Henry Kissinger, a man whose life was extraordinary by any definition, and whose career and policies were both 'pivotal' and 'polarising', as a BBC obituarist put it, passed away at the end of November, at the age of 100. Even that number seems strategically calculated, like everything else about the man. In death, as in life, he achieved a landmark before leaving.

The Internet is full of assessments of the man and his life; I have no intention to add to their number. For a few years in New York, I knew him well enough to be on first-name terms with him. I was still amazed how 'Henry', the architect of the US tilt towards Pakistan in 1971, could morph with such insouciance into the most prominent advocate of closer US-India relations three decades later. I somewhat cattily remarked on X (formerly Twitter) that it helps to live long enough so people don't remember your earlier statements and actions. But of course, we in India have never forgotten his stand then -- and subsequent revelations of the contempt and distaste for India and Indians expressed by President Nixon in Kissinger's company have only underscored the unpleasantness we had to put up with from that duo, at a vital time in our national existence.

But all that, too, is sufficiently written about. So are his amoral faith in realpolitik, and (not unrelated) his close relations with, and deep understanding of, Communist China. What is not, surprisingly, discussed is another subject I would like to address today. With the horrors of Gaza completely eclipsing the war in Ukraine, the one current subject on which Kissinger left us some invaluable advice is my theme in this column.

Way back in 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the beginnings of the conflict in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, Henry Kissinger wrote a magisterial essay entitled 'How the Ukraine crisis ends'. By his standards, it was little noticed at the time, and President Putin's subsequent invasion in 2022 so completely changed the terms of the Western debate over Ukraine that he did not attempt to revive his arguments, realising fully how unpopular they would be. But as that conflict now grinds on in a prolonged stalemate, and predictions of an imminent Russian defeat have proved to be so much bluster, it may well be time for a posthumous resurrection of Kissinger's ideas.

He started off with the proposition that if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must escape being caught up in the East-West confrontation re-emerging at the time. Ukraine 'must not be either side's outpost against the other - it should function as a bridge between them', Kissinger Solomonically opined. Russia should not try to reduce Ukraine to a satellite and the West should not try to capture the country as an ally. 'The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country', Kissinger explained. 'Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then.'

Teaching history to his news headline-obsessed compatriots was a characteristic responsibility that Kissinger felt he needed to take on. After summarising centuries of Ukrainian history before and after its absorption into the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, he concluded that 'Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century.' He then turned to Ukraine's internal dynamics. Recognizing the differences between the Russian-speaking East and the Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking West, Kissinger argued that 'A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.'

For Kissinger, both Russia and the West had failed to act on this principle, and only made the situation worse. In a line one wishes Putin had read and remembered, he warned that 'Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious... Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War.'. He was equally critical of policy-makers in Washington: 'For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.' Kissinger argued that 'Putin is a serious strategist', but that understanding Russian history and psychology was not Washington's strong suit.

Kissinger then came up with a four-point formula to resolve the Ukraine crisis then, which a decade later seems worth revisiting:
1. Ukraine should have the right to freely choose its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
2. Ukraine should not join NATO.
3. Ukraine should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland, cooperating with the West in most fields but carefully avoiding 'institutional hostility' toward Russia.
4. Russia should recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea. In turn, Ukraine should reinforce Crimea's autonomy and allow Russia to continue to deploy its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

Had Kissinger's suggestions been heeded then, the crisis of today might not have been ignited in 2022. Some of his ideas have been overtaken by the events triggered by that war - notably Finland has abandoned its neutrality and joined NATO, and Ukraine's process of admission to the European Union appears to be advancing strongly. Thanks to the war, U.S. policymakers are again mired in the 'institutional hostility' toward Russia that Kissinger warned against, and Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea seems unachievable.

So is the Kissinger formula, so wise in 2014, irrelevant a decade later? Not necessarily. Neither side seems to know how to end what threatens to be the most prolonged European conflict since the Yugoslav Civil war. A Ukraine modelling itself on the 'old' Finland might yet be the only way to ensure lasting peace with Russia. Kissinger argued that his ideas proposed 'an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides'. The ace diplomat added that the test of a successful negotiation 'is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction'.

As Kissinger is interred into the earth whose geopolitics he did so much to shape, let us remember his prescient warning: 'If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.' It did - and on this one, Henry, you were right. May you rest in peace.

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Kissinger and Ukraine Conflict

16 5
05.12.2023

Henry Kissinger, a man whose life was extraordinary by any definition, and whose career and policies were both 'pivotal' and 'polarising', as a BBC obituarist put it, passed away at the end of November, at the age of 100. Even that number seems strategically calculated, like everything else about the man. In death, as in life, he achieved a landmark before leaving.

The Internet is full of assessments of the man and his life; I have no intention to add to their number. For a few years in New York, I knew him well enough to be on first-name terms with him. I was still amazed how 'Henry', the architect of the US tilt towards Pakistan in 1971, could morph with such insouciance into the most prominent advocate of closer US-India relations three decades later. I somewhat cattily remarked on X (formerly Twitter) that it helps to live long enough so people don't remember your earlier statements and actions. But of course, we in India have never forgotten his stand then -- and subsequent revelations of the contempt and distaste for India and Indians expressed by President Nixon in Kissinger's company have only underscored the unpleasantness we had to put up with from that duo, at a vital time in our national existence.

But all that, too, is sufficiently written about. So are his amoral faith in realpolitik, and (not unrelated) his close relations with, and deep understanding of, Communist China. What is not, surprisingly, discussed is another subject I would like to address today. With the horrors of Gaza completely eclipsing the war in Ukraine, the one current subject on which Kissinger left us some invaluable advice is my theme in this column.

Way back in 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the beginnings of the conflict in the Donbas........

© Mathrubhumi English


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