India might be polarised on various domestic issues in this general election, but there is hardly any political argument on foreign policy. Is this because Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s diplomacy is so spectacularly successful that there is little room to debate?
To be sure, PM Modi’s stewardship of India’s foreign policy has been impressive. Coming to power with a full majority in the Lok Sabha in 2014 and improving on it in 2019, Modi has enjoyed great command over his party and government and a freer hand in running foreign policy. All his predecessors since Rajiv Gandhi had to run coalition governments in which all policies, including external affairs, were under continuous disputation. The steady accretion of economic salience has made India an attractive partner for many countries and offered valuable commercial levers to boost Indian diplomacy. At the same time, a favourable global geopolitical environment has created new strategic opportunities to transform key relationships. A professional diplomat — Subrahmanyam Jaishankar — as the foreign minister has given India a definitive edge in international relations.
Yet, it is hard to argue that there are no questions to be asked, no assumptions to be questioned, and no policy alternatives to be proffered. The lack of a foreign policy debate today is less about a genuine consensus than declining interest in world affairs within the demoralised Opposition. Ironically, the more India has become global, the less engaged its political class is with international affairs.
The main opposition party, Congress, has been unwilling to challenge the main trends of the government’s foreign policy. During his visits abroad in the last two years, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi chose to focus more on India’s domestic divisions than express any difference with the Prime Minister on foreign policy issues. Asked repeatedly about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Rahul backed the government’s position. There was a brief moment when the Congress seemed to question the government’s unstinting support to Israel in the immediate aftermath of the brutal October 7 terror attacks by Hamas. But the party soon tied itself into knots on the questions of terrorism and the “Palestinian cause”.
The loss of the Left voice on foreign policy has compounded the defensive orientation of the Congress. During the first term of the UPA government (2004-09), the Left parties had shaken India’s foreign policy to its core. They opposed the historic civil nuclear initiative and pulled out of the coalition, accusing the Congress of sacrificing India’s strategic autonomy by drawing close to the US.
The left’s arguments found interesting resonance in the BJP and triggered a rare and intense debate on a major foreign policy question — India’s relationship with the US. The Manmohan Singh government barely survived amidst an unprecedented and coordinated attack from the CPM and the BJP.
Although the Left parties were out of the UPA coalition, its influence on foreign policy endured in the second term of the UPA (2009-14). The Manmohan Singh government slowed down the engagement with the US. Over the last decade of NDA rule, India has moved closer than ever before to the US, and in PM Modi’s words, Delhi has shed its “historic hesitations” in engaging Washington.
The Congress has largely turned silent on the relations with the US and, more broadly, on the new foreign policy orientation of the Indian government. Despite the BJP government’s trenchant critique of Nehruvian foreign policy, the Congress party has not risen to the occasion. The Left critique has become less audible amidst the rapid decline in its parliamentary clout and intellectual influence.
The last decade has seen a dramatic expansion of popular interest in foreign policy. The rapid proliferation of think tanks, the increasing contribution of retired bureaucrats, and the explosion of social media engagement with Indian diplomacy have created the basis for a genuine democratisation of foreign policy discourse. However, much of the output tacks to the government line, some tend to be hyper-nationalistic, and a bit of partisan sniping does break into the discourse to complete the picture.
In the end, though, it is the burden of the political class to lead a purposeful discourse. The story of India’s changing foreign policy in the last three decades has been about the political leadership — Rajiv Gandhi, P V Narasimha Rao, Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi pushing the foreign policy establishment in new directions.
As the political parties prepare their manifestos, it might be unreasonable to expect them to devote too much attention to foreign policy. Yet, the fact that we are at a hinge moment in global politics demands serious reflection on the role of a rising India in a rapidly changing world. Four big ideas cry out for attention.
First is the need for a diagnosis of the changing international order — marked by the return of great power rivalry. The ongoing war in Ukraine at the heart of Europe and the growing potential for one in Asia’s Taiwan Straits are rooted in the changing distribution of power among the major states. There must be a debate about the nature of this key variable that shapes the international system as well as India’s choices in dealing with it.
Second, if India’s challenge in the last three decades has been about adapting to the logic of globalisation, the task today is to make the best of the unfolding rearrangement of the global economic order. There is room for a productive contestation of ideas on how to raise India’s share of global trade in the coming years and deepen regional economic integration as the US and China change the commercial rules.
Third is the question of dealing with a China that has risen and presents challenges across all major policy areas in the functional domain — commercial, political, security, technological, and climate change. Assessments of Chinese power also affect our policies in the neighbourhood and extended neighbourhood, as well as our approach to other great powers and global institutions.
Finally, the old tropes of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy” have become less relevant for an India that is on the rise and is well-placed to become the third-largest economy in the next few years. An India with the ambition to become a developed nation by 2047 deserves a new strategic lexicon and a new geopolitical grammar. Can the political classes begin to deliver?
The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
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