On Friday, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, gave his first public address since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel. As expected, Nasrallah praised the attack, excoriated Israel in general and for its operations in Gaza, and blamed the United States for the war due to its support for Israel. However, he was also careful to avoid committing Hezbollah to any escalation or otherwise widening the low-level war that his group is fighting against Israel.
On Friday, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, gave his first public address since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel. As expected, Nasrallah praised the attack, excoriated Israel in general and for its operations in Gaza, and blamed the United States for the war due to its support for Israel. However, he was also careful to avoid committing Hezbollah to any escalation or otherwise widening the low-level war that his group is fighting against Israel.
Nasrallah repeated common themes in his remarks, scorning Hezbollah’s enemies and praising its and Iran’s friends. He mocked the supposedly invincible Israeli army and Israel’s need for U.S. support while reiterating his long-standing argument that Israel is really a frail “spider’s web” that can be swept away with effective “resistance.”
He also nodded toward Iran and its broader network of clients in the Middle East. Referencing the recent attacks against U.S. forces by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria as well as the missiles and drones that Iran’s proxies in Yemen, the Houthis, have launched toward Israel in the last several days, Nasrallah praised the “strong and brave Iraqi and Yemeni hands who are now involved in this holy war.” And he declared that the Hamas operation would have “strategic and existential repercussions” for Israel.
Nasrallah’s remarks have been eagerly awaited. Since the Hamas attack, violence between Israel and Hezbollah has increased, with the latter firing rockets and anti-tank missiles into Israel and Israel responding by striking Hezbollah targets, killing 55 of its fighters so far. Hezbollah has also used explosive drones for the first time in its fight with Israel. U.S. officials have warned Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor to stay out of the conflict. Should Hezbollah decide to engage in all-out war, it would be a dramatic escalation: Hezbollah’s 100,000-plus rocket arsenal dwarfs that of Hamas, and its fighters are well-trained and battle-hardened.
Nasrallah and Hezbollah are trying to walk a fine line between demonstrating their resistance credentials and avoiding a full-scale war with Israel. They may succeed, with only limited violence resulting, but the potential for a more massive conflict remains.
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Tehran’s relationship to the conflict is not nearly as straightforward as its rhetoric suggests.
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As Israel shifts from an air-only approach to one involving its ground forces in Gaza, it will face new challenges and dilemmas.
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The militant group must consider domestic Lebanese politics as well as relations with its patrons in Iran.
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On the surface, it may appear that Hezbollah wants to go to war with Israel. It remains uncompromisingly hostile, seeing Israel as an illegitimate, Western-imposed occupier of Muslim land. Hezbollah has also worked closely with Hamas, helping to train the Palestinian group and perhaps even helping it to prepare for the Oct. 7 attack.
Both groups are also close to Iran, which rejects Israel on ideological grounds and believes that it is waging a low-level war against the Iranian regime by assassinating its nuclear scientists and military officers and trying to isolate Tehran regionally. Iran provides Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars every year as well as arms and training; Tehran also funds, arms, and trains Hamas, though to a lesser degree.
Tehran benefits from the current unrest. The Hamas attack and the overwhelming Israeli response disrupted progress toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, which was directed against a shared Iranian threat. The assault on Gaza has also made it harder for Israel’s friends in the region, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, to cooperate with it.
More broadly, the war is helping Iran to repair its reputation in the Arab world, which suffered when Tehran backed its longtime ally, Bashar al-Assad, in Syria’s civil war. There, Iran and the Assad regime primarily fought Sunni Muslims, thus exacerbating sectarian tension between Sunnis and the Shiite Muslim regime in Iran. By refocusing the Arab world on Israel, Iran is helping to restore its resistance credentials and get back into good standing in Arab public opinion.
Yet Hezbollah has many reasons for restraint. Israel has long made it clear that Lebanon would pay a high price for any major Hezbollah attack, and the devastation Israel is currently raining down on Gaza makes that threat even more credible. In the latest crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened strikes of “unimaginable” scope and scale against Lebanon should Hezbollah escalate. The country has long suffered an economic crisis, and ordinary Lebanese are not eager for a conflict that would create further misery.
Hezbollah itself would probably be hit hard. The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, while showcasing Hezbollah’s impressive fighting capabilities, also led to the deaths of several hundred fighters. Hezbollah lost far more when it intervened in Syria’s civil war on Assad’s behalf, taking more than 1,000 deaths. Nasrallah and other leaders may claim to love martyrdom, but their supporters are leery of yet another bloody conflict.
Indeed, Iran itself may be a source of caution. Hamas has already hit Israel hard and forced a new anti-U.S. and anti-Israel discourse on the region, so it’s unclear how much Iran would gain from worsening the conflict at this point. Hezbollah is an important asset for Tehran, and it does not want the group to become weaker, as would likely happen should Israel focus its military power in that direction. Moreover, the United States has threatened Iran directly if it becomes involved in the conflict, and Tehran is not eager for a direct confrontation with U.S. forces.
Nasrallah’s praise for the “absolute secrecy” of Hamas’s Oct. 7 operation has multiple purposes. On the one hand, it is a way of lauding Hamas and giving it credit for hitting Israel. At the same time, it implicitly distances Hezbollah from the attack: By claiming ignorance of the specifics of Hamas’s operation, Hezbollah can claim that it bears no responsibility and thus should not be punished for it by Israel or the United States.
Miscalculation is a major danger, though. The current tit-for-tat across the Israel-Lebanon border could easily escalate if a Hezbollah rocket causes significant civilian deaths in Israel or if an Israeli attempt to deter Hezbollah is interpreted as an all-out attack. Indeed, the 2006 war appears to have stemmed largely from miscalculation, when a successful Hezbollah raid led to a 34-day war.
The United States has an important role to play in keeping the conflict limited. Both private and public threats to Iran, backed up by enhanced U.S. military capabilities in the region, will make Tehran more reluctant to stir the pot and lead it to try to rein in Hezbollah. Similarly, U.S. efforts to press Israel not to expand the war should also be continued.
None of this guarantees stability, but there remains hope that the Israel-Hamas war will not escalate into a broader conflict.
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