Remembering how the world looked before Donald Trump became the U.S. president in January 2017 paints a striking picture. At that time, the idea that Beijing poses a threat to global security was not a mainstream one in Washington. Imposing tariffs on European imports seemed inconceivable. And controls on technology exports—which had fallen into progressive disuse since the end of the Cold War—were the realm of a tiny niche of policy wonks.
Remembering how the world looked before Donald Trump became the U.S. president in January 2017 paints a striking picture. At that time, the idea that Beijing poses a threat to global security was not a mainstream one in Washington. Imposing tariffs on European imports seemed inconceivable. And controls on technology exports—which had fallen into progressive disuse since the end of the Cold War—were the realm of a tiny niche of policy wonks.
For better or for worse, there is no denying that Trump changed the world, especially when it comes to relations between the United States and China.
Given Trump’s incendiary rhetoric about Beijing—including his promise to escalate the U.S.-China trade war—it is easy to believe that Chinese leaders would prefer incumbent U.S President Joe Biden over Trump, who will likely be the Republican Party candidate.
Yet this view is probably shortsighted, and it eclipses the broader picture. In all likelihood, China is rooting for Trump.
Beijing knows that there is no hope for an improvement in its ties with Washington, whether under Trump, Biden, or any other U.S. president. From the perspective of Beijing’s long game vis-à-vis the West, Trump’s return to the White House may well turn out to be in China’s favor, at least in the economic field. Here are five reasons why.
“I think the European Union is a foe, what they do to us in trade.” (Trump in July 2018)
In December 2023, the Financial Times reported that China’s intelligence services had been using Frank Creyelman, a former Belgian senator, as an asset for years. His Chinese handler neatly summarized the relationship’s objective: “Our purpose is to divide the US-European relationship.”
Beijing’s reasoning is simple: Cementing distrust between the United States and the Europe is the best way to prevent the emergence of trans-Atlantic policies detrimental to Chinese interests, such as joint export controls. From that perspective, a second Trump presidency would play into China’s hand. “I think the European Union is a foe, what they do to us in trade,” Trump said in 2018, and there is no indication that he has changed his mind.
If elected, Trump would probably be unable to resist the urge to restart trade wars with Europe—for instance, by making good on his pledge to impose a 10 percent tariff across the board. A trade fight, in turn, would likely halt U.S.-EU cooperation on measures that could hurt Chinese interests. Of course, Trump’s recent promise to impose a minimum 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports would also be painful for Beijing. But in the grand scheme of things, Beijing may assume that paying such a price is worth it if the prize is a schism between the United States and the EU.
“They have sanctions on Russia—let’s see if we can make some good deals with Russia.” (January 2017)
For all the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy, one constant has been his clear inclination to cozy up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was most evident during a U.S.-Russia summit in Finland in 2018, when Trump suggested that he trusted Putin more than his own intelligence services. If his admiration for Putin remains intact, Trump could well decide to lift sanctions on Russia as soon as he enters office, much to the horror of European countries.
Such a situation would not only delight Moscow, but also play into Beijing’s favor. Despite declarations of an unlimited friendship between Russia and China, the reality is that Chinese firms have been cautious in their dealings with Russia. Although Chinese exports to Russia have jumped since 2022, this was from a low base, and there is little evidence so far that Chinese firms are in a rush to invest in Russia.
This is because of worries that Washington could impose secondary sanctions on Moscow, forcing companies around the world to choose between their U.S. and Russian customers. For most Chinese firms, sticking to the U.S. market would be a no-brainer in such a scenario. As a result, Chinese companies have little interest in developing relationships with Russian businesses that they might need to abandon soon. If Trump lifts sanctions on Moscow, this problem would be solved for Chinese firms.
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“China wants to replace [the U.S. dollar] with the yuan, and it was unthinkable with us. Unthinkable. Would never have happened. Now people are thinking about it.” (August 2023)
China has long sought to vaccinate itself from U.S. sanctions, be it through de-dollarization, the creation of alternatives to the Western-controlled SWIFT global banking system, or plans for a digital yuan to settle cross-border payments. However, China can’t achieve this strategy on its own: For its financial structures to displace established Western ones, Beijing’s trading partners need to opt for the non-Western alternative as well. The path to get there will be steep; most firms and banks see no need to ditch SWIFT, which works perfectly well, to try a much smaller Chinese alternative.
A second Trump presidency could change this reasoning. The case of Russian aluminum producer Rusal in 2018 illustrates why: After slapping sanctions on the company without any warning, the Trump administration had to backtrack and lift the sanctions in a rush after realizing that the measures had massive global ripple effects.
The moral of the story was clear: Under Trump, anything can happen—and anyone can fall under sanctions without warning. As a result, many countries would seek to preemptively shield themselves from such measures if Trump were back in the White House. At this stage, the best way to do so is to switch to Beijing’s alternative financial mechanisms. That would be another win for China.
“Why are we having all these people from shithole countries coming here?” (January 2018)
A global battle for influence pits Western economies against China for securing access to the raw materials that will be crucial for the green energy transition, such as cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, and nickel. So far, this battle is mostly taking place in resource-rich emerging economies, such as Bolivia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Indonesia. China is, by far, the uncontested leader in this race, controlling around 50 to 70 percent of the refining of the global lithium supply, for instance.
A second Trump presidency would not help to convince developing economies—which Trump once collectively disparaged as “shithole countries”—to partner with Washington for the supply of critical raw materials. Many mineral-rich states would fear that promises from Trump have little value, as his sudden withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal showed in 2018.
Besides, Trump’s disdain for developing economies, likely curbs on immigration, and incendiary rhetoric about Islam will not exactly break the ice with African, Southeast Asian, or South American leaders. China would rejoice and continue to advance its interests in emerging economies by portraying itself as the adult in the room—a reliable partner that does not mix business and politics.
“The concept of global warming was created by China in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” (November 2012)
Restrictions on exports are a key tool for Washington to implement its China-focused strategy of economic de-risking. These measures target technologies that have dual-use applications, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum technology. So far, clean tech has been spared from U.S. export controls, but a Trump presidency would probably change this. Republicans have made it clear that they would adopt a more hawkish stance on China and seek to apply export controls to a broader range of sectors than the Biden administration did, probably including clean tech, such as renewable energy and battery technology.
Seen from China, U.S. export controls on green goods would be excellent news. In the short- to medium-term, such measures would have little impact on Chinese firms, since they are already world leaders in sectors such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.
In the long term, Chinese businesses could even benefit from such controls. Deprived of the world’s largest markets, U.S. firms would have fewer revenues and be forced to slash research and development budgets. Helped by generous public subsidies, Chinese businesses would be able to double down on research, helping them surpass U.S. firms by developing the next generation of clean tech gear. In addition, a scenario of U.S. clean tech retrenchment would help China influence global standards for future clean tech goods, culminating in an all-around win for Beijing.
At a 2016 campaign rally, Trump boasted, “I love China.” Regardless of whether this is true or not, Beijing likely thinks better of a second Trump presidency than one could expect at first glance. In key economic areas, such as trade, sanctions, financial infrastructure, access to critical raw materials, and export controls, a Trump 2.0 scenario could well play into China’s long-term interests.
There are, of course, other areas to consider beyond economics. But Trump’s recent statement that he is not too keen to defend Taiwan—another crucial issue for China—will also please Beijing. Seen from China, a Trump win in November could very well look like a tempting opportunity to benefit from the chaos, the divisions, and the hit to U.S. prestige that it would unleash.
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