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Over the last two months of war in the Middle East, no one in Washington or anywhere else has come up with a good idea about what should happen in the Gaza Strip when the fighting there ends. At the same time, everyone seems to agree that Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza is a bad idea. The Biden administration has already warned the Israeli government that it would not support such a return to military administration of the area.
Over the last two months of war in the Middle East, no one in Washington or anywhere else has come up with a good idea about what should happen in the Gaza Strip when the fighting there ends. At the same time, everyone seems to agree that Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza is a bad idea. The Biden administration has already warned the Israeli government that it would not support such a return to military administration of the area.
Still, the likelihood of a renewed Israeli occupation is greater than many might suspect. That is because Israelis want security, and all of the present ideas for Gaza are unworkable or politically untenable (or both). At the same time, the Israelis regard the fight with Hamas in existential terms and thus seem willing to countenance international opprobrium if that is the cost of survival.
In thinking about “the day after” in Gaza, it is important to understand some details about Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the territory. When then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon determined that Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip was no longer worth the cost, many Israelis agreed. There was no convincing reason to stay.
Unlike the West Bank, the Gaza Strip was never part of the historical Land of Israel. And though security there remained fraught in the waning days of the Second Intifada, the leadership of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) believed it to be manageable, even if troops were no longer in the territory itself. What’s more, Israel would get credit around the world for uprooting settlements and leaving the area. Left unstated was that, for Sharon, withdrawal from Gaza would free up resources to continue his efforts to tighten Israel’s grip on those parts of the West Bank he intended would always remain under Israeli control.
To many in Israel, occupation of the Gaza Strip was the poison chalice of the June 1967 victory, and handing it over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) seemed like a win. Yet not all Israelis were so supportive. The settlers decried what they perceived to be Sharon’s betrayal, and some resisted. Then-Transportation Minister Avigdor Lieberman was forced out of the government over his opposition. And the Likud party split. Sharon—along with well-known Likudniks such as Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni—formed a new party called Kadima. For Lieberman and other opponents, including former Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein, it was a mistake to believe that withdrawal from Gaza would produce either goodwill or security. Contrary to Sharon, they believed that the best way to ensure the safety of Israelis in sovereign Israel was to continue the occupation of Gaza.
In the ensuing years, as rockets fired from Gaza have fallen on Israel at regular intervals since the withdrawal and the United Nations has continued to criticize Israel for an occupation that many Israelis say does not exist, the Israeli right has maintained that Sharon’s withdrawal was a grave mistake. It is a view that seems to have gained more traction in Israel since the terrorist attacks of Oct. 7. In a poll conducted not long thereafter, 30 percent of Israelis supported an occupation and military administration of Gaza.
Of course, that poll was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the worst security failure in the history of the state. No doubt, in bloodied and wounded Israel, emotions were (and still are) running high. It could very well be that far fewer Israelis want to reoccupy Gaza than the poll reflects. But that does not diminish the fact that opponents of the 2005 withdrawal have a more compelling narrative now than they did then: When Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, there was relative calm and few, if any, rockets fell on the country; since the IDF left, there have been nothing but mini-wars (2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021) and now a full-scale conflict.
I am told that no one in the Israeli defense establishment—the same people who blew off warnings about Hamas’s plans for years—wants to occupy Gaza again. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has gone so far as to declare that the third phase of the war “will require the removal of Israel’s responsibility for life in the Gaza strip, and the establishment of a new security reality for the citizens of Israel,” suggesting that after Hamas is destroyed, the IDF will leave Gaza and seal it off from Israel. That may be his (unrealistic) intention, but that is not necessarily what others are saying.
On Nov. 6, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told ABC News that “Israel will, for an indefinite period … have the overall security responsibility [in Gaza] because we’ve seen what happens when we don’t have it.” Of course, the prime minister did not affirmatively state that the IDF would occupy Gaza and administer it after the war, but he did not not say that, either.
Then there is Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, one of Netanyahu’s closest advisors. Recently, Dermer pointed out to reporters that the Israeli military had not been in Gaza for 17 years and thus had not been able to undertake the kinds of security operations it routinely undertakes in the West Bank—implying that the 2005 withdrawal had compromised Israel’s security. He went on to say, “Obviously, we can’t repeat (this),” affirming what Netanyahu had previously stated, notably that the IDF will have “overriding security responsibility indefinitely” in Gaza.
From this, it seems they are suggesting that the best way to secure Israel is through occupation; but, of course, there is a certain amount of circumlocution in both men’s words. If, however, they were opposed to reoccupation, it would be easy to say, “We oppose occupation, but we will secure sovereign Israel by doing X, Y, and Z.”
Even if Netanyahu does not mean what he seems to be saying, or if he does but Israeli politics ensures that he is not in power one way or another after the war, a reoccupation of the Gaza Strip may still be the conflict’s outcome. Let’s run through a thought experiment: Assume the Israeli leadership does not want to occupy the Gaza Strip. Also assume that the destruction of Hamas remains Israel’s objective. And assume that the Israeli public remains quite hawkish. Now assume that neither Washington nor any of the other major global or regional powers can devise a workable and politically tenable plan for postwar Gaza. What exactly are the Israelis left with?
The Biden administration’s current plan, parts of which have been publicly articulated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, would see some type of international stabilization of Gaza until a reinvigorated PA can assume control, followed by a resumption of the U.S. search for a two-state solution.
Every part of this plan is unrealistic. There is unlikely to be a multinational force in Gaza because it will be exceedingly dangerous even if Israel were to render Hamas incapable of threatening Israeli security. The PA is so hobbled by corruption, dysfunction, and a lack of legitimacy—due to its dependence on and coordination with Israel as well as the fact that Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas refuses to stand for election—that it is beyond help. Even if it could be rehabilitated, Netanyahu and his advisors have made it clear that they do not regard the PA as a partner, and for their part, Palestinian leaders in Ramallah have made clear they will not be Israel’s proconsul in the Gaza Strip. Finally, it does not seem likely that U.S. policymakers have much to offer that has not been tried before to push Israelis and Palestinians to make peace.
Whether the Israeli public wants to occupy the Gaza Strip remains an open question, but as Israeli friends and interlocutors have relayed to me over the past two months, they are confronted with an impossible situation in the current conflict. They want nothing more than to wash their hands of the Palestinian issue and to have security. They thought withdrawal from Gaza would advance those goals, but the Oct. 7 attacks shattered that belief. That is why no one should be surprised when the Israelis reoccupy Gaza. For Israelis who crave security, there is likely no other choice.
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