One of the subtle but significant changes in the conduct of India’s foreign policy over the last decade has been the evolution of its diplomatic vocabulary. However, that vocabulary has yet to filter down to the political class. The sharp political polarisation in the country slows this process. It delays the emergence of a new and widely accepted diplomatic lexicon that is necessary for India, which is rising on the global stage.
Even the limited attention to foreign policy in the election manifestos of political parties, especially in the Opposition, will hopefully reduce some of the gap between India’s rise in the international hierarchy and the nature of discourse at home on Delhi’s new global role. India’s subjective capacity to seize the new objective international possibilities will depend on recognising the positive change in India’s relative and absolute position in the international system. Prime Minister Narendra Modi frequently talks about India’s emergence as the third-largest economy in the next few years. India is on course towards that goal.
There is little political gain for the Opposition in quibbling about this prospect and questioning the data. Instead of dissing “India’s rise”, an idea that enthuses large parts of society, the Opposition should take at least some credit for India’s transformation. All major political parties, including the regional ones, have, after all, been part of various coalition governments since 1991 that steered India on an upward trajectory. Yet, there is persistent resistance in many quarters of the political class to thinking of India as a major power. In fact, many leaders and intellectuals insisted that India either cannot or should not become a major power. However, given the uneven pace at which different countries progress and the size of their populations, India’s weight in the international system will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. What the Opposition could do is remind the nation that India will remain a distant third to the US and China and that there are gigantic tasks at hand to reduce that gap.
Years of self-perception as a weak and vulnerable nation constrained India’s ambitions and constructed a diplomatic language that tended to be defensive, defiant and passive-aggressive. As Delhi recognises and responds to its changing position in the international hierarchy, India’s foreign policy lexicon has begun to move towards greater self-assurance. In the all-consuming debate on the India-US nuclear deal in the mid-2000s, many had insisted that Delhi would lose its “strategic autonomy” and its tradition of independent foreign policy if it moved closer to the US. Although India has not bought a single nuclear reactor from the US, Delhi is now closer than ever to Washington.
But as India’s economy grows, its diplomatic language has become ever more self-confident. While the new language of assertion enthrals many nationalists, others worry about Delhi emulating Beijing’s counter-productive “wolf warrior diplomacy”. How Delhi talks to the world has clearly changed — it is increasingly unabashed in its emphasis on national interests and global ambitions; it has avoided, so far, the dangers of looking too aggressive.
Thinking of India as the third-largest economy, which also has the third-largest armed force and the fourth-largest defence budget, does not square with the idea of “strategic autonomy”. It is an idea inherited from the era of post-colonial insecurity and the persistent anxiety about being hustled into unwanted decisions by major powers. But when you are a major power in your own right, your autonomy inevitably expands. Even so, there is no such thing as “absolute strategic autonomy” — not even the world’s most powerful nation, the US, has total freedom of action.
India’s growing aggregate power also brings greater responsibilities and opportunities to shape and maintain regional and global order. It demands a different diplomatic language. It is no surprise that references to “strategic autonomy” have declined over the last decade and have been replaced by references to India as a “leading power”, “Vishwa Mitra”, “net security provider”, “first responder” to regional crises, “like-minded coalitions”, “minilateralism”, “inter-operability”, and “global public goods”.
Yet, there is much distance to go. The big question today for the Indian political class is no longer about preserving autonomy but contributing effectively to securing the region and governing the world. Historically, great powers have shaped the nature of war and peace and international institutions to limit the former and promote the latter. Great powers also set the rules for international commerce, manage global commons, regulate the emergence of new technologies and manage their consequences. An even more important opportunity comes from a higher position in the international hierarchy. It is about leveraging India’s growing weight in the international system to generate greater security and prosperity for its citizens.
Strategic autonomy was never about setting goals; it was about abstract claims on retaining freedom of action. Once you are a power of reasonable size with assured autonomy, you must set concrete goals and objectives. For too long, the pursuit of strategic autonomy seemed to become an end in itself. That prevented the Indian political classes from articulating specific external goals. Successive governments in the 21st century have talked about developing and publishing a “national security strategy”. Yet, the long-standing tradition of avoiding a definitive analysis of the international situation and identifying India’s goals and policies has prevailed.
To its credit, the Modi government has set one important goal — making India a developed nation by 2047. Rather than carping at this exuberance, the Opposition must press for a debate on the best possible pathways to that goal. After all, India’s per capita income today is less than $3000, quadrupling it to $12,000 by 2047 is at once inspiring and intimidating.
That also brings us to the real paradox of India’s power.
Although the aggregate size of its economy gives India some of the critical attributes of a major power, its low per capita income underlines the massive developmental challenges at home. Becoming a developed country in the next quarter of a century raises complex questions about economic strategy, industrial policy, new technologies, inequality, environmental degradation, and a changing global order.
It is the responsibility of the Opposition to debate the policy issues raised by the seemingly simple ambition of becoming a developed nation by 2047. Much of that political burden naturally falls on the Congress and hence the significant public interest in its election manifesto. There was a time, many moons ago, when the foreign policy resolutions of the annual AICC sessions set the term for domestic discourse on foreign policy. As India’s domestic and external imperatives become more intricately intertwined today, the Congress must rise to the occasion.
The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
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