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When it comes to the Israel-Hamas war and the future of the Gaza Strip—or the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict for that matter—it’s high time we retire the so-called “day after” conceit. It’s well intentioned, to be sure, and suggests a logical transition from active conflict to some new post-conflict reality, marked by significant change in the politics, economy, and security environment for Gaza. But the notion of the day after really doesn’t fit here. There’s unlikely to be a bright line separating Israeli military activities from a post-conflict period in which the focus will be on governance and reconstruction. Indeed, of late I’ve been leaning toward the depressing conclusion of my inestimable colleague Nathan Brown, who argues that there is likely to be no day after at all, only a “long twilight of disintegration and despair.”
When it comes to the Israel-Hamas war and the future of the Gaza Strip—or the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict for that matter—it’s high time we retire the so-called “day after” conceit. It’s well intentioned, to be sure, and suggests a logical transition from active conflict to some new post-conflict reality, marked by significant change in the politics, economy, and security environment for Gaza. But the notion of the day after really doesn’t fit here. There’s unlikely to be a bright line separating Israeli military activities from a post-conflict period in which the focus will be on governance and reconstruction. Indeed, of late I’ve been leaning toward the depressing conclusion of my inestimable colleague Nathan Brown, who argues that there is likely to be no day after at all, only a “long twilight of disintegration and despair.”
Perhaps matters will turn out somewhat better than that. According to one report, Israel might be ready to pause the fighting for two months, redeploy from main population centers, and free some Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of all Israeli hostages held in Gaza. Hamas has rejected this idea but a negotiation may be in store that could produce some sort of deal nonetheless.
Should something like this actually happen, Gaza’s future would look a little brighter. But it wouldn’t end the war.
In fact, several challenges suggest it will be a long slog. The U.S. administration may well decide to put out the “Biden parameters,” laying out its views on what a two-state solution might look like and the steps each side might take to get there. But it’s hard to imagine any serious action to realize this goal anytime soon. Indeed, most of 2024 will almost certainly be focused on managing the Gaza crisis rather than pushing a broader peace initiative. Should the Biden administration get a second term—along with leadership changes in Israel and Ramallah—it might be possible to imagine a better and brighter pathway forward for Israelis and Palestinians.
In the meantime, it’s a safe bet that Israel will still be operating militarily at some level in Gaza throughout this year. Why? Because it’s highly unlikely there will be a central government or a security force other than Israel’s ready to ensure that Hamas won’t resurge as a military force. Under the best of circumstances, it would take a year to train and deploy Palestinian Authority security forces, and that’s not factoring in the politics of a PA return to Gaza, which right now is just a thought experiment.
In the coming months, Israel will almost certainly end its division-size operations heavy on air and artillery in favor of brigade-size, intelligence-driven operations going after Hamas tunnels, residual rocket launchers, and leadership targets. But that won’t mean it can declare victory over the group. It’s one thing to break Hamas’s centralized command and control; it’s quite another to kill all or even most of the group’s fighters. In recent weeks, Hamas in northern Gaza has launched a barrage of rockets into Israeli airspace from areas Israel forces had worked to clear.
It’s difficult to imagine much stability in Gaza with Israel understandably trying to hunt down and kill Hamas leaders who emerge from tunnels. Call it the Gaza Catch-22: Israel won’t leave unless there is sufficient force to guarantee its security needs. But creating a satisfactory security environment requires the end of Israel’s military presence. And in the wake of Hamas’s Oct. 7 surge, who is Israel going to trust to prevent another attack?
As we approach the end of the fourth month of the Israel-Hamas war, there is still no real plan to determine who or what will govern in Gaza even during a transition or stabilization phase, let alone on a permanent basis. There’s no realistic turnkey approach. Israel’s notion that large family clans will be able to maintain order, reminiscent of the Israeli-endorsed village leagues in the West Bank in the 1970s, is a non-starter. Palestinians cooperating with Israel will either be intimidated by Hamas or worse. Key Arab states will not deploy their forces while Israelis operate militarily. Under no circumstances would they want to run the risk of policing Palestinians or suppressing a Hamas insurgency. Egypt may agree to a role in border security and to help train Palestinian security forces but will not commit its own. And a United Nations-sanctioned force, or a trusteeship along the lines of Kosovo, is magical thinking.
Palestinian governance of Gaza is, of course, the answer, but there’s little prospect of the PA’s imminent return—now 17 years since losing control of the territory to Hamas in an armed clash. Training thousands of Palestinian security forces would be a logical first step, but this will take up to a year or more. Even if that were to happen, the PA has no credibility in the West Bank, let alone in Gaza. Elections for a new Palestinian Legislative Council and president are light years away. And given the PA’s weakness, it would need Hamas’s support in Gaza to return to govern. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has openly called for Hamas participation in a post-conflict governing structure, something Israel is certain to reject.
Hamas, for its part, has no intention of ceding Gaza. By the looks of things now, it may well survive Israel’s military campaign with some of its military assets intact. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s chief in Gaza and the architect of the Oct. 7 attack, has every intention of waiting out the Israelis and trading the Israeli hostages Hamas took that day for thousands of jailed Palestinians and a cessation of hostilities.
Some PA officials have implied that Hamas must reconsider its policies. But given the surge of Hamas’s popularity, especially in the West Bank, it’s hard to imagine that any plan for unified governance of the West Bank and Gaza wouldn’t require Hamas’s assent. The PA, weakened both by its own corrupt and autocratic practices and Israel’s annexationist West Bank policies, would seem to lack the credibility and legitimacy to govern alone.
Israeli pundits may be taking bets on who leaves office first, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or U.S. President Joe Biden. But at the moment, with no mechanism to remove the Israeli leader, it’s more than likely that he will be around for a while, perhaps even through this year’s U.S. presidential election. And Netanyahu has already shown how problematic a partner he can be, deploying a just-say-no strategy to U.S. and Arab state aspirations for a post-conflict scenario.
Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival and possibly for his freedom as a result of his indictment and ongoing corruption trial. He will try to draw the war out for as long as possible in hopes of achieving some redemptive victory. He will also work to manipulate the terms of any state commission of inquiry, avoid personal responsibility for the intelligence and operational failures that led to the war, and will play on Israeli fears in the wake of Oct. 7 to campaign against any pressure from the United States to press him on Palestinian statehood.
As hard as it is to imagine, Netanyahu is still looking for some magic bullet that might save him. And he hasn’t given up on the possibility of a U.S.-brokered Israeli-Saudi normalization accord. The price for such a deal has gone up and presumably is one that would cost Netanyahu his government—Palestinian statehood. Biden is interested in keeping the Saudi option open, too, which is one reason he seems to unwilling to break with Netanyahu.
How much flexibility Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has after the exponential rise in Palestinian deaths in Gaza isn’t clear. One would assume not much. Key Arabs states have made it clear that political and financial support for Gaza reconstruction will depend on Israel’s withdrawal from the area and its agreement to a two-state solution. Still, if Washington were prepared to meet Mohammed bin Salman’s key demands for a mutual defense pact and assistance with the Saudi nuclear program, who knows what he might do.
Netanyahu would clearly love to see Donald Trump elected again and doubtless believes that a Trump presidency would relieve pressure on him for compromises on the Palestinian issue, while the ever-transactional Trump would be willing to push hard for an Israeli-Saudi deal. That Netanyahu is clearly thinking about his own survival instead of working with the Americans on a feasible strategy for Gaza after the war reflects just how hard it’s going to be to make significant progress on Gaza this year.
Biden has made clear that he’s committed to not going back to the status quo as it existed on Oct. 6. It’s a well-intentioned aspiration. But if that requires creating a Hamas-free Gaza that can’t threaten Israel and a credible Israeli-Palestinian peace process based on two states, the chances are slim to none. And slim has already left town. It’s just too heavy a lift, especially against the backdrop of a looming presidential election almost certain to be among the most consequential in U.S. history.
Risk aversion is likely to be the hallmark of Biden’s approach on this issue and others, with sound policy likely taking a back seat to sound politics. If Biden can get the Israelis to wind down the war and create the time and space to surge humanitarian assistance into Gaza, if he can facilitate a deal to release the hostages, avoid a major explosion of fighting on the West Bank, and head off a war between Israel and Hezbollah, he can consider it a very good year.
Capped by a win in November and freed from political constraints in a second term, Biden might have clearer running room for pursuing a broader peace initiative. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never been one hand clapping. Biden can say and do whatever he pleases. But leadership is required in more than just Washington. Without a new Israeli prime minister willing to work with him, a more credible Palestinian leadership, and serious buy-in from key Arab states, a better pathway for Israelis and Palestinians will not be found. And the traumas of Oct. 7 and what it has wrought will sear a generation of Israelis and Palestinians for years to come, driving them deeper into conflict, terror, and violence and further away from the security and peace they’ve long been denied.
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