Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt, did you know it’s Groundhog Day today? And just like Bill Murray in the movie, it seems like the United States is destined to repeat the same story over and over again: in this case, getting sucked into unnecessary Middle Eastern wars.
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt, did you know it’s Groundhog Day today? And just like Bill Murray in the movie, it seems like the United States is destined to repeat the same story over and over again: in this case, getting sucked into unnecessary Middle Eastern wars.
Matt Kroenig: Well, I hope Punxsutawney Phil doesn’t see his shadow today; I am ready for spring (What a strange North American tradition, by the way.). But I think you and I are destined, like Murray, to relive the same day over and over. We have been debating the Middle East a lot since Oct. 7, and that is where we should start today.
There was a tragic attack on a U.S. base in Jordan earlier this week that left three American service personnel dead. What is your take on these events?
EA: It’s appalling, and yet at the same time completely expected. Insurgent groups have used rocket and drone attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria for more than a decade; they’ve really stepped up since the assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani by the Trump administration. So far, they’ve mostly caused minor injuries, but it was really only a matter of time before something penetrated the defenses and killed U.S. troops.
That’s what seems to have happened in this case. The air defense system got confused between a returning U.S. drone and a hostile drone, and the result was three dead service members. Frankly, I blame U.S. policymakers for leaving troops in that position for this long, especially when they’re not doing anything vital to national security.
MK: You tied the origins of these attacks to the killing of Suleimani, but of course there has been a major uptick since Oct. 7, with more than 100 attacks on U.S. forces and bases in Iraq and Syria in recent months.
EA: Yes. The tactic is now regularly used by militants in the region for all kinds of reasons—most recently to signal disapproval with U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza.
MK: OK. Yes. We agree on that. But we disagree on where U.S. foreign policy went wrong. In the past several columns, you and I have debated whether and how Washington should respond to these attacks. You recommended that President Joe Biden respond directly against the Houthis for their attacks on international shipping. I argued that the source of all of these attacks was Iran, and that, in order to restore deterrence, the United States would need to impose costs directly on Tehran to get it to demand that its proxies (in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) cease these attacks.
Biden chose to hit back against the Houthis but avoided hitting back against their sponsor, Iran, because he feared escalation in the region. Unfortunately, as I predicted, this caution only encouraged more aggression and now three Americans are dead and dozens more are injured.
Biden has now announced that he will conduct military action to impose a cost directly on Iran. This is the right move and I am glad to see it, but it should have come in November, not after this tragedy.
The military strikes do nothing to fix the basic problems underlying the violence.
EA: I don’t think that’s what Biden announced. He said that the United States would respond “at a time and in a manner of our choosing.” That’s not the same thing as imposing a cost directly on Iran. So let’s hold our horses and see what the administration actually does. It’s tended to be cautious about escalation in other cases, so I hope it applies that same logic to this situation.
The problem—as you point out above—is that none of this is actually about the United States and Iran. This is all spillover from Israel’s war in Gaza, from the disrupted shipping in the Red Sea to the rocket attacks on U.S. forces. And I struggle to see how escalating to a direct regional war between Washington and Tehran would de-escalate the situation. If anything, what we’ve seen in recent months and years is that these rocket attacks are part of a largely pointless tit-for-tat pattern of strikes. The United States strikes militant groups; these groups fire rockets at U.S. bases. Rinse and repeat.
But the military strikes do nothing to fix the basic problems underlying the violence. The U.S. troop presence in Iraq is wildly unpopular, and it’s entirely possible that they’ll be expelled from the country before too long. Washington continues to train and equip the Iraqi military, which in turn funnels funds and supplies to some of the militias attacking U.S. forces. American troops on these under-defended bases are little more than attractive targets for those with anti-American grievances in the region. And Washington’s unrestricted support for Israel’s war in Gaza is creating a groundswell of regional hatred.
How do military strikes on Iran solve any of that?
MK: I respectfully disagree with everything you just wrote. The “underlying” cause of the violence is not the U.S. presence in Iraq. If that were the case, then the violence would be isolated to Iraq. The underlying cause is that the United States has allowed deterrence against Iran to erode, and Iran is urging its proxies to conduct attacks in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. So, the solution is to restore deterrence.
And while Biden didn’t specifically name his targets, multiple anonymous officials told journalists (this is usually a sign of a deliberate leak) that the targets could be Iranian commanders outside of Iran (similar to a Suleimani strike) and/or Iranian naval vessels at sea.
And even just putting the credible military option on the table worked. Already, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah, the group many think is responsible for the attack on Jordan, has announced that it will cease all attacks on U.S. forces.
It’s simple. A weak America invites aggression. A strong America deters it.
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EA: You know, I expect to hear daft statements like “restore deterrence” in Washington. But I think you know better. You can’t “restore deterrence,” because deterrence is either something that is working or isn’t working. Restoring deterrence is like getting a “little bit pregnant.” It’s definitionally absurd.
In this case, deterrence failed a long time ago. I like how the scholar Sara Bjerg Moller describes it: “[I]f you have to carry through on your coercive threat deterrence by definition has failed.”
So what we’re talking about in this case is compellence, which is a form of coercion. U.S. strikes on Iranian assets are intended to force Iran to control its proxies and stop attacks on U.S. forces. And even putting aside the question of whether Tehran could do that effectively, the one thing we do know is that coercion is always more difficult than deterrence. In this case, Iranian leaders would have to back down, in full view of their own population and the region, at a time when regional tensions are extremely high.
These attacks are fundamentally linked to the conflict in Israel and Gaza. Yes, there have been rocket attacks related to other issues before, but it’s notable that during the brief cease-fire in the Gaza war, the rocket attacks mostly stopped. Instead of more military strikes, we should be trying to stop the fighting in Gaza.
What matters is persuading the adversary (in this case, Iran) that attacking the United States and its allies is not in its interest.
MK: Well, let’s turn to Gaza next. But first—of course you can restore deterrence, and saying you cannot is what is daft. Iran has been conducting attacks on U.S. interests because there were no real consequences. If the United States hits back hard and imposes significant costs on the Islamic Republic, Tehran will recalculate. It will understand that the costs of attacking the United States outweigh the benefits and admonish its proxies to halt future attacks. Deterrence will be restored.
As a bit of an aside, I have always thought Thomas Schelling’s classic statement of the difference between deterrence and compellence worked in theory but not in practice. Schelling explained that deterrence is a military threat to defend the status quo (e.g., don’t attack me), but compellence is a threat to change the status quo (e.g., withdraw your forces from my territory). He argued, sensibly enough in theory, that threatening an ally so it does nothing was more likely to succeed than threatening an ally in an attempt to force it to do something. But this simple distinction almost always breaks down in practice.
Was the Cuban missile crisis, for example, a case of deterrence or compellence? Was the United States defending the status quo by preventing Soviet nuclear deployments in Cuba? Or was it compelling Moscow to remove the missiles that were already there? One could plausibly argue it either way. I think, therefore, that this academic deterrence-compellence debate is mostly a distinction without a difference. What matters is persuading the adversary (in this case, Iran) that attacking the United States and its allies is not in its interest.
EA: I’m always skeptical when folks in D.C. say academic theories aren’t useful in the real world, since it’s usually a precursor to arguing for something we know from research is a bad idea, like regime change. But the compellence-deterrence point is certainly a technical distinction. I just wish it were one that folks in the Pentagon actually understood.
My bigger point here is that military strikes are not only unlikely to work; they’re not even the only way to change Iran’s calculus here. There are other ways to do that, too: another cease-fire in Gaza, or negotiations and concessions on related issues.
Maybe we should talk about Gaza for a minute? Things have gone from bad to worse since the last time we talked, at least for the Palestinian civilians caught on the ground.
MK: Yes, there have been several developments we should discuss. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will take years to reach a final ruling on the case brought by South Africa alleging genocide in Gaza. It interim order found that Israel may or may not be committing genocide. It also demanded that Israel comply with the Genocide Convention (something Israel has committed to doing since 1949) and provide additional evidence about what steps it has taken to comply with the court’s ruling.
I think this case may be more interesting for the broader context and ramifications than for the legal ruling itself. Of course, the U.N. has been stacked against Israel for some time, and this case is no different. I agree with the U.S. government that the entire thing is ridiculous. There is tremendous suffering in Gaza, to be sure, but Israel is clearly not intending to commit genocide.
And maybe a topic for a different column, but why doesn’t South Africa or another brave country bring forward a case to the ICJ against China for its actions in Xinjiang? There you have a country that really is trying to commit genocide.
EA: Probably because power matters and hypocrisy is common in international affairs?
My sense is that this ruling will mostly just highlight how toothless the ICJ is, and how few mechanisms it has to actually enforce its rulings. But it’s certainly a public relations loss for Israel and only adds to the growing sentiment around the world that the Israeli government isn’t doing nearly enough to protect civilians in Gaza.
Then there was the incident this week in a West Bank hospital, where Israeli commandos executed three men in their beds. I’m sure the men were involved with Hamas or some other militant group and equally sure that they deserved justice. But executing them in cold blood in the middle of a hospital—while disguised as medical personnel and civilians!—is pretty appalling. Extrajudicial killings are bad when Russia murders dissidents; they’re bad when the United States uses drone strikes; and they’re bad in this case. The ICJ ruling just adds to the pile of problems for Israel here.
MK: The other big related item we should discuss is the Biden administration’s strategy for Israel and Gaza. As you note, the ICJ ruling puts additional pressure on Israel and America’s support for Israel’s war aims. The Biden administration is taking a ton of heat domestically in a presidential election year—especially from young voters and Muslim Americans. And, for strategic reasons, the United States really would like conflict in the region to wind down so that it can focus on bigger priorities, like China.
There are efforts underway to negotiate at least a temporary cease-fire. And, in a major shift, there are reports that the U.S. and U.K. governments are reviewing options for recognizing a Palestinian state.
How do you think Biden should or will handle these competing demands?
EA: I think Biden should be putting far, far more pressure on the Israeli government to wind down the hostilities. He’s providing weapons and support; that gives him leverage. There are reports that the State Department is considering whether to recognize a Palestinian state. Honestly, that seems like an excellent idea, whether it’s a genuine impulse or whether the administration is simply hoping to use the prospect as leverage over the Israeli government.
Perhaps the biggest problem here is Benjamin Netanyahu, who knows that his role as prime minister may last only as long as the war does. Another is Netanyahu’s allies in the Israeli settler movement, many of whom are openly calling for ethnic cleansing and Israeli settlement in Gaza after the war. But there are also voices in Israel making more reasonable arguments: Defense Minister Yoav Gallant recently presented a proposal for at least some Palestinian autonomy after the war.
The United States should be doing everything it can to bolster the voices looking for peace and for postwar solutions, not the more extreme voices in Israel.
MK: I see these as two separate issues. There is the military strategy and the postwar strategy. Of course, as Gen. Carl von Clausewitz taught us, they are linked. But Netanyahu’s military objective of eliminating Hamas is the right one. The United States has been inconsistent, first saying it would support Israel in this goal and now trying to pressure Israel into a temporary cease-fire. Strong-arming Israel to a pause in fighting that leaves Hamas in control of Gaza is a mistake.
The United States should use its leverage and resources to help Israel and the international community devise a plan for a secure post-Hamas Gaza. Though I know that is easier said than done.
EA: Yes, they should. But there won’t be a secure postwar Gaza if the entire region slides into a U.S.-Iran war. So keeping a lid on broader conflict is essential. I worry that the Biden administration is already committed to escalating against Iran in ways that will make this a regional—not a localized—war.
But if I had one wish, it would probably be that next time we could debate something other than the Middle East. This column is starting to feel a bit like Groundhog Day, too!
MK: In the film, Murray finally breaks the loop by basically becoming a good human being. Let’s be on our best behavior for the coming weeks, and maybe we, too, will be rewarded—with a different international crisis to discuss.
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