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The United States launched military strikes on Iranian-backed militants in both Syria and Iraq on Friday in retaliation for the killing of three U.S. service members in Jordan earlier this week. The attacks, which appear to mark the largest and most direct U.S. involvement in the post-Oct. 7 Middle East hostilities, seem intended to punish the groups and deter them from conducting future attacks, while sending a tough message to Iran.
The United States launched military strikes on Iranian-backed militants in both Syria and Iraq on Friday in retaliation for the killing of three U.S. service members in Jordan earlier this week. The attacks, which appear to mark the largest and most direct U.S. involvement in the post-Oct. 7 Middle East hostilities, seem intended to punish the groups and deter them from conducting future attacks, while sending a tough message to Iran.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said in a statement that more than 85 targets were hit in the assault, and White House National Security Council coordinator John Kirby said there would be more attacks coming.
“The facilities that were struck included command and control operations, centers, intelligence centers, rockets, and missiles, and unmanned aired vehicle storages, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities of militia groups and their IRGC sponsors who facilitated attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces,” the CENTCOM statement said.
The attack on U.S. forces in Jordan on Jan. 28 was likely carried out by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi militant group that has repeatedly targeted U.S. forces in the region. Although it stood out because of the U.S. casualty toll—dozens were wounded in addition to the three fatalities—it is part of a broad, if low-level, war Iranian proxies are waging on U.S. forces and Israel.
In Iraq and Syria, Iranian-backed groups have struck at U.S. forces over 150 times since President Joe Biden took office, mostly attacks that killed no one and injured few, while Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah are engaged in near-constant attacks against each other. Yemen’s Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on Israel and on international shipping in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade. Iran seeks to use such attacks to increase the price of the U.S. presence in the Middle East, ideally driving it out of the region altogether, and to position itself as the leader of an anti-U.S., anti-Israel “axis of resistance.”
With the strikes on Iraq and Syria, the Biden administration is trying to walk a fine line. On the one hand, it seeks to end the attacks, showing both Iran and its proxies that there is a price to be paid for killing U.S. service members and degrading their capabilities to do more attacks in the future. In addition, Biden seeks to reassure Americans that he will not stand idly by in the face of foreign aggression. On the other hand, the administration wants to avoid escalation that could lead to an all-out war in the Middle East. Maintaining this balance will be difficult due to fraught regional politics and the difficulty of using military force in a calibrated way against either Iran or its proxies.
Before the latest strikes, the United States conducted limited attacks on Iranian proxies and their military assets but avoided striking Iran itself. In Iraq, the United States has killed militant leaders responsible for attacking U.S. forces, and against the Houthis, the United States has bombed targets, including drones and a ground control center.
It is difficult, however, to deter Iran solely by going after its proxies. Part of why Iran works with militant groups in the first place is to gain at least token deniability, allowing it to claim (and its enemies to pretend to believe) that it is not responsible for any attacks. In reality, Iran exercises control over some proxies and has considerable influence with others. For Kataib Hezbollah, for example, an Iranian official sits on its leadership council, and the group has heeded Iran’s wishes about cease-fires in the past. The Houthis are less under Iran’s control, but Iran arms, trains, and funds them, giving Tehran considerable clout. Thus, Iran is able to fight to the last Iraqi or last Yemeni without risking its own forces.
In addition to heeding Iran’s wishes, the proxies themselves have their own interests. The proxies have a genuine hatred of the United States and of Israel, and they see themselves as heroic fighters for the faith.
The attacks are also good politics for the militant groups. Kataib Hezbollah, for example, has contrasted its own attacks with what it mocks as the passivity of rival groups, boosting its prestige in the highly competitive militant politics community in Iraq. For Iran, support for these groups is a way of highlighting its willingness to defend fellow Muslims from what it, and much of the region, sees as a U.S.-Israeli campaign of slaughter against the Palestinians. This stands in contrast to Iran’s rivals like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have cooperated with Israel and partner with the United States, continuing this in spite of the Gaza war.
For some proxies, especially the Houthis, there is not much to destroy, limiting U.S. coercive leverage. Yemen has suffered a brutal civil war for nearly a decade, devastating its already-limited infrastructure and leading to the death of more than 100,000 Yemenis. A few more killed in a conflict with the United States is a drop in that massive bucket, and Iran will happily replenish equipment lost in the fight with the United States.
Targeting Iran directly, however, risks a greater Iranian response, which could create an escalatory cycle. Iran has politics, too—it is hard for the Iranian regime to suffer a military attack and simply do nothing in response. Tehran has warned in advance that it would respond to a U.S. attack.
The proxies might also step up their anti-U.S. attacks, and the U.S. response might further alienate public opinion in the proxy’s home countries. Iraqi groups, for example, have largely avoided attacking the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, though they could easily do so. The Iraqi government will also face more pressure to expel the U.S. military presence. Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah have limited their attacks on Israel, seeking to show solidarity with Hamas but avoiding striking deep in Israel or otherwise using even a fraction of the group’s massive military strength. Hezbollah does not want Israel to devastate Lebanon as it has Gaza, but pressure from Iran could change its calculations.
Despite these pressures, Iran and many proxies may seek to avoid a larger war and responses to token strikes. After its strike in Jordan, Kataib Hezbollah took the rare step of declaring it would suspend attacks, a decision apparently approved by Tehran. Tehran knows that its military has no chance of winning a fight against the United States directly. In addition, the regime is unpopular, with widespread protests against its despotic rule in the recent past. A war might rally support, but it is also risky, especially if Tehran is seen as losing. When the United States killed Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force, a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that heads Iran’s support for terrorist and insurgent groups around the world, in 2020, Iran limited its immediate response to missile attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, and even these were telegraphed in advance to enable U.S. forces to take defensive positions.
Even as strikes appeared inevitable, both sides seemed to be guarding against escalation. Iran claimed, dubiously, that it had no link to the attack on U.S. forces in Jordan. The United States, for its part, has telegraphed the current strikes for days in advance, allowing Iran and leaders of key groups to redeploy personnel and seek shelter, thus limiting their casualties.
In the end, the U.S. strikes are not likely to move the regional needle significantly. The limited scale of targets the U.S. hits, even if continued for several days, will not inflict the massive pain on Iran that would change Tehran’s calculus, nor does it create a strong political need for Iran to step up retaliation. At best, Tehran and some of its proxies may be more cautious about their future attacks, though they are not likely to end them completely while they can still squeeze political and strategic advantages from a continued confrontation.
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