China’s recently announced GDP target for 2024 remains unchanged from last year, at 5 percent. But even if the country hits that number, its economic problems run deep. In January, China published economic data for the last quarter of 2023 which put its annual GDP growth rate at 5.2 percent, beating the government target. Yet, to put things in perspective, China’s real GDP growth rate from 2011 to 2019 averaged 7.3 percent while 2001-10 saw average growth of 10.5 percent.
China’s recently announced GDP target for 2024 remains unchanged from last year, at 5 percent. But even if the country hits that number, its economic problems run deep. In January, China published economic data for the last quarter of 2023 which put its annual GDP growth rate at 5.2 percent, beating the government target. Yet, to put things in perspective, China’s real GDP growth rate from 2011 to 2019 averaged 7.3 percent while 2001-10 saw average growth of 10.5 percent.
After the figures dipped in 2020 to 2.2 percent owing to COVID-19, expectations for post-pandemic recovery were high. This was rooted in the assumption that China lifting its dynamic zero-COVID policy in January 2023 would unlock pent-up demand in the economy, which remained suppressed during the two-year-long lockdown. But that hasn’t happened. Some observers even doubt the recently released GDP data’s authenticity and suspect the numbers are far below the official figures.
But even if the figures are accurate, the wider trends of the Chinese economy suggest a worrying state of affairs. To begin with, this was the first time since 2010 that China’s real GDP growth rate exceeded its nominal GDP growth rate (4.8 percent). The nominal growth rate is calculated on the previous year’s numbers without accounting for inflation. Discounting inflation is necessary to remove any distortion arising from a mere increase in the prices of goods and services. Thus, the real GDP figure is calculated after adjusting for inflation to reflect the increase in output of goods and services. This is also the number economists and governments refer to when stating GDP growth numbers.
Usually, the nominal growth rate should be higher than the real growth rate. But in a deflationary year, the real growth rate can give a distorted picture, because deflation or negative inflation amplifies the real numbers. Thus, the fact that China’s real GDP number exceeded its nominal number indicates that Beijing’s gross value of output in real terms was amplified thanks to negative inflation, i.e. a general decrease in the prices of goods and services. If not for deflation, China’s real GDP growth in 2023 would have been even lower and would have certainly missed the national target of 5 percent.
The news on China’s gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) isn’t encouraging either. The term refers to the acquisition of fixed assets such as land and machines or equipment intended for production of goods and services. It is one of the four components of GDP (besides exports, household consumption, and government expenditure) and a measure of investment in the economy. For decades, China relied on a high GFCF rate to power its economy, but it has witnessed a sustained decline under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. For reference, the GFCF growth rate in the last 9 years (2014-22) averaged 6.7 percent as compared to 13 percent in the 21 years before that (1994-2014). It hit over 10 percent only on four occasions in the last nine years, once in 2021 thanks only to a significantly low base due to the pandemic year.
The bulk of this investment came from the real estate sector, which constituted a quarter of China’s total investments in fixed assets. Between 1994 and 2014, the sector witnessed a year-on-year growth rate of around 30 percent. But in the last eight years, the property sector has witnessed average growth of only 4.2 percent—and shrank by 10 percent from 2021 to 2022.
In part, the drop in investment can be attributed to the conscious decision of the central leadership under Xi to deflate the property bubble, which had become unsustainable, and reallocate and redirect capital from speculative to more productive forces. The decelerating impact this decision has had on China’s GDP has forced leadership to reverse its policies to some degree, trying to prop up the bubble. But the forced deflation is now proving too resistant to change, as is evident from the 2023 numbers that suggest the real estate sector shrunk by 9.6 percent.
But that’s not the only reason for the drop in investment. In the past year, China’s economy has witnessed an increasing securitization of its development. On numerous occasions, including at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 and the Two Sessions in 2023, Xi has underlined that the idea of development cannot be isolated from that of security. In a meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s National Security Commission last year, Xi reiterated the need to “push for a deep integration of development and security.”
Consequently, in the first half of 2023, Chinese authorities carried out a series of crackdowns on foreign and domestic consultancy companies that offered consultancy services to help overseas businesses navigate China’s challenging regulatory environment. The infamous instances included raids on U.S. companies Mintz in March and Bain & Company in April. In May, Shanghai-based consultancy Capvison saw its offices raided for stealing state secrets and transferring sensitive information to its foreign clients. Weeks later, China’s Cyberspace Administration announced that U.S. chip giant Micron failed to obtain security clearance for its products.
This need to put security over the economy further became apparent in China’s revision of its counter-espionage law, which came into effect in July 2023. The updated law not only broadens and dilutes the definition of espionage but also confers wide-ranging powers on local authorities to seize data and electronic equipment on account of suspicion. China’s new developmental security approach, which manifested in its crackdown on foreign and domestic consultancies alike, has spooked private investors since then.
The government has issued repeated assurances to both domestic and foreign investors to improve the business environment and spur investment. However, investment in fixed assets by private holding companies has been declining since 2018. It briefly rebounded in 2021, only to drop again in 2022. The data for 2023, although not yet updated, is unlikely to pick up.
In contrast, investment by the state has gone up to compensate for the decline in private investment. But this can’t be a substitute in the long run for two reasons. First, rising government debt at a time when private investment is declining can lead to crowding out of capital, thereby shrinking the resource pool for private businesses. And second, the government has already stretched itself as its debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 55.9 percent in 2023. Given the mounting debt situation, there exists very little room for the government to even sustain, let alone expand, its current expenditure.
The data on China’s net exports suggests their contribution to GDP, although steadily picking up since recording a low in 2018, is unlikely to return to the glory years of 2001-14. While China will continue to be a leading export nation, the contribution of net exports to its growth rate might not be high. Poor external demand also means that export-oriented investments will see a decline, thereby pulling the overall investment rates further down albeit with a lag.
China’s strategy in the wake of this situation has been to seek to boost domestic consumption and household spending. Yet for domestic consumption to emerge as a new engine of growth requires not only sustaining its previous momentum but also increasing its share as a percentage of GDP to compensate for the loss of growth due to falling investment (in property and export-oriented sectors) rate.
However, a look at China’s household consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP suggests that it has remained significantly low compared to other consumption-driven advanced and emerging economies. For instance, in both the United States and India, household consumption makes up more than 55 percent of GDP. In contrast, China’s household consumption has historically hovered around 40 percent—and dropped to 37 percent in 2022.
To add to the misery, the growth of China’s household consumption expenditure is also declining in the wake of a pandemic that left the public deeply insecure about their financial future. For ten years (2010-19), growth remained stable at around 10 percent before the pandemic forced the household consumption growth rate to drop to zero in 2020. After recording an uptick in 2021from that low, the growth rate dropped again in 2022. The negative difference between the nominal and real GDP in 2023, indicative of deflation, further confirmed the sluggish demand in the economy.
Thus, domestic consumption seems unlikely to be able to fuel China’s growth. The rising unemployment rate, declining consumer confidence, aging population, and rising dependence ratio will further burden any attempt to raise China’s consumption.
These trends may be baked in the near to medium term. China will not see a return to the high growth rates witnessed in 1980-2010 and will instead stabilize near 4 percent. This will likely derail China’s plan to transition from a middle- to a high-income country and certainly dent Xi’s dream of transforming China into an advanced socialist country. The much-dreaded fear of the “middle-income trap” is real for China.
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