Each time a new president comes to power, the U.S. government conducts a major review of important policies. One of the policies which undergoes such a review is the U.S.' policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. This is a presidential election year in the U.S. I already hear the beginning of related discussions in Washington.
Chris Miller, who is often touted as a strong candidate as secretary of defense in case of a new Trump government, said through an interview with a Korean newspaper: "we need to look at the merit of trading the withdrawal of sanctions for the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons." He even suggested the possibility of engaging North Korea in disarmament talks. Mira Rapp-Hooper, senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, said that we could consider first arranging an interim step on the way to the ultimate goal of North Korea’s denuclearization.
Why are such discussions being held in Washington at this time? I raised the question with some former U.S. diplomats and scholars who recently came to visit Seoul. One of them recalled that U.S. President Joe Biden, at the beginning of his presidency, said that his North Korean policy would be based on “diplomacy and stern deterrence.” Much progress has been made for strengthening deterrence, especially after the inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol government in Seoul. However, there has been very little progress on diplomacy. Rapp-Hooper’s statement was an early indication of Biden’s diplomatic efforts in the second term.
Another piece of background was the reality on the Korean Peninsula as perceived by Washington: there’s very little chance for making progress on denuclearization for the time being, while the more immediate concern is North Korea’s provocations of various kinds.
A related fact was the collusion between North Korea and Russia, which is moving into a very ominous direction. Washington sees the need to engage North Korea to keep it from going too far.
I observed a common thread underlying all these pieces of background facts shared by U.S. visitors: A sense of frustration over the failure of all diplomatic efforts and the aggravation of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. I share this frustration. However, there are several points to keep in mind before changing the course for interim steps.
The first point is the present context surrounding the issue. Chairman Kim Jong-un met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year at the Vostochny Space Center. Beginning from around that meeting, North Korea has supplied hundreds of thousands of munitions and even missiles to Russia. Russia is believed to be supplying North Korea with energy, materials and even military technology.
If sanctions are removed in such a context, it could lead to the significant strengthening of North Korea’s conventional forces. Peace has been maintained on the Korean Peninsula through two mutually reinforcing components: the U.S. extended deterrence and the predominant advantage in conventional capability over North Korea’s. The interim step could lead to undermining the second component.
The consequences of the interim step may not be limited to strengthening North Korea’s conventional forces, but have a wider impact upon the security environment in Northeast Asia and beyond.
Recently, Russia exercised veto power to terminate the panel of experts for the 1718 Sanctions Committee. It is indicative of wide efforts among a group of countries to undermine the rules-based international order. Were the North Korean sanctions to be removed through interim step negotiations, it would be perceived as another conspicuous achievement by these countries. Such perception’s consequence will be felt in other parts of Northeast Asia and beyond.
We must have more confidence in our current approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. We have maintained peace through further strengthening extended deterrence and maintaining predominant advantage in conventional forces. The diplomatic door should be kept open. However, it must not be used in a way to undermine the effective formula for peace on the Korean Peninsula. We also have to remember that the impasse on the diplomatic front was dictated by North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons at any cost, even at the cost of sacrificing millions of lives during the Arduous March period of the 1990s.
North Korea’s persistence stays the same even today. However, the context will change in time for North Korea. The structural and chronic weaknesses in the North Korean economy and society will eventually lead to that outcome. Its economy is not getting any better. There are growing signs of widespread discontent in North Korean society. The younger generations in particular have more chances to learn about South Korea and the outside world, which undermines its loyalty to the regime. It’s another reason why we must stay the course.
Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as ambassador to the United States and vice foreign minister.
North Korea's nuclear threat: why we must stay the course
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14.05.2024
Each time a new president comes to power, the U.S. government conducts a major review of important policies. One of the policies which undergoes such a review is the U.S.' policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. This is a presidential election year in the U.S. I already hear the beginning of related discussions in Washington.
Chris Miller, who is often touted as a strong candidate as secretary of defense in case of a new Trump government, said through an interview with a Korean newspaper: "we need to look at the merit of trading the withdrawal of sanctions for the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons." He even suggested the possibility of engaging North Korea in disarmament talks. Mira Rapp-Hooper, senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, said that we could consider first arranging an interim step on the way to the ultimate goal of North Korea’s denuclearization.
Why are such discussions being held in Washington at this time? I raised the question with some former U.S. diplomats and scholars who recently came to visit Seoul. One of them recalled that U.S. President Joe Biden, at the beginning of his presidency, said that his North Korean policy would be based on “diplomacy and stern deterrence.” Much........
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