Governor of Tamil Nadu R N Ravi has once again reminded us of the constitutional folly of retaining the colonial institution of governor. After the Supreme Court’s rebuke, reminding him that he is not an elected authority and should not presume to sit in judgement of the elected government, he returned all 10 bills sent to him for assent by the Tamil Nadu state legislature.
A special session was called by the speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly to pass these Bills again, ensuring that Governor Ravi will have to give assent to them. Similarly, decisions of the state government relating to sanction for prosecution of AIADMK ministers, appointment to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and premature release of prisoners have been held up by Ravi for no apparent reason.
Lest I be misunderstood, this piece is not about the personal conduct of Ravi — someone who clearly had a distinguished service record as a police officer and negotiator before he was appointed governor of Nagaland first, and then Tamil Nadu. The problem is that India’s Constituent Assembly chose, amid much opposition, to retain the colonial office of the governor to be the head of state but appointed by the Union government. Although the governor is supposed to be the president’s analogue at the state government, the reality is that they have been, and continue to be, the agents of the Union government, sent to keep a check on popularly elected state governments.
The key difference between the governor and the president is in the manner of appointment and removal — whereas the president is elected by the elected representatives of the country, the governor is appointed by the Union government alone. Whereas the president can only be removed by way of impeachment, the governor can be removed from office at the pleasure of the Union government. The president’s functioning as the head of state is kept in check at all times by an understanding that the elected representatives can remove them if they overstep their boundaries.
On the other hand, the governor is secure in the knowledge that as long as they do as they are told by the Union government, they will continue to hold their positions. As heads of state, they are not even answerable to the courts for their actions while in office.
None of this is new — all of this was predicted in the Constituent Assembly during the course of debates.
Dakshayani Velayudhan was highly critical of the provisions relating to governors. She said: “The general criticism is that the draft is a replica of the 1935 Act, but we cannot forget the fact that we have got a legacy of the British imperialist administration which goes by the name of the parliamentary system of government… The trouble arose from one point, viz., just as the British administrators who wanted to keep India centrally and provincially as a single unit, we in our bewilderment and anxiety tried to bring India centrally and provincially as a strong unit and this centralisation of power has led to all the troubles.”
Her views were echoed by other members of the Assembly such as Biswanath Das and H V Kamath.
B R Ambedkar had justified the existing provisions relating to governors arguing that there was very little time to make changes to the existing provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 and in any case, governors were only supposed to work with and not overrule the state governments. He did not address the possibility of a governor simply doing what the Centre wishes, as other members pointed out.
Ambedkar’s response is puzzling. As an economist, he should have foreseen the perverse incentives for the governor’s behaviour being built into the Constitution. Velayudhan also refuses to accept his justification for retaining the provisions relating to the governor, noting that significant changes had been made to the GoI Act, 1935 where needed but provisions relating to the governor were retained as is.
Fears as to what governors would turn out to be were proved true almost as soon as the Constitution came into force. The machinations of the Madras Governor, Sri Prakasa, to make C Rajagopalachari the chief minister and engineer a Congress government in the state despite the absence of a popular mandate are well known. Such shenanigans have been repeated by governors across the country in service of the ruling party at the Centre.
The knee-jerk reaction to such behaviour by governors is to call for an abolition of the institution itself. This is both unwise and unnecessary. Unwise because Westminster parliamentary democracy requires a head of state and head of government and removing the governor entirely would mean a dismantling of the system itself. Unnecessary because there are viable alternatives — judicial intervention or constitutional reform.
Judicial intervention into the conduct of governors has increased of late. While the court has not directly held governors responsible or liable in a legal sense (they can’t, thanks to Article 361) the strong observations made by the court have been sufficient to get the Union government to advise the governors to carry out their duties properly. This is a welcome move but it shouldn’t mean that every state has to keep approaching the Supreme Court each time to get the governors to do their duty.
The other option relates to constitutional reform of the office of the governor. In “Heads Held High”, Shankar Narayanan, Lalit Panda and Kevin James have outlined a detailed blueprint for reform of the appointment and removal process, while still retaining the power for both with the Union government. However, I would argue that perhaps the better way out might be to make the governor accountable to the state legislature in the same manner that the president is accountable to the Union Parliament — through election and impeachment.
Whether the judicial or the constitutional reform route is taken, it is high time that the colonial institution of the governor is reined in to strengthen India’s democracy and federal structure.
The writer is Co-Founder and Lead, Vidhi Karnataka
The colonial institution of the governor needs to be brought in sync with the letter and spirit of a federal democracy
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21.11.2023
Governor of Tamil Nadu R N Ravi has once again reminded us of the constitutional folly of retaining the colonial institution of governor. After the Supreme Court’s rebuke, reminding him that he is not an elected authority and should not presume to sit in judgement of the elected government, he returned all 10 bills sent to him for assent by the Tamil Nadu state legislature.
A special session was called by the speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly to pass these Bills again, ensuring that Governor Ravi will have to give assent to them. Similarly, decisions of the state government relating to sanction for prosecution of AIADMK ministers, appointment to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and premature release of prisoners have been held up by Ravi for no apparent reason.
Lest I be misunderstood, this piece is not about the personal conduct of Ravi — someone who clearly had a distinguished service record as a police officer and negotiator before he was appointed governor of Nagaland first, and then Tamil Nadu. The problem is that India’s Constituent Assembly chose, amid much opposition, to retain the colonial office of the governor to be the head of state but appointed by the Union government. Although the governor is supposed to be the president’s analogue at the state government, the reality is that they have been, and continue to be, the agents of the Union government, sent to keep a check on popularly elected state governments.
The key difference between the governor and the........
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