Matt Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I usually like turning to you for insights on President Vladimir Putin and Russia, but your insights may be dated. Unlike Tucker Carlson, you haven’t spent hours chatting with the dictator lately.
Matt Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I usually like turning to you for insights on President Vladimir Putin and Russia, but your insights may be dated. Unlike Tucker Carlson, you haven’t spent hours chatting with the dictator lately.
Emma Ashford: Having seen most of that interview, I’m mostly grateful for the fast-forward button. He usually doesn’t let his guests talk much, but I guess he was intimidated by Putin this time. Tucker spent hours being lectured about medieval Russian history and other irrelevant issues. Putin came across as a smug, spoiled leader who never gets told that he’s wrong by anyone.
But the fact that Carlson went to Moscow to do that interview—and the fact that the Kremlin was willing to grant it—says a lot about the state of the Ukraine debate in America at this point: growing disenchantment among grassroots Republicans and growing partisan rancor on the question of future funding.
Did you glean any insights from Putin’s pontificating?
MK: Well, you are right that the debate on Ukraine strategy is at an inflection point, and I think that would be a good topic for the rest of the column.
But starting on the Carlson interview, I had several takeaways. First, I thought it was genuinely enlightening to hear Putin’s view of the world. Even if you disagree, it provided a window into his mindset. He seemed to genuinely believe, for example, that he was right to detain Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, because his investigative reporting turned up information that Putin considered classified.
Second, I found it humorous, but also a bit uncomfortable, as Putin occasionally insulted someone who was trying to do his reputation such a huge favor. Did you catch the bit when he said it is understandable that Carlson wasn’t accepted into the CIA as a young man because it is a “serious organization”?
Third, and most importantly, it further revealed that Putin’s reason for invading Ukraine wasn’t about recent history, mistakes America made, etc., but about ancient (or at least medieval) history. Putin is intent on resurrecting the Russian Empire, and the West is right, in my view, to defend the more civilized European order in place today. (I enjoyed the tweet from the former Mongolian president, joking that if current borders should be based on medieval maps, then Ulaanbaatar has some boundaries it would like to adjust.)
Your thoughts?
EA: We’re absolutely not getting into a discussion of which people lived where in ancient times. You promised me we wouldn’t have to talk about the Middle East for at least one column! But I would like to place my ancient Scottish claim to most of Roman Britain. I hear Cumbria is nice in the spring.
The interview was certainly worth watching. And it’s always amusing to watch Carlson getting mocked. But in all seriousness, Putin did himself no favors here. It’s a sign of how out of touch he and his regime are that he took an ideal opportunity to reach out to disaffected GOP voters in the United States and convince them that support for Ukraine is a waste and instead turned it into a restatement of all of his pet peeves and historical minutiae.
This continues a general trend with Russia in recent years: Its election interference and meddling in Western societies would probably be more effective if it actually bothered to learn more. I’ll give you an example: The Russians have been trying to boost the “Texit” campaign, a few crazy people who want Texas to secede from the United States. I’m pretty sure that’s not going to work. We can at least count ourselves lucky that they’re just really bad at understanding how to appeal to Americans.
It’s also more evidence that the disaffection about Ukraine aid in the United States really isn’t a Russian plot, as some pundits are starting to claim. It’s about broad-based unhappiness about the amount of money that’s being sent over there, the question of why European states aren’t contributing more, and why the Biden administration appears to have no endgame for resolving the conflict.
These are all objections that were raised by Senate Republicans during the debate on the supplemental Ukraine aid bill, and former U.S. President Donald Trump has started calling for aid to be provided only if it is a loan to be paid back.
MK: Speaking of the endgame, let’s talk about Ukraine strategy. We had dueling pieces (here and here) on this topic in recent weeks. We both argue for a shift to defense, but, unlike you, my co-author, former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and I argue for new measures to pressure Putin and anchor Ukraine in the West.
We largely agree that Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive was less successful than many had hoped, and it is unlikely that future counteroffensives will be any more successful in the near term. We also agreed that Kyiv should, therefore, shift to more of a defensive strategy, including with enhanced air and missile defense, to protect the territory it already controls and prevent future Russian land grabs.
But we disagree on what the other elements of an adapted Ukraine strategy should look like. Hadley and I argue that in addition to shifting to defense, Kyiv should pressure Putin by conducting strikes and special operations attacks against Russian forces, bases, and supply lines in Crimea and supply lines in western Russia and that the United States and Western supporters should provide the longer-range weapons with larger payloads without restrictions in order to conduct those strikes.
We also argue that aid should increasingly focus on incentivizing joint ventures between Western defense firms and Kyiv to help Ukraine strengthen its indigenous defense-industrial base and make it less dependent on foreign aid.
Finally, we argue that this could bring down the violence at the line of contact between the opposing forces and help to pave the way for a path to the EU and NATO for Ukraine, even as Russian occupation of parts of the country continue. Ukraine and the West should recognize all of Ukrainian territory and pursue efforts to reclaim it through negotiation.
We think that this is a pretty good strategy that could wind down the war and result in an independent Ukraine within internationally recognized borders, anchored in the West, and capable of defending itself.
EA: Matt, it sounds like you’re saying that Ukraine may not be able to reclaim the entirety of its territory by force. Protecting the territory it already controls and seeking to stabilize the conflict is the position I’ve been taking for 18 months now. That’s a pretty big shift for you! Would you like to admit I’m right publicly?
MK: No. You were wrong and I was right. As I have argued, the best strategy at the start of the war would have been to define a clear end state of Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat, and give Kyiv everything it needed to win war decisively. If the West had followed that strategy, the war would be over by now and Ukraine would be in full possession of its internationally-recognized territory.
Instead, fearing Russian “escalation,” the West dithered and was cautious and indecisive in its approach to arming Ukraine. They lost valuable time and, now, after two years, the Russian invaders are dug in. Historians will look back on this period as a huge missed opportunity.
Given where we are now, therefore, it is time to shift approach. And, correct me if I am wrong, but the strategy Hadley and I lay out is still much more muscular than what you recommend and still retains the goal of Ukraine joining NATO and reclaiming all of its lost territory.
Even if the administration does manage to scrounge up some extra aid, stockpiles of everything from ammunition to long-range strike systems are running low.
EA: The pace of arming Ukraine was very reasonable given the risks of potential escalation and the available supplies at the time. It wouldn’t have been realistic to do massively more.
And yes –your strategy would differ from mine in that it still has Ukraine engaging in a strike campaign and other expensive and challenging offensive operations. I can’t see how that succeeds now, especially since it’s completely divorced from fiscal and supply-related realities. The White House is out of money to send new weapons to Ukraine.
The supplemental for an additional $60 billion might have passed the Senate, but the speaker of the House probably isn’t going to bring it up for a vote. Even if the administration does manage to scrounge up some extra aid, stockpiles of everything from ammunition to long-range strike systems are running low. There’s literally not enough to send in the quantities you’re talking about, and every additional missile that Washington sends to Ukraine (or to the Middle East) takes away supplies from other areas like Asia.
That’s why I continue to think that a purely defensive strategy in Ukraine is about the best that can be achieved. Defense is a lot cheaper, relies on plentiful supplies like mines, doesn’t require lots of advanced systems, and even European states can provide money and civilian equipment that’s useful for creating static defenses like trenches or dragon’s teeth.
I mean, even a defensive campaign is going to struggle to procure the needed supplies of anti-air capabilities or artillery ammunition; Ukraine is going to have to make some difficult choices about what to protect in coming months. So where are you going to get the supplies for the deep-strike campaign you’re proposing?
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MK: The U.K. and France are already providing the Storm Shadow/SCALP missile. And we argue that Germany should provide the Taurus missile and the United States should send the longer-range unitary warhead ATACMS.
You are right that there are real political challenges to getting the aid through Congress. But the $60 billion package you just mentioned was passed by the Senate. House Speaker Mike Johnson has previously voiced support for arming Ukraine but faces a difficult political balancing act and wants to rewrite the legislation to include provisions for border security. Moreover, the European Union recently announced a new $54 billion aid package to Ukraine.
So, yes, there are challenges, but I suspect the Western effort to contain Russia in Ukraine will continue—for now.
It’s always been utterly ridiculous that the United States was contributing more to Ukraine than its closest neighbors.
EA: Maybe. But Johnson just lost another seat from his majority with the election of a Democrat in George Santos’s old seat, and if he goes against the will of too many of his members, he’ll likely lose the speakership, just like Kevin McCarthy did. I’m no domestic politics wonk, but I heard he can only lose two or three folks before he’ll have problems. So I’m not sure this will come to the floor, at least not in this form.
I think the odds are better if the administration were to try to negotiate or reduce its ask. Right now, the White House’s entire strategy appears to be yelling at those who oppose the supplemental, whether that’s progressives on Israel or conservatives on Ukraine. That may make for good political theater—and good attack ads—but it’s not actually going to move the needle.
If anything, it will probably make folks in Congress dig in their heels more. Senator J.D. Vance, who’s one of the bill’s most ardent opponents, was not wrong when he asked the White House “to articulate what the ambition is, what is $61 billion going to accomplish that $100 billion hasn’t.” It hasn’t done that!
And European elites aren’t helping. Even Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham took to the Senate floor to complain about rude tweets from Polish leaders calling the GOP un-American. If you’ve lost Graham on defense spending, then you probably need to rethink your strategy.
A better approach might be to try to find a lower ask: a smaller amount of funding, funding tied to certain approaches to ending the conflict or to European contribution levels, or funding that prevents its use on certain key military systems for the Indo-Pacific. Any of these might help to assuage concerns in Congress and would keep a lower level of aid flowing to Ukraine—ensuring it doesn’t lose—while addressing the very real concern that the war in Ukraine is just turning into another forever conflict the United States is backing with no real strategy.
MK: Republicans in Congress have continually referenced the lack of a strategy, and I do think the Biden administration has a simple solution to that problem. You and I have just laid out coherent strategies; it should adopt one of our proposals!
And you mention tying funding to European contribution levels, but, as you know, after a slower start, European giving to Ukraine is now actually outstripping that provided by the United States.
EA: It’s good to see European states stepping up with spending increases; this is first and foremost a European conflict and about European interests. It’s always been utterly ridiculous that the United States was contributing more to Ukraine than its closest neighbors.
Don’t be fooled by some of the charts that are out there showing that European states are now giving more than the United States. Those are comparing apples and oranges: future European commitments against existing U.S. ones. If things continue as they are, then Europeans will indeed end up contributing more, and that is great. But it remains to be seen if we’ll get there. The Germans have had serious trouble meeting their post-Ukraine budgetary commitments to defense, for example.
MK: So, given your focus on Europe doing its fair share, I guess this means you fully endorse Trump’s statement this week about NATO allies failing to meet their burden-sharing pledges. For those who somehow missed it, he said: “You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent? No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay. You gotta pay your bills.”
EA: Well, I wouldn’t endorse that because I’m not a Mafia don trying to shake down some poor business owner for protection money. That’s what he’s saying, right? That if European states don’t pay up, he’ll let Russia invade them? It’s gross, unpresidential—and entirely in keeping with Trump’s personality and history.
But there’s a reason that these remarks are also popular. European states have been free-riding on U.S. protection for decades. They cut way back on defense spending after the Cold War and only recently started to increase again. Even those spending increases don’t necessarily mean that Europe has the defense capabilities it needs to defend itself. I think a lot of voters are fed up paying for rich European states’ defense when there are things we can’t fund here at home; Trump’s remarks resonate with them. I’d like to see a more equal U.S.-Europe defense relationship, and that will take spending increases from Europe.
MK: Trump’s word choice certainly caused a stir, and people close to the campaign have said we shouldn’t take his statement literally. But I agree he does have a point. Allies need to step up. Ten years after their reaffirmation to do so at the 2014 Wales summit, too few NATO allies are meeting their 2 percent of GDP defense spending obligation.
This is not, in my view, only an issue of fairness, but also of successful global strategy. If the free world is going to deter (and, if necessary) defeat China and Russia (and Iran and North Korea) at the same time, then the United States can’t do it on its own. We need Europe’s help.
EA: Wow, Matt Kroenig arguing that Europeans need to do more on defense? Now I know that we’re making progress.
MK: To be fair, I have been making this case for a while. You mean you don’t read everything I write? I just think Europe should do more while the United States continues to lead in Europe, while I think you and others argue Europe should do more so the U.S. can exit Europe.
EA: Fair point. And whichever version of European strategic “autonomy” or “capability” one favors, some progress is being made. You’ll be pleased to hear that the newest data shows 18 European states will meet the 2 percent of GDP goal next year. But it’s still not enough and needs to be matched with improving capabilities and building out an appropriate force that can defend Europe without significant U.S. involvement. 2024 is going to be an interesting year on this front; will the specter of a second Trump presidency finally push European states to get their acts together on defense? Will congressional Republicans buck Trump, or will they veto further Ukraine aid?
Perhaps we can get Carlson back from Moscow to interview some folks and find out? I’m sure Trump would be happy to explain ancient American history to him, like the question of who lost the 2020 election.
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