Joining NATO was the best foreign-policy pursuit that Turkey ever initiated in its existence as a republic. During the Cold War, its membership in the alliance kept Turkey from being overrun by the Soviet Union and helped provide space for its economic development as a Western ally.
Joining NATO was the best foreign-policy pursuit that Turkey ever initiated in its existence as a republic. During the Cold War, its membership in the alliance kept Turkey from being overrun by the Soviet Union and helped provide space for its economic development as a Western ally.
Why, then, is the alliance constantly having to grapple with an uncooperative and at times even pugilistic Turkish leader in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan? It seems that, in every instance, Erdogan is devoted to undermining the trans-Atlantic alliance. Is it time for NATO to reconsider Turkey’s membership?
It was not always like this. Turkish diplomats often like to remind their international counterparts that Turkey lives in a difficult neighborhood and the maintenance of its sovereignty is a testament to the skill of generations of Turkish statesmen who worked tirelessly to keep Ankara safe.
This perspective certainly has merits. Ismet Inonu’s leadership was instrumental in keeping Turkey out of World War II and being overrun by Nazi Germany, while still being an ally of the West. The Kemalist regime was also foresighted enough to avoid entangling the new republic in any international conflict, mainly because it would hamper economic development.
More than diplomatic prowess, though, what allowed Turkey to pursue its developmental goals was the blanket of security NATO membership provided. Turkey was admitted into the alliance in 1952 along with Greece, due to the Truman administration’s belief that containing communism in Europe could not be achieved without their membership.
Joining NATO, along with the assistance offered by the Truman Doctrine in the form of monetary ($400 million for Greece and Turkey) and military assistance, allowed Ankara to build a capable and modern military and provided the republic with much of the gravitas it had long sought from affiliation with the West. It gave Turkish officials, both civilian and military, a seat at the table, enabling them to weigh in on security concerns along with their Western allies. Most significantly, NATO membership allowed Ankara to punch above its military and economic weight.
Ankara’s willingness to play military roles in vital NATO missions such as Kosovo and Afghanistan gave Turkey a loud voice within the alliance. As a result, many U.S. administrations have paid special attention to addressing Ankara’s security concerns, be it in the realm of Kurdish separatism or threats from Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
In November 2015, after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in its airspace (the first such instance by a NATO country since 1952), Putin had to think very carefully about whether to respond militarily against a NATO member. Suffice it to say that without NATO membership, there is good reason to believe that Turkey could have suffered a similar fate to what Ukraine has experienced since 2014.
These were the good old days. As of March 2022, a majority of the Turkish population now perceives the United States as the greatest threat to Turkey, while only 19 percent see Russia in the same light. And under Erdogan’s leadership, Ankara has relentlessly worked to undermine NATO security.
Take NATO’s Scandinavian enlargement, which Erdogan has been holding hostage since 2022. What will it take for Erdogan to do the bare minimum of what is expected of a NATO ally and ratify Sweden’s membership? Answer: for Washington to agree to sell Turkey new F-16 fighter jets and perhaps a meeting with President Joe Biden at the White House. Transactions should not determine the behavior of NATO allies; instead, common values and threat perceptions should.
The reason the United States and its allies want to admit Sweden into NATO in the first place is because Russia’s belligerent behavior is threatening European security and admitting Sweden will help bolster NATO against that threat. Yet Turkey is not doing the bare minimum to thwart the threat posed by Russia.
Indeed, in 2019, Turkey went all the way to acquiring Russian military hardware (the S-400 missile system), which directly undermines NATO cohesivity. It is because of this move that Ankara was removed from the United States’ F-35 program and slapped with CAATSA sanctions by the Trump administration. Yet Erdogan has done nothing to backtrack from this unacceptable position.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, the Biden administration has implored Erdogan—at times by sanctioning Turkish entities—to do more to prevent the country from providing a permissive financial environment that has allowed Russian oligarchs to bypass international sanctions and move money around the world through Turkey. Yet not only has Erdogan failed to do so, but recent reporting discovered that Turkey, with the likely permission of its government, was providing space in its territorial waters for Putin’s personal yacht to undergo renovations (Tuzla shipyards).
Pick your theater of vital security interests for the NATO alliance, and you’ll discover a Turkish connection that actively undermines it. Take, for example, underreported efforts to prevent the Islamic State from regrouping in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its U.S. partners are among the more crucial entities in the region who can help ensure that Islamic State fighters stay locked up in prisons, while at the same time continuing to carry out counterterrorism missions against its remnants across the region. Yet Ankara has carried out military strikes against the SDF, which it perceives to be a terrorist entity. On several occasions, these attacks have endangered the lives of U.S. forces, forcing the U.S. military to shoot down a Turkish drone.
Between 2019 and 2022, Erdogan openly undermined the safety and security of the eastern Mediterranean by threatening to invade NATO ally Greece and annex part of EU member Cyprus over disputed claims of territorial waters, especially in relation to natural gas drilling rights. While Erdogan’s belligerent stance in the region appears to have quieted down in 2023, it has been superseded by Turkey’s ongoing support for terrorism. In the wake of Hamas’s Oct. 7 terror attacks that killed more than 1,200 people in Israel, Ankara’s shameful support of the U.S.-designated terrorist entity has come under increased scrutiny. While Israel may not be a NATO member, most of its members have been quick to offer their support for the country in its darkest hour. Erdogan, however, described Hamas as a group of “mujahideen” freedom fighters and actively provides the organization with diplomatic, financial, and military support.
Were Ankara to apply for NATO membership today, it would not be considered, let alone approved. The only reason it is having to be tolerated is due to the fact that there is no mechanism for removing a member once it has joined. One could be forgiven for thinking that this is an obvious design flaw that should not be in place. They would be right, except for the fact that NATO was designed with the intent of thwarting the threat posed by the Soviet Union; the alliance’s architects likely never thought that one day, NATO would have to strategize against a threat posed by one of its own members.
Changing membership rules may be tough, but this is an opportune time when such a discussion must begin, given the numerous challenges the Western Hemisphere faces. At the very least, NATO members should remain united and agree not to sell Ankara any defensive capabilities such as fighter jets as long as it maintains Russian capabilities that could degrade collective defense. For the Biden administration and State Department, which bend over backward not to lose Turkey, it is long past time that Erdogan was read the Riot Act: You are either a NATO ally that accepts our common values, or you are not. Make up your mind.
login
who are we?
contact us
qosheapp
Toi Staff
Gideon Levy
Belen Fernandez
Rami G Khouri
Mort Laitner
Donald Low
Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Nikkei Editorial
visit website
