The Chief Justice of India, at a recent event, proposed an initiative to reward “super-performing” trial court judges as a way to incentivise better performance within the judiciary. While the intention behind such a move is to promote efficiency and excellence within the judiciary, one has to keep in mind Goodhart’s Law — “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”. This adage warns against relying too heavily on a single metric for evaluation as individuals may adjust their behaviour to meet the specific criterion, potentially leading to unintended consequences.
The pitfalls of a system that solely focuses on incentivising performance are seen in the infamous “Cobra Effect”. During British rule in India, a local government offered a bounty on cobras to curb their population. However, the unintended consequence was a surge in cobra breeding, as people sought to capitalise on the lucrative reward.
Goodhart’s law, therefore, says that relying solely on quantitative measures, such as case disposal rates, may have unintended, deleterious consequences for the judiciary at large. Judges may be tempted to prioritise quantity over quality, potentially compromising the thorough examination of cases. Similarly, the emphasis on boldness in handling difficult and sensitive cases may create an environment where judges feel pressured to take extreme measures to demonstrate their mettle, potentially creating a hostile courtroom atmosphere.
Currently, the evaluation of trial court judges is based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACR), prepared by High Court judges who assess their performance based on the number and categories of cases disposed of, resolution of old cases, quality of judgments delivered, etc. While this existing mechanism provides a foundation for assessment, improvements are necessary to ensure a more accurate and holistic evaluation of judicial officers. Lack of scientific assessment of time and acumen required for different categories of cases, non-recognition of administrative duties carried out by the trial court judges, and ad hoc timelines for carrying out performance evaluation are some of the persistent gaps in the current ACR framework that remain unaddressed.
However, rather than scrapping the current system and introducing an entirely new one, a more pragmatic approach might be to improve and build on the existing evaluation mechanism. One key step is to identify broader, authentic, and multiple metrics that go beyond mere quantitative outputs. The emphasis should shift towards a more nuanced evaluation that considers the quality of judgments, adherence to judicial ethics, and the fairness and efficiency demonstrated in handling cases. Some of these are subjective criteria but that is not necessarily a bad thing. One way to account for potential bias is to widen the scope of persons consulted in assessing a judge and not just leaving it to one other judge higher up in the hierarchy.
What this calls for is that the commitment to rewarding “super-performing” judges should be accompanied by a commitment to refining and optimising the evaluation process. By fortifying the existing mechanism with a broader range of metrics and incorporating feedback loops, the judiciary can ensure a fair and transparent assessment of judicial officers’ performance. This approach not only acknowledges the existing system’s strengths but also addresses its shortcomings, promoting a culture of accountability, excellence and continuous improvement for judicial officers.
The evaluation is not an end in itself but a means to attract and keep the best legal talent in the judiciary, especially in the trial courts. While a robust and effective evaluation process can inspire confidence that performance will be rewarded, it will lose its effectiveness if the existing glass ceiling in the judiciary is not removed.
This glass ceiling, highlighted by Justice Bela Trivedi at the same event where the CJI spoke, relates to the limited opportunities for trial court judges to become High Court judges. Less than one-third of High Court judge positions are taken by district court judges who, on average, tend to have shorter tenures and less important rosters. Such a glass ceiling defeats the purpose of a system of rewarding the best performing trial court judges. Removing this glass ceiling must therefore go hand in hand with any changes to the evaluation process for judges.
Kumar and Kinhal are Senior Resident Fellows at Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy and lead the Karnataka and JALDI teams respectively
The evaluation is not an end in itself but a means to attract and keep the best legal talent in the judiciary
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20.03.2024
The Chief Justice of India, at a recent event, proposed an initiative to reward “super-performing” trial court judges as a way to incentivise better performance within the judiciary. While the intention behind such a move is to promote efficiency and excellence within the judiciary, one has to keep in mind Goodhart’s Law — “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”. This adage warns against relying too heavily on a single metric for evaluation as individuals may adjust their behaviour to meet the specific criterion, potentially leading to unintended consequences.
The pitfalls of a system that solely focuses on incentivising performance are seen in the infamous “Cobra Effect”. During British rule in India, a local government offered a bounty on cobras to curb their population. However, the unintended consequence was a surge in cobra breeding, as people sought to capitalise on the lucrative reward.
Goodhart’s law, therefore, says that relying solely on quantitative measures, such as case disposal rates, may have unintended, deleterious consequences for the judiciary at large. Judges may be tempted........
© Indian Express
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