On March 2, she was gone. The Belize-flagged, British-owned bulk carrier Rubymar sank in the narrow water lane between the coasts of Yemen and Eritrea. The Rubymar was the first vessel that has been completely lost since the Houthis began their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea—and its demise, with 21,000 metric tons of ammonium phosphate sulfate fertilizer, spells ecological disaster. A similar substance—ammonium nitrate—caused the devastating explosion at the Port of Beirut in 2020. It had been stored there after being abandoned on a vessel and authorities intervened to prevent an environmental disaster.
On March 2, she was gone. The Belize-flagged, British-owned bulk carrier Rubymar sank in the narrow water lane between the coasts of Yemen and Eritrea. The Rubymar was the first vessel that has been completely lost since the Houthis began their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea—and its demise, with 21,000 metric tons of ammonium phosphate sulfate fertilizer, spells ecological disaster. A similar substance—ammonium nitrate—caused the devastating explosion at the Port of Beirut in 2020. It had been stored there after being abandoned on a vessel and authorities intervened to prevent an environmental disaster.
Because the Houthis have no regard for the environment, there are likely to be more such disasters. Indeed, groups set on destruction could also decide to attack the carbon storage facilities now beginning to be built underneath the seabed.
For two weeks after being struck by a Houthi missile in the Red Sea, the Rubymar clung to life despite listing badly. The damage caused by the missile, though, was too severe. At 2:15 a.m. local time, the Rubymar disappeared into the depths of the Red Sea. The crew had already been rescued by another merchant vessel that had come to the Rubymar’s aid, but there was no way anyone could remove its toxic cargo.
The ship’s owner had tried to get it towed to the Port of Aden—where Yemen’s internationally recognized government is based—and to Djibouti and Saudi Arabia, but citing the environmental risk posed by the ammonium phosphate sulfate, all three nations refused to receive it.
Now enormous quantities of a hazardous substance are about to spread into the Red Sea. IGAD, a trade bloc comprising countries in the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa, points out that the Rubymar’s fertilizer cargo and leaking fuel “could devastate marine life and destroy coral reefs, sea life and jeopardize hundreds of thousands of jobs in the fishing industry as well as cut littoral states off from supplies of food and fuel.”
Not even shipping’s option of last resort, salvage companies, seems available. “The salvage companies that normally recover vessels are reluctant to go in,” said Cormac Mc Garry, a maritime expert with intelligence firm Control Risks. That’s because salvage ships and crews, too, risk being targeted by Houthi missiles. “If a salvage company knows it’s likely to be targeted, it will hesitate to take on the task. It has a duty of care for its crew,” said Svein Ringbakken, the managing director of the Norway-based maritime insurance company DNK.
It was only a matter of time before a Houthi missile brought down one of the many tankers and bulk carriers that still traverse the Red Sea every day. (In the first two months of this year, traffic through the Red Sea was down by 50 percent compared to the same period last year.) “The Houthis have no regard for life and even less for the environment,” Ringbakken said. “They shoot missiles at ships even though they know that there are humans and hazardous cargo on them.”
For years, the Houthis allowed an oil supertanker ironically named Safer that was moored off the coast of Yemen to rust away even though she was holding more than 1 million barrels of crude oil. By the beginning of last year, the Safer was close to disintegration: an event that would have cost hundreds of thousands of Yemenis their livelihoods because it would have killed enormous quantities of fish. Indeed, had the Safer’s oil leaked, it would even have forced the Houthi-controlled ports of Hudaydah and Saleef to close, thus preventing ordinary Yemenis from receiving food and other necessities.
It would, of course, also have caused permanent damage to all manner of marine life, including coral reefs and mangroves, in the Red Sea. Then the United Nations pulled off an almost impossible feat: It got Yemen’s warring factions, international agencies, and companies to work together to transfer the oil off the Safer. Disaster was averted. “It was a massive undertaking,” Ringbakken noted. “But for years and years and years, the Houthis were adding impediments against this undertaking, even though the Safer was sitting just off the Yemeni coast.”
Indeed, maritime terrorism itself is not new. “Besides guerrillas and terrorists, attacks have been carried out by modern day pirates, ordinary criminals, fanatic environmentalists, mutinous crews, hostile workers, and foreign agents. The spectrum of actions is equally broad: ships hijacked, destroyed by mines and bombs, attacks with bazookas, sunk under mysterious circumstances; cargos removed; crews taken hostage; extortion plots against ocean liners and offshore platforms; raids on port facilities; attempts to board oil rigs; sabotage at shipyards and terminal facilities; even a plot to steal a nuclear submarine,” researchers at RAND summarized—in 1983.
Now, though, the Houthis have upped the nihilism, and unlike the guerrillas, terrorists, and pirates of the 1980s, they have the weaponry to cause an ocean-going vessel to sink. The joint U.S.-U.K. military operation against the Houthis has failed to deter the Iranian-backed militia’s attacks; indeed, not even air strikes by U.S. and U.K. forces have convinced the Houthis that it’s time to stop. On the contrary, they’re escalating their attacks. They do so because they’re completely unconcerned about loss of life within their ranks or harm to their own waters.
It’s giving them a global platform. That, in turn, is likely to encourage other militias to also attack ships carrying toxic substances—even if it ruins their own waters. The local population is hardly in a position to hold a militia accountable. Indeed, militias interested in maritime terrorism could decide that the world’s growing sea-based infrastructure is an attractive target. And there’s a new form of sea-based infrastructure they could decide to make a preferred target, not just because it’s set for explosive growth but because attacking it would guarantee a global platform: CO2 storage.
With the world having failed to reduce its carbon-dioxide emissions enough to halt climate change, CO2 storage has become an urgent priority. Through this technique, carbon dioxide can be captured and buried underground, typically underneath the ocean. Norway has, for example, begun auctioning out licenses for CO2 storage exploration on its continental shelf. So has Britain. The United States has 15 carbon-storage sites, and another 121 are being developed. Even Big Oil has discovered carbon storage. ExxonMobil is buying offshore blocks to use for carbon storage instead of oil drilling.
Carbon storage sites are, of course, designed to withstand both natural perils and man-made attacks, but that won’t prevent destructive groups—especially ones backed by a powerful state—from trying. And because groups like the Houthis are so unconcerned about all forms of life, it won’t matter to them that releasing concentrated CO2 would cause extreme harm to the planet—including themselves. Even a tiny carbon-storage leakage of 0.1 percent per year can lead to additional CO2 emissions of 25 giga-tonnes, researchers have established.
Until recently, sea-based infrastructure was only lightly guarded, because it was in everyone’s interest that it worked. The sabotage of Nord Stream and various other pipelines and undersea cables over the past two years have demonstrated that such peacefulness can no longer be taken for granted. The new CO2 sites will need not just AI-enhanced monitoring but regular patrolling to communicate to potential attackers that it’s not even worth attempting an attack.
And for now, attacking merchant vessels remains a promising and economical strategy for the Houthis and their ilk. It doesn’t seem to matter that ammonium phosphate sulfate will soon be poisoning Yemeni waters and thus depriving locals of their livelihoods. Indeed, other bulk carriers and tankers may soon join the Rubymar on the bottom of the sea, poisoning the future for even more Yemenis.
For the Houthis, what matters is not the outcome: It’s the attention. That’s what makes them such a vexing problem for the U.S. Navy and other navies, shipowners, maritime insurers, and especially for seafarers. But there is another group that should be just as worried about the rampant insecurity on the high seas: ocean conservationists.
There is, in fact, a woman with an unsurpassed green platform who could make the growing scourge of maritime terrorism her new cause. (Nearly) everyone would thank you, Greta.
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