Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry flew to Kenya late last month to ensure the deployment of 1,000 police officers to Haiti, part of a multinational force, after a Kenyan court blocked the arrangement. But during Henry’s trip, Port-au-Prince descended into chaos, coming under the near-total control of armed gangs who released thousands of inmates from two prisons, one within the capital and the other on its outskirts. As Haiti continues its yearslong spiral into chaos, the United States has condemned the violence, imposed sanctions on gang leaders, and called to hasten the transition to elections.
Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry flew to Kenya late last month to ensure the deployment of 1,000 police officers to Haiti, part of a multinational force, after a Kenyan court blocked the arrangement. But during Henry’s trip, Port-au-Prince descended into chaos, coming under the near-total control of armed gangs who released thousands of inmates from two prisons, one within the capital and the other on its outskirts. As Haiti continues its yearslong spiral into chaos, the United States has condemned the violence, imposed sanctions on gang leaders, and called to hasten the transition to elections.
The United States released a comprehensive plan to combat fragility in Haiti as part of the Global Fragility Strategy. That approach came out of the Global Fragility Act, a bill passed with bipartisan support in 2019 that has potential to reshape how the United States approaches conflicts around the world.
But with the strategy only set to last for 10 years and funding so far only authorized for the first five, the strategy faces real challenges to ensure it remains viable for years to come and can be successful in combating violence in Haiti and elsewhere.
The Global Fragility Act was supposed to redefine America’s approach to stabilization, including developing the Global Fragility Strategy and encouraging a whole-of-government approach that would bring together the State Department, Defense Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alongside other agencies to tackle persistent instances of conflict worldwide.
In April 2022, the Biden administration released a prologue to the strategy that laid out the areas of geographic focus: Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and coastal West Africa, which comprises Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo. A little under a year later, in March 2023, the administration released detailed plans to combat fragility in each area. These plans were developed in coordination with local stakeholders and representatives from relevant U.S. government agencies and aim to be tailored and adaptable to the local context.
A year after the announcement of the region-specific plans, violence is still spreading in the areas it targets. In Libya, the 2020 brokered peace agreement has largely held, but the country remains divided between different factions in the east and west, with little prospect of a long-term peace deal. In Mozambique, violence is ticking back up, after falling in 2023, and there is concern that violence could spill into Nampula province. This comes as Mozambique moves toward October elections where tensions are likely to run high.
In Papua New Guinea, tribal violence has spiked in the nation’s north, with worries it could spread after at least 64 people were killed in February. This comes after the capital, Port Moresby, was put under a two-week state of emergency following deadly riots in January. The countries of coastal West Africa, where some states like Ghana are much more stable, also face a variety of challenges, with Guinea expected to transition to civilian rule this year following a 2021 coup, though the ruling military junta has dissolved the interim government and sealed the country’s borders, leaving its democratic future in question.
U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia are working to exploit the instability in these regions to their advantage. Documents have leaked that show Russia’s Wagner Group—which is trying to find a new role after the dramatic loss of its leader last year—has been interested in Haiti for some time. In Mozambique, the government initially turned to the Wagner Group to provide security services, though it failed spectacularly in its mission.
In Libya, Russia reportedly delivered tanks to troops loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar, in power in the east, and helped to support a military exercise. Officials in Port Moresby are exploring a potential security pact with China in an effort to bring stability to Papua New Guinea. Finally, in Guinea, the junta leader addressed the United Nations in September, stating that Western democracy does not work for Africa, in a seeming endorsement of the autocratic style of governance that China has sought to promote.
Working toward peace in these regions can help to turn these nations into future trade and security partners of the United States and serve to help counter the strategic threat posed by China. To do so, policymakers across the relevant agencies and the executive branch must ensure the Global Fragility Strategy has the backing it needs.
That means, first of all, making sure the Prevention and Stabilization Fund is fully funded at the levels authorized. In passing the act, Congress authorized that up to $200 million for each of the first five years could be appropriated for the fund. Congress also created the Complex Crises Fund, which was designed to respond to unforeseen challenges overseas.
In the 2024 Congressional Budget Justification, only $114.5 million was requested for the Prevention and Stabilization Fund. Though the Complex Crises Fund was well-funded, its purview is wider than supporting just the strategy. Moving forward, the Prevention and Stabilization Fund needs to be funded at the $200 million level to fully support the implementation of the strategy while recognizing that this is still a relatively small amount for this type of work.
Second, relevant agencies should ensure that documents related to the strategy are released promptly, as the act mandates. Initial attempts to adhere to this timeline have not been encouraging. After the signing of the act, the strategy was supposed to be released within 180 days but was not until around a year later, in December 2020. The five country- and region-specific plans were supposed to be released within one year of the passing of the act but were not released until March 2023, three years later. With the strategy only having a 10-year time frame, policymakers should work toward meeting that future deadline promptly to give the strategy the best chance at success.
Finally, policymakers should ensure that the country-specific plans are responsive and up to date to the situation on the ground. The act mandates a report to Congress every two years that details progress as well as any changes to the region-specific strategies, but in locations where the situation on the ground is rapidly changing, like Haiti, action can’t be bound purely to a bureaucratic timetable. That needs local partners—and adaptable plans.
The Global Fragility Act is a landmark piece of legislation that, when combined with the strategy, offers Washington a chance to redefine how it approaches stabilization missions. As Haiti illustrates, there is a clear and urgent need for smartly targeted U.S. moves to protect ordinary people from violence. U.S. policymakers should ensure that the benefits of the strategy are maximized over the remaining time frame, as doing so will bring stability while helping Washington to achieve its strategic interests.
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