It is likely that there is going to be a war between Hezbollah and Israel within the next six to eight months.
It is likely that there is going to be a war between Hezbollah and Israel within the next six to eight months.
It is important to be as clear about this as possible because almost every article written on the topic to date declares that Hezbollah and Israel don’t want war. That analysis infers the future based on present conditions, but developments in the Middle East are highly dynamic. It would be wise for analysts and government officials to reexamine their assumptions and update their expectations.
It is true that, to date, Israel and the Lebanon-based militant group have kept their conflict below the threshold of all-out war, preferring tit-for-tat responses to various provocations. Yet this apparent restraint does not mean that Hezbollah and Israel do not want war. Rather, Hezbollah’s leadership and the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) high command are currently confronted by a range of constraints that, so far, have put the brakes on a conflict. No one should count on these factors—the strategic calculations of Iran’s leaders; the Biden administration’s determination to avoid a regional conflict; the outcome of the war in Gaza, especially the disposition of Hamas; and U.S. politics—to limit the conflict for much longer. Indeed, these constraints are already breaking down.
The claim that Hezbollah does not want war hinges on a further claim that Iran fears a conflict between its proxy and Israel. The logic that underpins these two arguments is compelling: In recent years, Hezbollah has become an expeditionary force for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), playing important roles in supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in its bloody campaign against its own people, working with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and training the Houthis in Yemen.
Yet before it was an arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah was—and remains—first and foremost a critical component of Iran’s deterrence. The group and its reported 100,000-plus rockets are Iran’s second-strike capability. If Israel or the United States were to attack Iran’s nuclear program, Hezbollah’s arsenal would deliver a devastating blow on Israeli population centers. As much as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Iranian leaders are committed to Israel’s destruction, they are more devoted to regime survival and do not want to lose the deterrent capability that they have invested in Hezbollah.
Still, it is not hard to imagine a moment at which the Iranians loosen the reins on their primary proxy. As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah made clear in an early January speech remembering the life and work of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani—the IRGC Quds Force commander who the United States killed in a drone strike in early 2020—the Iranians have put significant time, energy, and resources into the development of so-called axis of resistance.
Not only is Hezbollah an important part of this axis, but so is Hamas. Despite the possibility of a pause in the fighting in the coming weeks, the Israelis are determined to capture and/or kill the Hamas leadership and render the group incapable of being an organized threat to the state of Israel. If the IDF threatens to turn these goals into reality, the Iranians are likely to lift whatever constraints under which Nasrallah’s forces have been operating rather than accept Hamas’s defeat. That day seems to be approaching.
If Iran has restrained Hezbollah, the United States has done the same regarding Israel. The Biden administration has been consistent about two issues during the Gaza war: First, Hamas must be defeated. Second, a war between Israel and Hezbollah must be avoided. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reportedly relayed Team Biden’s concerns to Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant in a blunt conversation last November. U.S. President Joe Biden also told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to widen the war to include Lebanon. U.S. officials clearly believe that war between Hezbollah and Israel will quickly become a regional conflict in which the United States could become a combatant against Iran.
The administration’s concerns are reasonable, but the U.S. president’s ability to influence the Israelis on how they deal with their northern border is waning. That is because the Israeli government decided to evacuate an estimated 80,000 Israelis from towns in the north as a precaution in the case of a major escalation. From the Israeli perspective, this portion of their country is uninhabitable, and Israeli sovereignty there is now uncertain. That is simply not tolerable for the government—or any Israeli government—requiring a forceful response.
But because the Israelis have had their hands full in Gaza, they have been grudgingly amendable to U.S.- and French-led diplomatic efforts. Yet, neither Washington nor Paris have produced a plan that satisfies either the Israelis or Hezbollah. The Israelis require Hezbollah to withdraw to the Litani River, which is 18 miles from the Israeli border, in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)—a demand that Hezbollah rejects.
For its part, Hezbollah wants Israel to reduce the size of its forces on the border—something the Israelis are not going to do, especially after the events of Oct. 7, 2023. As time goes on, diplomacy has proved to be fruitless, and if the Israelis claim victory in Gaza, they will turn their attention to fixing their security problem in the north. It is an existential issue for the Israelis because, despite the wishes of the White House, war is likely to come to Lebanon this spring or summer.
A final restraint on Israel is U.S. congressional dysfunction. Although it is generally not the case, the kind of war that Israel is now fighting has left it critically dependent on the United States. No doubt, Israel has a well-developed defense industrial base and advanced military structure, but its war in response to Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack is a major departure from the IDF’s standard doctrine, which calls for short, devastating wars on enemy territory.
Indeed, as the conflict in Gaza drags through its fifth month, the Israelis need to replenish their stocks of certain weapons. When it comes to taking on Hezbollah, the IDF needs more precision-guided weapons, which would be critical to neutralizing Hezbollah launch sites and other sensitive locations. The Israelis cannot acquire these weapons without the supplemental aid package that now languishes on Capitol Hill, meaning that the major military operations that Gallant envisions to push Hezbollah away from the Israel border cannot happen—yet.
Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently admitted as much. In explaining the need for the U.S. security assistance, he declared: “Because it’s very important, as we’re [also doing] our planning. Remember, we’re not just dealing with one front,” he said. “We’re dealing not just with Hamas in the south, we’re dealing with Hezbollah in the north.”
At some point, however, Congress will get its act together and pass the funding bill. Israel remains popular on Capitol Hill, and vote counters indicate that security assistance for the country, all things being equal, should be a legislative layup. Yet as with everything on Capitol Hill these days, even initiatives and legislation that are broadly popular get caught in the maw of polarization, power politics, and generalized Congressional dysfunction. The relatively non-controversial Israel aid is now wrapped around more controversial Ukraine assistance, which is connected to the biggest political football in the United States, border security. That means the Israelis have been left waiting while elected leaders in Washington sort out the other two issues, which have become ever more complex in a presidential election year. But Congress will eventually act, and once that happens, the last restraint on the Israelis will be gone. Presumably, the IDF’s major military operations in the Gaza Strip will have wound down by then, allowing the force to turn its full attention to Hezbollah.
With the restraints on both Hezbollah and Israel weakening, all signs on the ground point to war. Hezbollah and IDF attacks on each other are becoming bolder and occurring deeper inside each other’s territory. Recently, the Israelis hit the Bekaa Valley after Hezbollah shot down an Israeli drone. Before that, Hezbollah sent drones into Lower Galilee, and the Israeli Air Force hit weapons’ depots in Sidon, less than 30 miles from Beirut.
Kudos to the U.S. and French officials for trying to avoid war, but as they are discovering, there is no diplomatic solution to the zero-sum relationship between Hezbollah and Israel, especially as Israeli leaders vow to change the rules of the game between Israel and the axis of resistance. So, either Nasrallah will order his forces north to the Litani River, or the IDF will force them back. Hezbollah will resist because that is what it purports to do—and what better way to burnish its tattered domestic credentials? It is unlikely there is any way to hold off war now.
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