It is said that history does not repeat itself, but often rhymes. This truism, usually ascribed to Mark Twain, may provide some cues about the kind of security challenges that India would have to prepare for in 2024. The last two years are too recent to be consigned to “history” but some of the most significant punctuations of 2022 and 2023 in the strategic domain could be extrapolated to the composite Indian national security challenge in the year ahead.

2022 first. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 upended the long-held belief that in the post-Cold War era, major nations would not go to war — much less over territory. The wisdom gained after the German reunification was that the spirit of the 1976 Helsinki Agreement, which made borders sacrosanct in Europe, would not be violated.

Citing long-held historical grievances and the betrayal by the US-led West over the eastward expansion of NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his military invasion, and the war in Ukraine will soon enter its third year. Thus the 2022 distillate is that nuclear weapon states can enter into conventional warfare over contested territory, and when pushed to the wall, they may rattle their nuclear sabre.

India had a similar experience when China chose to violate the 1993 agreement to maintain peace along the LAC and moved into Galwan in the Ladakh region — though both nations have not escalated the stand-off to a shooting war. Will this restraint be maintained by Beijing in 2024?

As regards 2023, the October 7 Hamas terror attack and the brutal reprisal by Israel have stoked a conflict with little or no light at the end of a tragic tunnel. The Palestine issue has come back into global focus and many layers of Israeli oppression, occupation and apartheid policies have been illuminated.
From a purely military perspective, Hamas, a non-state entity (albeit with covert state support), stunned Israel with its audacious attack. The manner in which the operation was mounted in complete secrecy till the moment of the attack and the innovative use of rockets exuded considerable tactical acumen. Whether this will lead to any meaningful resolution of the tangled Palestine issue is moot.

In December, the little-noticed Houthi rebel group in Yemen, another non-state entity, picked up the Palestine gauntlet and embarked upon a daring attack on merchant shipping with Israeli linkage. The impact on global shipping and supply chains has been disruptive, compelling the USA to cobble together a naval task force of like-minded nations to ensure safety and stability in the Red Sea region. This has been a mixed bag since the politics surrounding the relentless Israeli attacks on Palestine have led to divergent views among US allies and there is visible reticence among the latter to uncritically support Washington in this matter.

What is germane is how another non-state entity (again, with covert state support), with no naval capability worth mention, has exploited low-cost technology — unmanned drones — to attack merchant shipping and cause considerable disruption in one of the world’s most critical shipping routes. Missiles have been used by the Houthis making this challenge more formidable than piracy. India has also been adversely impacted by this pattern of attacks and one of them took place just 200 miles off the country’s west coast, triggering a stern warning to the perpetrators by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.

In alluding to the rhythms of history, the strand to be highlighted is how the target of each attack (Ukraine, Israel or merchant shipping) was caught by surprise, revealing the inadequacy of both actionable intelligence at the tactical level and the ability at a higher planning level to anticipate out-of-the-box security exigencies based on technological trends.

India has a patchy track record in this regard. The October 1962 border war with China, Kargil in 1999, the Mumbai terror attack of 2008 and most recently Galwan in 2020 are cases in point. The surprise element left Indian apex security planners (cabinet committee on security) and the operational force commanders bewildered, and more often than not an arduous reactive response was mounted to overcome the setback.

India enters 2024 with a complex set of security challenges, both on the external front and the LIC-IS (low-intensity conflict – internal security) domain. The security postures of China and Pakistan individually and the strategic cooperation between them, as well as their support to non-state entities, is an abiding challenge for Delhi. Furthermore, the probability that the current Hamas-Houthi churn could embolden groups in the Subcontinent to advance their anti-India agenda remains high. The spike in terrorist violence in Jammu is illustrative.

Recent developments in Myanmar and their spillover into the Indian northeast and the pro-China orientation in the politics of the Maldives could unspool in a manner that is inimical to Indian interests. Concurrently, the electoral dynamic in Pakistan has the potential to unleash dormant anti-Indian fervour.

India’s overall security index will remain relatively parlous in 2024 due to a combination of factors that include electoral compulsions in the early part of the year where rhetoric may be removed from reality and the funding constraints that have hobbled the much-needed induction of platforms and modernisation of old inventory. It merits recall that after the Khanduri report was tabled in Parliament in March 2018, there has been no objective review of the status of India’s military preparedness. Rhetorical assertions are periodically made about the capability of the Indian military, but these are not borne out in the bean counting of tangible combat assets.

The more serious challenge is that institutionally, the Indian fauj is going through a radical re-wiring both at the apex, by way of the intent to move towards theatre commands, and at the bottom of the pyramid because of the pattern of recruitment. Appointing a retired three-star officer as the second CDS was a radical decision by the Narendra Modi government that has dented the apolitical nature of the armed forces. Its impact on the combat efficiency of the military and the higher defence management remains indeterminate at this stage. The more significant policy shift has been the introduction of the Agniveer scheme for young recruits — this has resurrected many of the misgivings that were earlier voiced after the excerpts of former army chief General M M Naravane’s memoir were made public. The impact on the Gorkha regiments could reduce the combat level of the army in the long run.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge for security planners worldwide will be to study the tea leaves of 2023, which are yet to settle, and arrive at an informed decision about further acquisitions of conventional platforms (tanks, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft) and determine their efficacy/vulnerability in the emerging battlefield environment. This will be further modified with the gradual introduction of AI and related technologies. Security planners will have to factor in exigencies that go beyond traditional conflict scenarios, wherein states may be pitted against opaque non-state entities and their hidden support structures that could include market forces and shady corporate power brokers.

The rhymes of history may chime at a quicker pace than envisaged and the security challenges for India in 2024 and beyond will test the nimbleness and bench strength of the next government and the higher defence management team.

The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi

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India enters 2024 with a complex set of security challenges

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10.01.2024

It is said that history does not repeat itself, but often rhymes. This truism, usually ascribed to Mark Twain, may provide some cues about the kind of security challenges that India would have to prepare for in 2024. The last two years are too recent to be consigned to “history” but some of the most significant punctuations of 2022 and 2023 in the strategic domain could be extrapolated to the composite Indian national security challenge in the year ahead.

2022 first. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 upended the long-held belief that in the post-Cold War era, major nations would not go to war — much less over territory. The wisdom gained after the German reunification was that the spirit of the 1976 Helsinki Agreement, which made borders sacrosanct in Europe, would not be violated.

Citing long-held historical grievances and the betrayal by the US-led West over the eastward expansion of NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his military invasion, and the war in Ukraine will soon enter its third year. Thus the 2022 distillate is that nuclear weapon states can enter into conventional warfare over contested territory, and when pushed to the wall, they may rattle their nuclear sabre.

India had a similar experience when China chose to violate the 1993 agreement to maintain peace along the LAC and moved into Galwan in the Ladakh region — though both nations have not escalated the stand-off to a shooting war. Will this restraint be maintained by Beijing in 2024?

As regards 2023, the October 7 Hamas terror attack and the brutal reprisal by Israel have stoked a conflict with little or no light at the end of a tragic tunnel. The Palestine issue has come back into global focus and many layers of Israeli oppression, occupation and apartheid policies have been illuminated.
From a purely military perspective, Hamas, a non-state entity (albeit with covert state support), stunned Israel with its audacious attack. The manner in which the operation was mounted in complete secrecy till the moment of the attack and the innovative use of rockets exuded considerable tactical acumen. Whether this will lead to any meaningful resolution........

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