All current discussions on the geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence inevitably hark back to the nuclear experience. As the world recalls the lessons from the nuclear age to cope with the problems and opportunities presented by AI, India too could benefit from a reflection on its complex nuclear history.
Although nuclear and AI are very different, there are similarities too. The nuclear revolution was revealed to the world by the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The enormous destructive power and its horrendous consequences compelled statesmen and scientists to consider ways to limit the threats to the survival of humanity in the nuclear age. The AI revolution threatens an even bigger catastrophe — machines taking over from humanity and enslaving them. The broader impact of the AI revolution is likely to be far more sweeping; while nuclear technology never lived up to its economic promise of “delivering electricity too cheap to meter”, AI promises to transform the economy, society and polity in fundamental ways.
Yet, many of the issues that animate AI governance today are similar to those the world faced at the dawn of the nuclear age. These challenges include managing the impact of this new technology on geopolitical rivalry among the great powers, erecting a firewall between the use and abuse of these technologies and creating international norms and institutions to govern its use. As in the nuclear age, many today demand a ban on military uses of AI or at least a “freeze” on research and development until there is a better assessment of the technology at hand. As in the past, those concerns have not slowed the rapid advances in AI.
Like in the nuclear era, there is growing interest in promoting “arms control” agreements between the great powers. If the US and the Soviet Union — the superpowers of the post-War world — dominated the discourse on nuclear weapons, Washington and Beijing do the same in the AI arena today. It is no surprise that US-China agreements on AI are viewed as critical for the management of the new technological revolution. At their summit in San Francisco last month, US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed to initiate sustained discussions on the regulation of military AI. The attempt to manage US-China competition in the military uses of AI does not mean they are standing still. Both sides are moving vigorously to develop the military uses of AI.
Even as the US seeks to put guardrails against AI’s potential to destabilise relations with China, Washington is taking a range of steps to slow Beijing’s development of AI by choking off the supply of advanced chips and chip fabrication equipment. However, Beijing is finding diverse ways of beating these restrictions and accelerating the development of sophisticated chips so critical for the development of AI.
Beyond the bilateral, there is talk of international norms to manage the potential negative consequences of the AI revolution. Some have proposed the setting up of an “International Agency for Artificial Intelligence” (IAAI), much like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that was set up in 1957 to regulate the uses of nuclear energy. While an IAAI may not be around the corner, the US is focused on building “like-minded coalitions” to discuss the development of AI and manage its effects. One such initiative is the GPAI or the Global Partnership for Artificial Intelligence which has 28 members. It is also bringing its allies and partners together to enhance military deterrence against Russia and China.
As India hosts the GPAI summit next week in Delhi, what kind of lessons can it draw from its own nuclear history in dealing with AI? Three of them stand out.
For one, the disarmament idealism of the kind that animated India’s approach to nuclear weapons is fortunately behind us when it comes to AI. The endless drumbeat from Delhi about the “time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons” prevented India from thinking clearly about the role of atomic weapons in the international system. The too-clever-by-half posture of “keeping the nuclear weapon option open” imposed massive political, economic and technological costs for India. Unlike in the nuclear domain, India does not have the luxury of taking things easy until it’s too late in the AI domain.
Second is the importance of building on the current momentum in the partnership with the US on AI and other critical and emerging technologies. Independent India began with expansive technological cooperation with the US and the West that were eager to shore up Delhi’s position vis a vis Communist China. But an India that was determined to befriend China dropped the ball. As told by the former foreign secretary and one of India’s most distinguished diplomats, Maharaj Krishan Rasgotra, US President John F Kennedy had sent a hand-written note in the early 1960s to help India build a nuclear weapon. The idea was to ensure that democratic India beat the PRC in the race to become the first Asian country to possess nuclear weapons.
India nearly dropped the ball again in 2005. After Prime Minister Manmohan Singh negotiated a historic civilian nuclear deal with the US in July 2005, the Congress leadership developed cold feet about going forward. The fear of offending Beijing and ideological worries about getting too close to Washington prevented Delhi from taking full advantage of the possibilities that the civil nuclear initiative had opened up. The NDA government is less inhibited and has put technological cooperation with the US and the West at the very top of India’s national agenda. However, it needs to move on multiple policy fronts quickly to raise its position in the global AI hierarchy.
Third, one danger persists on the downside. It is Delhi’s traditional temptation to find a “third way” in technological development and proclaim India’s exceptionalism. While their application can be country-specific and context-dependent, science and technology are universal. There is no such thing as “Indian physics”.
Delhi’s political posturing on technological development in the 1970s set India back badly, and it can’t afford to make the same mistake on AI today. Building strong domestic capabilities in AI is critical to making the best out of international cooperation. That, in turn, calls for a larger role for the private sector. If technological progress in the second half of the 20th century — especially in nuclear and space — were led by governments, it is the private sector that leading AI research, development and innovation in the West. The NDA’s recent efforts to open up the S&T sectors is a welcome first step. But the agenda of reforming India’s technology sector is at once large and urgent.
The writer is senior fellow, Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
Many issues that animate AI governance today are similar to those the world faced at the dawn of the nuclear age
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06.12.2023
All current discussions on the geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence inevitably hark back to the nuclear experience. As the world recalls the lessons from the nuclear age to cope with the problems and opportunities presented by AI, India too could benefit from a reflection on its complex nuclear history.
Although nuclear and AI are very different, there are similarities too. The nuclear revolution was revealed to the world by the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The enormous destructive power and its horrendous consequences compelled statesmen and scientists to consider ways to limit the threats to the survival of humanity in the nuclear age. The AI revolution threatens an even bigger catastrophe — machines taking over from humanity and enslaving them. The broader impact of the AI revolution is likely to be far more sweeping; while nuclear technology never lived up to its economic promise of “delivering electricity too cheap to meter”, AI promises to transform the economy, society and polity in fundamental ways.
Yet, many of the issues that animate AI governance today are similar to those the world faced at the dawn of the nuclear age. These challenges include managing the impact of this new technology on geopolitical rivalry among the great powers, erecting a firewall between the use and abuse of these technologies and creating international norms and institutions to govern its use. As in the nuclear age, many today demand a ban on military uses of AI or at least a “freeze” on research and development until there is a better assessment of the technology at hand. As in the past, those concerns have not slowed the rapid advances in AI.
Like in the nuclear........
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