Amid all the talk of 2024 as the second wave of right-wing populism, including my recent prediction of a bloodbath for liberal democracy at the European Parliament elections in June, there is one country that could buck the trend. By the end of this year, Britain could be the one country where the light of responsible centrism shines bright, where good governance returns, and, as a result, its global influence increases again. Yes, this is the same Britain that in recent years has been dubbed the “clown country,” or, during the height of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s COVID-rule-busting miscreance, “the party island.” The irony of ironies.
Amid all the talk of 2024 as the second wave of right-wing populism, including my recent prediction of a bloodbath for liberal democracy at the European Parliament elections in June, there is one country that could buck the trend. By the end of this year, Britain could be the one country where the light of responsible centrism shines bright, where good governance returns, and, as a result, its global influence increases again. Yes, this is the same Britain that in recent years has been dubbed the “clown country,” or, during the height of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s COVID-rule-busting miscreance, “the party island.” The irony of ironies.
This presupposes that Keir Starmer, the Labour leader, wins the next general election, which technically can take place any time before late January 2025 but which almost all politicians and commentators believe will happen in the second half of this year. Opinion polls have consistently shown a significant lead for the opposition party, usually around 20 percentage points, which would translate into something between a landslide and a comfortable victory.
Starmer rails against anyone in his entourage who predicts such an outcome, pointing to Labour’s lamentable election performances in past years. He reminds his MPs that in half a century only former Prime Minister Tony Blair knew how to gain power. That was back in 1997. Before him, you must go back to Harold Wilson in 1964 and 1974. Indeed, given the propensity of British voters to act against their own self-interest (think the Brexit referendum of 2016 and the victory of Johnson in 2019), a sensible outcome for the country cannot be declared a dead certainty.
The rudderless Rishi Sunak (the Tories’ fifth prime minister since the Brexit referendum in 2016) is clinging to the hope that he could secure a near-impossible victory if he frames the election as a Dunkirk-style “battle of the small boats,” a single-issue plebiscite on migration. The polls show his plans, going through Parliament now, of sending asylum-seekers away are not playing well, but that seemingly is all he has.
Starmer is not known for his exuberance. He has been shedding or watering down policies that could be construed as remotely radical as part of his mission to win at all costs. Parliamentary candidates who are anything but squeaky clean, who have anything close to a hinterland, are being rejected.
Not a lot of Conservatives are counting on staying in office, and many are bailing from Parliament to avoid having to endure a defeat. Many have been turning to professional headhunters in search of something to do on leaving politics. (It will be moot to see how many, or rather how few, end up with meaningful employment.)
If, or when—but let’s stick to the logic and say when—Starmer walks through the famous black door of 10 Downing Street, consigning the Conservatives to opposition for the first time in nearly 15 years, it will not be the U.K.’s own Zeitenwende, a moment of epochal change. There will be no reprise of 1997, that pre-millennial era when Blair declared that “things can only get better.” Britain, the leader in Europe, was the one to whom others deferred. The incoming Labour government had copious amounts of money and international goodwill in the bank. Not now.
Starmer inspires guarded optimism, not excitement. He is not a performer. He will be an incremental leader, testing the ground at each step of the way before acting. That will still be an improvement on what Brits have had to live through. After the buffoonery of the recent period, an element of sobriety will be welcome at home and abroad.
What role, therefore, might the United Kingdom assume in a Europe where moderate politics faces an existential threat? There are two ways of looking at this: the formal relationship with the European Union and the wider relationship with the continent and the wider West.
Starmer is planning several steps that he hopes will lead to a rapprochement of sorts with the EU. Expect changes to veterinary rules, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, education exchanges. In other words, low-hanging fruit—important, but not constituting a breakthrough in the short or medium term.
The EU by the end of this year, disrupted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and new friends soon to be elected, will be deeply unsettled. This will have contradictory effects. Pressure on Starmer from pro-Europeans within his ranks to move further and faster in looking for a second stage of improvements with EU institutions will wane the more the Brussels brand is tarnished.
And yet, conversely, the readiness for him to help play a part in combating Europe’s many problems will grow—particularly if former President Donald Trump wins the U.S. election, likely to take place within weeks either side of the British vote. From Ukraine (the one area in which Britain has been consistently respected since Russia’s invasion in 2022, due to its unwavering support for Kyiv) to the Middle East to China and the Indo-Pacific, Britain’s voice is likely to be stronger than before. Even though policymakers seek to differentiate foreign-policy issues from domestic politics, the U.K.’s bombast and unreliability, particularly under Johnson, hampered its diplomatic performance.
That is likely to change under Starmer. Even though he will be wary of attempting to institutionalize cooperation with the European Union—and Brussels will be equally reluctant to provide the U.K. with any precipitate “rewards” while remaining on the outside—personal relationships will improve. Expect Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, to have him on speed dial.
Bilaterally, Starmer is already on more solid ground. He has developed warm relations with Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor. A number of meetings have already taken place, with plans for a new security agreement and other deals in the first few months of a change in government. Ties are also growing with France’s president, Emmanuel Macron. Starmer will seek out allies where he can find them, such as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, though both will struggle to maintain their hold on power.
Starmer will be thrust immediately into a strange position. He will attract attention for simply being the only center-left leader from a major European country with a majority government. In Germany and Spain, Social Democrats are hanging on by their fingertips. In Poland, Donald Tusk is engaged in the fight of his life. Italy has joined others in tacking to the ultra-Right. President Macron in France is looking over his shoulders at Marine Le Pen’s populist nationalists. Starmer will be studied not just to see if he can restore the U.K.’s reputation for trustworthiness, but whether he can provide social democratic answers to economic uncertainty, social division, migration, climate, and any of the many other problems facing Europe.
His counterparts will want to know if there is more to him than stability and dependability. History shows that the center left suffers from an affliction that the right does not. In 1997, Blair had a mighty majority, a healthy budget bequeathed to him, and a country that was relatively optimistic. And yet, with one terrible exception (Iraq), he was frightened to take risks. He now regrets his caution.
An excess of caution by Starmer will leave him prone to being buffeted by events. The background noise—on migration, on culture wars—will start the day after his victory. Populists will rally to the flag, exploiting every sign of weakness.
The size of Starmer’s expected majority is extremely important. He desperately needs two terms, going steadily in his first and displaying greater radicalism in his second. Others believe his ultra-caution is not a tactic; it is a personality trait that will be the template throughout his time in office.
If Starmer ends up a mere stopgap who fails to arrest the populist tide, the longer-term prospects for the U.K. will be especially bleak. The nightmare scenario would see a general election by 2029 in which an ideologically sharpened Conservative party sweeps to victory, led perhaps by Suella Braverman, the former home secretary, or even by the Trump-adoring Nigel Farage.
Whether he likes it or not, Starmer is set to become not just prime minister of one country, but also the standard-bearer for grown-up social democracy across Europe. His success, or failure, will have repercussions that extend far beyond his nation.
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