Hamas’s October 7 attack shattered Israel’s sense of security and humiliated its intelligence and security apparatus. It also laid bare the infeasibility of the country’s dual approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had worked hard over the years to keep the Palestinian house divided by playing Hamas against the Palestinian Authority. He also convinced Arab regimes that it would be in their benefit to normalize relations with the Jewish state without the precondition of Israel’s first making peace with the Palestinians.
More than a month into their war, Israel and Hamas are both trying to break the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to do so definitively. Hamas appears to have hoped its attack would provoke Israel to resort to overreach, thereby putting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back on the international agenda. Israel responded by seeking to eradicate Hamas’s military capability and rule over the Gaza Strip once and for all rather than keeping the militant group contained there, a strategy it referred to as “mowing the grass.” The cost has been staggering: Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis on October 7 and took over 200 hostages. The death toll from Israel’s subsequent assault on Gaza continues to mount, at last count exceeding 12,000, at least 5,000 of them children. Much of northern Gaza is flattened, more than two-thirds of all Gazans are displaced, and the entire population of 2.3 million is struggling to find clean water, food, or medicine.
Both Israel and Hamas see their current paths as forced upon them. Hamas at first played the political game. It participated in Palestinian elections, which it won in 2006, only to be denied victory. After thwarting an attempt by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to wrest power from it, Hamas assumed governance of Gaza only to see Israel impose a suffocating blockade. In the following years, it fought several wars with Israel, each time hoping that international acknowledgment of the unsustainability of the Gazans’ situation might lead to pressure on Israel to lift its siege. As this unfolded, Israel tried to make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict disappear, or settle it on its own terms, through military rule and the expansion of settlements in the territories it has occupied since 1967. It also tried “shrinking” the conflict through seeking an Arab-Israeli peace that would improve the day-to-day lives of Palestinians but not fulfill their aspiration for a state of their own.
Hamas appears to have drawn Israel into its trap, and now needs to tweak its plan in response to Israel’s ongoing military campaign. These are tactical adjustments that Hamas must have determined it can afford to make despite the horrendous destruction and suffering of Gaza’s population and its own growing losses in fighters and military capacity. By contrast, Israel was caught by surprise, had to scramble to forge an effective answer, and so far has produced only a military response—to be clear, a devastating one—without a discernible endgame. In its fury and its pain, Israel has struck out not just at Hamas but at the entire Gazan population as well. It may soon find that it is not only incapable of achieving its stated goal of destroying Hamas’s military capability and governance of Gaza but will also be stuck with reoccupying Gaza and ruling directly over its newly homeless, desperate, and very angry population.
Israel could end up assuming this responsibility because no alternative is readily available. Hamas has relinquished its role as the territory’s governing authority. And in its single-minded pursuit to destroy Hamas, Israel appears to have ceded the initiative for planning what should happen after the war ends to its Western allies, even though its military operations will set the limits of what is feasible. Leaders in the West have floated a number of vague scenarios, none of which seem to have much hope of being realized. There is a way out of the endless cycle of violence, but there is no indication today that either side is willing to reach for that lifeline.
One of the proposals for the “day after” in Gaza is for Arab countries to send a peacekeeping force to govern the strip. Arabs are all brothers, the reasoning goes, so Arab regimes should be prepared, if not eager, to take care of their kin; at least, this is how the apparent obligation is filtered crudely through the Western news media. Yet these governments have signaled that they lack the appetite for such a job. They are divided by their separate regional interests and objectives. All are loath to take on the burden of ruling a notoriously unruly population hardened by years of armed resistance to Israel; they are equally unwilling to take the burden of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict off Israel’s shoulders. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians stands at the origin of the making of the modern Middle East and resonates like none other among the Arab public.
As the Arab state neighboring Gaza, Egypt in particular has rejected any suggestion that it reassert control over a territory it ruled unhappily from the 1948 war over Israel’s independence until the 1967 war, when it lost not only Gaza but also the Sinai Peninsula. (Egypt regained the latter territory as a result of its peace treaty with Israel in 1979.) It realizes that taking control of Gaza would pose an even greater challenge than before now that Palestinians would view it as a successor occupier to Israel and actively resist its presence.
An idea that has gained greater traction in Western countries, including the United States, would see the Palestinian Authority replace Hamas in Gaza. It is difficult to imagine how this would work. The PA, which nominally governs the Israeli-occupied West Bank, has long since lost all credibility as the government-in-waiting for a future Palestinian state as envisioned under the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO. Palestinians view the authority as ineffective, authoritarian, venal, and, in their view—the worst accusation—a facilitator if not an arm of the Israeli occupation. PA leaders have themselves said they are not interested in running Gaza. The PA’s mother ship, the PLO, has fragmented and is struggling to keep up in its competition for power with the more popular Hamas. If the PA can barely govern the West Bank, how could it expect to do better in Gaza, where the population is likely to exhibit even greater hostility toward it, especially if it were to take charge at Israel’s behest?
If the PA can barely govern the West Bank, how could it expect to do better in Gaza.
Some tweak this arrangement by suggesting that the PA would play only a nominal role and that Gaza’s professional class, currently in survival mode, could run the institutions of government to provide services to the population. It is difficult to see how they could do so without getting a green light from whatever remains of Hamas. Even if Israel succeeds in destroying Hamas’s military arm, the Qassam Brigades—which seems an unlikely prospect—the movement is more than a militant organization. Hamas has been the government of Gaza since 2006, has a presence throughout major institutions and civil society, and enjoys significant public support. Although many Gazans were becoming increasingly disaffected with the group because of its poor governance over the past few years, Palestinians are now crediting it for standing up for their national rights by confronting Israel. Hamas unconscionably targeted civilians on October 7, but there is no gainsaying the popular support it garnered from dealing Israel a body blow—despite the gigantic cost Gazans have borne in lost lives and homes.
If Israel fails to destroy Hamas’ military capacity, including its tunnel network, ability to fire rockets, and senior command structure, it may be forced to accept Hamas’s continued control of Gaza, even if from behind the scenes. Such a scenario appears unfathomable, given the mood in Israel. But there is no Palestinian alternative to Hamas. Hamas itself doesn’t seem interested. Some point to Mohammed Dahlan, a rogue Fatah commander based in Abu Dhabi who hails from Gaza and would enjoy backing from Israel and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the United States. But any attempt to impose his leadership would likely be stillborn, given his lack of local support, and he has indicated that he is not interested.
If the leadership vacuum in Gaza cannot be filled by an Arab state or a Palestinian actor, what then? Netanyahu recently declared himself in favor of Israeli security control for an indefinite period, either through direct reoccupation or deployment within a buffer zone and along the periphery. Yet under current circumstances, it is likely that some of the far-right members of Netanyahu’s cabinet would agree to reoccupy Gaza only if it could first empty the territory of its population—a scenario that some of them have hinted at as a solution to Israel’s security challenge in Gaza. The Biden administration’s recent messaging that a move to push Palestinians into Egypt, or even an Israeli reoccupation, would be unacceptable may have given Israelis leaders pause, if only in their public discourse. But whether the United States would actively lean on Israel if it were to push hundreds of thousands of desperate, panicked Gazans across the border remains an open question. Egypt would certainly bridle at such an influx of refugees: it does not want to be saddled with caring for a new generation of Palestinians likely to launch an insurgency against Israel from inside Egyptian territory and thus draw return fire. But it is not clear that Egypt can prevent such an expulsion from happening.
A second mass expulsion of Gazans from their homes—a “second nakba,” the term referring to the forced displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war that led to the founding of Israel—would almost certainly trigger an escalation of violence on other fronts. Openly threatened by several Israeli leaders and invoked in fear by Palestinians, this Nakba, or “catastrophe,” would bring upheaval in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where violence has spiraled over the past month and Palestinians live with the same primordial fear; and could further escalate tensions between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon; with other Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and possibly with Iran itself. These groups have repeatedly targeted Israel as well as U.S. assets in the region with rockets and drones for the past six weeks. Even if, for now, neither they, nor Israel, nor the United States appear keen to engage in an all-out war, they could stumble into one through miscalculation or error. This threat grows with every passing day as Israel and Hezbollah send missiles ever more deeply into each other’s territory.
In light of these improbable proposed arrangements, “the day after” for Gaza looks increasingly grim. The most likely scenario, not at all a good one, would be one in which the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies provide basic amenities such as fuel, food, water, and medicines, most Gazans remain displaced, and Israel keeps a certain security presence inside Gaza, possibly for an extended period, while also providing piped water and electricity.
Some observers take the worst-case scenario—driving Palestinians out of Gaza and embarking on an Israeli reoccupation—a step further. They suggest that Israel may decide it has no choice or won’t again find a golden opportunity to not only defeat Hamas and drive Palestinians from Gaza but also try to do the same in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It could eventually also choose to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon and even go so far as to drag the United States into a war with Iran. Netanyahu has fruitlessly angled for an American attack on Iran since long before this year. But October 7 exploded Israel’s sense of security, and even the war-averse Biden administration might find it impossible to leave its ally exposed if it engaged in a regional fight to the death.
Should Israel take this route, or Hezbollah and Iran decide to attack Israel for fear of losing credibility as the “axis of resistance,” an ensuing war could render any effort to identify winners and losers moot. It is hard to see how the outcome of a regional war would be good for Hamas; the Palestinians, broadly speaking; Israel; Iran; or just about anyone else.
Another way forward is imaginable, even if the chances of successfully pursuing it are small indeed. This path would not lead to a solution for the day after, but it could bring the parties to a better outcome for the present day. It would have to start with humanitarian pauses, now being negotiated, in which Hamas would release hostages in exchange for serious halts—of days, not hours—to military operations and for stepped-up aid for Gaza (and perhaps also for the release of Palestinians held in Israeli prisons). From there, negotiations could build incrementally toward a cease-fire. Israel is on record saying that it rejects a cease-fire, and it is unlikely to agree to one before major releases of hostages and something that could be made to look like a military victory over Hamas. But Israel’s calculus could change if it were offered, at the same time, a political horizon for a way out of its Gaza conundrum.
Such a political horizon exists, but it won’t materialize unless a release of hostages and a humanitarian pause create space for further diplomacy, and it won’t come for free. In making the utter defeat of Hamas its top priority, Israel has lost sight of the thing it needs and values the most: restoring its sense of security. Its past use of overwhelming force against the Palestinians has brought the illusion of peace and security, but the underlying reality was clearly different. A better way of achieving greater security on an enduring basis could be for Israel to come to terms with the broader region through normalization accords or through another mechanism while placing the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict front and center. Such an approach would require major compromises from Israel on West Bank settlements and Palestinian statehood to which the Netanyahu government, or any likeminded successor, would be unlikely to agree.
Israel has lost sight of the thing it needs and values the most: restoring its sense of security.
Enter the United States. If the Biden administration wants to undo some of the enormous damage it has inflicted on U.S. credibility in its unqualified support for Israel—blatantly showcasing its double standards on international human rights and humanitarian law—it would need to undertake a major political initiative to pursue a durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That could transform or at least mitigate the sentiments of an enraged global public, not to mention a swath of Biden’s own political base as well as Arab states. Of course, Biden may not be keen to take this path, but a failure to do so could haunt him at the polls next year, particularly among important constituencies, such as Arab and Muslim Americans in Michigan and other swing states, and among young voters. (Of course, this could cost him with mainstream pro-Israel constituencies.) For now, the United States can put pressure on Israel to at least abide by the rules of war, agree to humanitarian pauses, and allow vastly more aid into Gaza as the basis for a way out of the current crisis. It is clear that any solution would require far stronger U.S. pressure on Israel than has been evident to date.
The current dynamic suggests that the Biden administration will do otherwise. The Israeli leadership seems unlikely to be swayed from its military course. Hamas has dug in and continues to enjoy wide support well beyond Gaza. Iran and its nonstate allies, while reluctant to launch an all-out battle with Israel, may be preparing for or blunder into one. Israel’s rejection of a two-state solution and the vanishing possibility of such a future pose an almost insurmountable challenge to reaching a negotiated settlement that both Israel and the Palestinians could live with.
But failure to try would doubtless condemn generations of Israelis and Palestinians to more of the horrible same. In their determination to go for broke, Israel and Hamas are inviting continued conflict and suffering.
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