Symbolically and discursively, the consecration of a Ram temple in Ayodhya has dealt a monumental blow to India’s constitutional republic. Legally and politically, however, the construction of a Hindu state remains unfinished, and it may not come about. This paradox needs to be understood and explained.

Consider, first, how the consecration represented not only a fusion of the state and religion, but also a union of the state with the majority religion, something that India’s Constitution-makers explicitly fought against and forbade. Even the ghastly violence of Partition, which accompanied the birth of a Muslim homeland in 1947, did not convince the Constitution-makers that post-Independence India should be a Hindu homeland. The Constitution-makers were firmly committed to the idea of religious neutrality of the state and religious equality of citizens.

Such high principles are not easy to practise in politics, in India or elsewhere, which inevitably raises the question of how one should evaluate political practice. In some circles, it is said that Indian secularism, presented as religious neutrality of the state, was an empty shell even under pre-Narendra Modi governments. All that PM Modi has done is taken the pretence away.

This argument is wrong. Political practice is normally not analysed in binary terms (“yes or no”). It is appraised on a scale (“more or less”). We judge whether the practice has been close to the ideal (1) or to its opposite (0). Thus, it is plausible to argue that in the pre-2014 era of Indian politics, the principle of religious neutrality was never fully executed, just as we can legitimately say that the idea of equality was not fully practised in the US or France, despite a constitutional commitment to it. The important thing is that, in India, the principle of religious neutrality was not abandoned for over seven decades, and was in fact repeatedly made the yardstick for judging state practice, just as ethnic, racial or religious equality was often the touchstone of evaluating state conduct in the US or France. The Ayodhya consecration has changed all that. It is not just a practical deviation from a normative practice. It has fully invalidated the principle of the state’s religious neutrality.

For illustration, ask a simple question. Can a Prime Minister lead a ceremony of religious consecration? To consecrate, according to the dictionary, means “to make or declare sacred”. That is typically done by a “holy” or religious figure. The very idea of a politician leading a consecration ceremony in modern times would be abhorrent to most religious leaders and theologians. But that was precisely the point. Regardless of what the Shankaracharyas or the scholars said, the Prime Minister led the consecration. For him and his organisation, it was unquestionably a political project.

Though Hinduism, unlike Catholicism, does not have a clearly established ecclesiastical hierarchy and, a bit like Protestantism, it is highly decentralised, the four Shankaracharyas, in the Sanatani tradition, are nonetheless viewed as epitomising the summit of Hinduism’s religious establishment. If they had led the consecration, it would have been a purely religious event. They were entirely absent.

Moreover, the consecration was not simply a union of the state and religion. The most political aspect of the pious event was the fusing of the state with the religion of the majority, the Hindus. Given the RSS’s century-long commitment to restoring Hindu dominance in India, which the 1950 Constitution denied, a Constitution which the RSS explicitly disowned, January 22 was aimed at taking a massive step towards a Hindu rashtra, or what many comparative scholars would call Hindu supremacy. Modi used new vectors of language — such as Dev se desh (divinity to nationhood ) and Ram se rashtra ki chetna ka vistaar (Ram as a mode of the spread of national consciousness) -– to articulate Hindu supremacy.

But to see Ayodhya as a decisive victory of Hindu theocracy, or as the establishment of a Hindu nation, would be an overstatement. The term “Hindu theocracy” does not make sense without a clear dominance of the Hindu religious establishment. It is the political establishment of Hindu nationalism that dominated January 22, not the Shankaracharyas. And it is the RSS which will most probably dominate a possible Hindu rashtra in the future, not the religious heads.

Equally important, a Hindu nation will require legal changes, which codify Hindu supremacy and reduce Muslims, the key contestants in Ayodhya and the prime object of Hindu nationalist ire, to second class citizenship. Politically speaking, given the key ideological arguments of Hindu nationalism, Hindu primacy and Muslim marginalisation are two sides of the same coin. While January 22 is a monumental step towards Hindu primacy, the project still lacks legal foundations.

Legally, the biggest step thus far has been the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). India’s original Citizenship Act (1955) contained no religious distinction. But the CAA said that all, except Muslim, immigrants from the neighbouring Muslim-majority countries were eligible for citizenship. A National Registry of Citizens (NRC) was to follow the CAA, and its aim was to deny citizenship to those who did not have the right ancestry papers. Hindus without such papers would not lose citizenship, for the CAA could provide a cover. But a Muslim documentary deficit would be legally fatal, for the CAA could not help them. Losing citizenship can lead to disenfranchisement and possibly loss of welfare benefits. In India, only citizens can vote, and generally speaking, if not always, only citizens can receive state-mandated benefits.

The CAA has not been operationalised yet, nor has the NRC been announced as a central government policy. The biggest obstacle is federalism. The BJP not only has to win national elections, bring about legal changes through the national parliament and have them constitutionally approved by the judiciary, but it also needs to win many more states. States have the biggest machinery for policy implementation in India. If they don’t cooperate, many central legislations will simply fail. In economic policy, this problem is well-known. Delhi-legislated land reforms in the 1950s and nationalisation of grain trade in 1973 faltered on the bedrock of state resistance.

India will be a Hindu state if the BJP wins central and most state elections. Elections and politics thus remain critical to India’s future. Ayodhya is not a Hindu nationalist closure. It is simply a very big start.

The writer is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences at Brown University, where he also directs the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia at the Watson Institute

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To see temple consecration as a decisive victory of Hindu theocracy, or as the establishment of a Hindu nation, would be an overstatement

14 1
27.01.2024

Symbolically and discursively, the consecration of a Ram temple in Ayodhya has dealt a monumental blow to India’s constitutional republic. Legally and politically, however, the construction of a Hindu state remains unfinished, and it may not come about. This paradox needs to be understood and explained.

Consider, first, how the consecration represented not only a fusion of the state and religion, but also a union of the state with the majority religion, something that India’s Constitution-makers explicitly fought against and forbade. Even the ghastly violence of Partition, which accompanied the birth of a Muslim homeland in 1947, did not convince the Constitution-makers that post-Independence India should be a Hindu homeland. The Constitution-makers were firmly committed to the idea of religious neutrality of the state and religious equality of citizens.

Such high principles are not easy to practise in politics, in India or elsewhere, which inevitably raises the question of how one should evaluate political practice. In some circles, it is said that Indian secularism, presented as religious neutrality of the state, was an empty shell even under pre-Narendra Modi governments. All that PM Modi has done is taken the pretence away.

This argument is wrong. Political practice is normally not analysed in binary terms (“yes or no”). It is appraised on a scale (“more or less”). We judge whether the practice has been close to the ideal (1) or to its opposite (0). Thus, it is plausible to argue that in the pre-2014 era of Indian politics, the principle of religious neutrality was never fully executed, just as we can legitimately say that the idea of equality was not fully practised in the US or France, despite a constitutional commitment to it. The important thing is that, in India, the principle of religious neutrality was not abandoned for over seven decades, and was in fact........

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