim”, is part of this latest shift.

For Modi’s critics, there is an obvious inconsistency in what has been said. On the one hand, is the “explanation” by Modi that he is averse to exploiting Hindu-Muslim divisions and at the same time he continues with criticising Congress for being partial toward the minorities. How do we understand this duality?

It would be naïve to believe that there is confusion in the BJP camp and as a result, the party is resorting to conflicting strategies, as it does not know how to respond to criticism about its communal stance without losing votes that are mobilised through it. This is rather unlikely. Ever since Modi took over leadership of the party, the BJP has ceased to bother about criticism; it has not been bothered about the minority vote either. Its approach has been based on a systematic sidelining of the constitutional vision of fraternity and plurality and its electoral strategy is based on express polarisation of Hindu votes. Even though we assume that in the current election the BJP fears a slight setback, it is unlikely that this possibility would confuse it or weaken its resolve to imagine India in terms of a beleaguered majority vis-à-vis a pampered minority.

So an assessment of the seeming duality should be based on two considerations. First, the duality, rather than inconsistency, has helped the BJP to force its critics to talk about tricky issues of majority sentiment, minority rights and the idea of Hindutva. Second, we can comprehend the duality only if we understand the differentiated manner in which the BJP presents itself to various sections.

Those who read or listen to interviews of the kind Modi has been giving are in a different campaign zone from those who savour the PM’s rhetoric through rallies — and we must remember that these rallies are telecast live by electronic media besides being widely forwarded through social media such as YouTube. So, the high moral stance of his interviews mainly serves the purpose of formal record for gullible chroniclers of the present moment while the bitter polemic is served as the core agenda of the campaign lest it loses momentum.

Historically, the BJP has witnessed two expansions in its electoral support. The first occurred around 1990-1991 through the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation. Besides appropriating sections of the Hindu vote by inflaming religious identity, this expansion was assisted by the decline of Congress and fragmentation of the Janata Dal vote through the 1990s. Thus, in that first expansion, while Hindutva played a critical role, the need for an additional impetus was evident. The BJP’s alliances with various state parties from 1996 onward helped it in the shaping of that additional impetus which supplemented the Hindutva vote. By 2004, the BJP had come to think that its alliances and its economics would get it more voters and in any case, its Hindutva was now too well-known to its core base to require repetition. That change of gears pushed the BJP out of power for a decade. The lesson was clear: Its expansion had limits if it underplayed Hindutva.

The second expansion came in 2014. This was shaped by two interwoven factors — Hindutva and Modi. In a sense, they were indistinguishable from each other but Modi was presented to the electorate as something more than Hindutva. Observers named that strategy as “Hindutva plus”, wherein Modi represented both militant Hindutva and dreams of development. But let us not forget that Modi himself sought to equate development and Hindutva. That strategy gave the BJP a small but critical layer of voters who had no objection to Hindutva but were not enamoured by Hindutva alone. For them, so-called development was Modi’s asset. These voters convinced themselves that they were voting for Modi more because of economic factors and aspirational elements and less for his Hindutva. Nevertheless, they didn’t mind Hindutva. The accretion to the BJP’s vote in 2019 mainly came from this section which saw new possibilities in Modi’s BJP.

As India entered the campaign for the 2024 elections, the dreams of 2014 and 2019 had become distant. The promises have become worn out, and lost credibility. After two terms in office, the BJP could hardly go on with a campaign of dreams and possibilities. Economic woes faced by the electorate don’t allow the BJP to bank upon its performance record. The eruption of the Hindu-Muslim question into the campaign happened in this overall context: That the BJP cannot limit itself to development and performance alone to win the elections; that it cannot sideline the excitement it has generated on the question of minorities, and that it cannot sustain the interest of the electorate without stoking anxieties among the majority.

With its star campaigner daily invoking issues of Hindutva and the minority, the BJP may hope to stem the tide of disinterest and disenchantment that seems to have haunted its campaign earlier in this election. Will this help the BJP? The answer may depend on whether the Opposition plays into its hands by responding to this polemic and whether the already saturated Hindutva vote expands because of the routine of “doing Hindu-Muslim”.

The writer, based in Pune, taught political science

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Its approach has been based on a systematic sidelining of constitutional vision of fraternity and plurality and its electoral strategy is based on express polarisation of Hindu votes

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18.05.2024

A stout denial of “doing Hindu-Muslim” is followed by a claim that the UPA government wanted to set aside 15 per cent resources for Muslims. The statements by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his interviews and public rallies stir up heat and dust in the campaign. But how do we decode this inconsistency?

A lacklustre campaign has turned into an acrimonious one. An election that seemed to have a limited element of uncertainty as to whether the ruling party will retain its 300-plus strength or better it, has become somewhat open over the past weeks. Admittedly, much of the noise about the BJP on the back foot might simply be an overenthusiastic reading by its detractors. But even so, there are signs that the nature of competition has altered slightly.

Irrespective of the outcome, the campaign saw one major change: For quite some time, the BJP seems to be losing the initiative and is instead busy responding to its critics — both within the party system and outside it. Instead of publicising its achievements, it has gone back to what it does best — exploiting social prejudices against the minorities and exacerbating the assertion of the majority. This itself has led observers to wonder whether in the war of perceptions the BJP has incurred losses. The PM’s interview, where he clarifies that he is averse to “doing Hindu-Muslim”, is part of this latest shift.

For Modi’s critics, there is an obvious inconsistency in what has been said. On the one hand, is the “explanation” by Modi that he is averse to exploiting Hindu-Muslim divisions and at the same time he continues with criticising Congress for being partial toward the minorities. How do we understand this duality?

It would be naïve to believe that there is confusion in the BJP camp and as a result, the party is resorting to........

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