On Jan. 13, Taiwan hosted the first of many critical elections in 2024—elections that may reshape the global political order. In the first close three-candidate race since 2000, current Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je.
On Jan. 13, Taiwan hosted the first of many critical elections in 2024—elections that may reshape the global political order. In the first close three-candidate race since 2000, current Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je.
Lai’s victory will not be welcome news in China. His stance as a pro-independence supporter has softened over the last decade; he now emphasizes that the Republic of China, Taiwan’s formal name, is already a sovereign state, so independence is unnecessary. Yet he remains a lightning rod for critics concerned that a Lai presidency may further worsen relations with China. The defeated KMT blames the outgoing Tsai Ing-wen administration—for which Lai served as vice president since 2020—for heightening cross-strait tensions with its refusal to accept the so-called 1992 Consensus, China’s precondition for any direct talks. Lai has argued that this would be akin to accepting China’s “one country, two systems” formula applied to Hong Kong.
While not dismissing the various salient domestic factors that dominated all three candidate manifestos, the growing threat of China and the deterioration of cross-strait relations certainly loomed large over this election. The KMT vice presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong framed the election as a choice between “war and peace”; China’s Taiwan Affairs Office used a similar framing. There are some limited parallels here to the 2000 election, when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji implied a vote for DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was a vote for conflict. (Chinese disinformation campaigns further aimed to influence the 2024 election and prevent a Lai victory.)
An undercurrent to Taiwanese politics in general, and this election in particular, is the potential for greater conflict with China. Taiwanese across the political spectrum want peace, while long-term trends show a public increasingly identifying as Taiwanese and with little interest in unification—factors that must worry China. Critically for future relations with China and the world, the Lai administration must adopt a posture of strength while not inviting conflict. This may be a difficult task given the changing composition and views of Taiwanese citizens. The new divided government, with the TPP’s increased seat share in the legislature, however, may mean that Lai uses harsh rhetoric against China while government policies remain more moderate. To shed more light on the changing domestic climate and decipher how public opinion may affect the new administration, I commissioned the Seoul-based firm Macromill Embrain to survey 1,213 eligible Taiwanese voters in early December. A team of researchers, including Vasabjit Banerjee of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Benjamin Tkach of Mississippi State University, and Ian Milden of Rice University, analyzed the data.
Our polling finds that more than 60 percent of Taiwanese are now moderately to extremely concerned about an invasion by China and that this concern aligns with respondents’ partisan identity. We also find that more than 60 percent of Taiwanese are not confident that the United States will defend Taiwan, and, again, this aligned with partisan identity. That supporters of the DPP show much less concern about conflict with China than other voters and exude more confidence in U.S. defense commitments may have consequences for how the Lai administration governs. Finally, our findings from similar surveys in 2022 and 2023, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine increased concerns about a similar scenario in Taiwan, indicate that these preferences are stable over time.
Our survey establishes how partisan views may affect the Lai administration’s policies. Several analysts have suggested that China would have the capabilities to invade Taiwan in the near future, while others contend that such an invasion is unlikely. Despite the unknown likelihood of a war, 60 percent of respondents expressed moderate to extreme concern about China starting a war with Taiwan. The results are deeply divided along party lines: Nearly half of DPP supporters are not at all or slightly concerned (46.85 percent), while a plurality of KMT supporters indicated being very or extremely concerned (43.23 percent), with TPP supporters falling in between. Based on this data, the Lai administration will struggle to build a consensus on the China threat.
Countless analysts, scholars, and politicians have voiced the necessity of U.S. support for Taiwan in a potential conflict. Taiwan remains largely dependent on the United States for arms and munitions. Defense of the island is frequently talked about in terms of deterrence through strength, with the fundamental expectation that Taiwan would resist an invasion. The so-called porcupine strategy entails Taiwanese stockpiling of arms and munitions in quantities to resist an invasion. This strategy depends, however, on the assumption that the Taiwanese people will unify to resist an invasion. Our survey does not provide insight into whether or not Taiwanese would feel emboldened to fight following a Chinese invasion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized the population, and social science evidence suggests that invasions motivate nationalist fervor, but there is no guarantee the same dynamics will occur in Taiwan. Instead, consistent with analysis from the Brookings Institution, Taiwanese retaining “confidence in their future” will be essential during times of tension. Fundamental to Taiwanese expectations of their future are their views on the likelihood of U.S. support.
On this, we see a divergence in opinion between the U.S. and Taiwanese publics. For the first time in history, a majority of the U.S. public supports defending Taiwan, while the majority of Taiwanese we surveyed do not expect the United States to come to their defense. Survey respondents generally lacked confidence that the United States will defend Taiwan, with a majority not at all or not very confident, compared with only 7.58 percent very confident in such commitments. Partisan lenses shape these views as well, with a clear majority of DPP supporters displaying confidence in the promise of U.S. security, including 22.44 percent very confident. Meanwhile, more than three-quarters of KMT supporters (77.6 percent) and more than two-thirds of TPP supporters (69.43 percent) have little or no confidence in such assurances. Our results mirror those from last year.
Several factors may explain this divergence among supporters of the various parties. DPP supporters may be responding to the assurances frequently touted by the Tsai administration, perhaps believing the government has received additional private assurances from Washington. This group may also maintain normative beliefs about U.S. duties to defend democracies in peril. In contrast, KMT and TPP supporters may be more critical of U.S. intentions, viewing such commitments as well-meaning but comparatively costless in the absence of actual conflict. U.S. defense would require a Taiwan that could at least temporarily defend itself as well, which remains a challenge despite recent reforms, such as the longer conscription period, and U.S. military sales.
As for the increasing divergence between U.S. and Taiwanese political leadership: While the visit of then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and successive increasingly intrusive Chinese airspace incursions raised tensions across the strait in 2022, President Joe Biden appeared to deviate from long-standing U.S. policy by stating that the United States would defend Taiwan against an unprovoked attack. Confusingly, though, Biden has also stated that independence is a decision left to Taiwan, with the latter point quickly backtracked by senior officials. Meanwhile, former President Donald Trump, the front-runner for the Republican nomination in this year’s U.S. presidential election, declined to say in a recent interview whether he would order the U.S. military to defend Taiwan if it were attacked, having previously said in 2022 that he expected China to invade. A book published in 2021 by Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin quoted Trump as telling a U.S. senator in 2019 that he would not do anything if China attacked Taiwan. Trump has also complained about Taiwan’s rise in the global microchip business. At the same time, worsening Sino-U.S. relations over the past eight years have indirectly benefited Taiwan, including increasing U.S. public support for defense.
On the other side of the Pacific, a Lai administration would be expected to largely continue Tsai’s policies, including on cross-strait relations, which have worsened in recent years. The Rand Corp. has noted Taiwan’s critical strengths in defending against possible annexation by China as effective political leaders with widespread support and society’s will to unify in the defense of Taiwan. But further policies are necessary to improve those defenses. With the creation of a civil defense force—authorized by the 2021 Civil Defense Act—Taiwan must train and equip personnel while procuring and warehousing munitions and supplies necessary for the island’s defense. And, as emphatically demonstrated by Ukraine’s resistance against Russia, the will to fight will be necessary to sustain combat operations. To this end, the Tsai administration expanded military conscription to one year, a measure that few Taiwanese opposed, though critics argue this does not address the structural challenge of maintaining talent with specialized skills in the long term. Moreover, Taiwanese popular will to unify and fight depends on expectations that such resistance can succeed. Given China’s overwhelming superiority in air, naval, and land forces, such an expectation will be contingent on popular expectation that an invasion is likely and that the United States will intervene to stop China.
A clear majority of poll respondents said cross-strait relations over the past year had worsened (56.97 percent), with supporters of the KMT and TPP more likely to choose this option (78.13 percent and 61.78 percent, respectively, vs. 46.06 percent of DPP supporters). Regardless of any U.S. commitment, Lai will likely face increased pressure from China and struggle to balance deepening relations with Washington while also not allowing China to justify its own unilateral changes to the status quo. Facing a divided government, the Lai administration may not only struggle to pass military spending and reform bills but also risk mixed messaging—a situation China will be keen to exploit.
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