The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been in an alliance-forging mode for the past several months. Its recent pacts with Chandrababu Naidu-led Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Pawan Kalyan's Jana Sena in Andhra Pradesh made headlines. Considerable news space is also being expended on the possibility of the party striking up an electoral understanding with the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Odisha. Weeks ago, the party stitched up an alliance with the 'ally-once-again' Nitish Kumar and his Janata Dal (United) (JD-U). The BJP has also weaned the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) led by Jayant Chaudhary away from the Samajwadi Party-led opposition in Uttar Pradesh.
When the aforementioned decisions were announced sequentially at different centres, the BJP leaders present took care to present a picture of humility. They ensured that the new ally was seen as being treated equally, although the reality was the opposite. The BJP remains the 'Big B'.
The BJP's current disposition is at odds with its temperament last year in May, when it more or less glossed over the 25th anniversary of the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). It instead highlighted the ninth anniversary of the Modi government's formation. The reasons were not difficult to seek. Numerically, the BJP stopped being dependent on coalition partners in 2014, and in Prime Minister Nardendra Modi, it had a leader who towered over peers in any party in terms of popularity and charisma.
Compared to the previous NDA governments which had Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the prime minister, the Modi government paid scant attention to the concerns of its alliance partners. The phrase "compulsions of coalition politics", which Manmohan Singh confessed restricted his decision-making abilities, applied equally to Vajpayee too. The BJP, between 1998 and 2004, jettisoned its core issues - Ram temple, abrogation of Article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code - from the National Agenda of Governance, which was adopted by coalition partners as the regime's consensual programme in March 1998.
The Modi government faced no such constraint. Its survival was never a worry. Contrarily, partners became more cautious for fear of losing their positions. From the beginning, especially after 2019, there were no 'taboo' issues and many decisions that once appeared improbable were hustled through Parliament - the triple talaq bill, the status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill (CAA), and most importantly, the Ram temple.
So, what has changed between May 15, 2023, the NDA's 25th anniversary, and now, for the BJP to become more accommodative towards allies? Why the urgency to forge electoral alliances, with the total number of coalition partners now being the highest ever? Does the BJP's patience in exploring pacts with regional parties indicate the leadership's anxiety about electoral prospects? Or, should this be seen as evidence of a strategy of leaving no stone unturned in pursuit of its goal, ensuring that no uncertainty remained? And on the other end, do hurried alliances with the BJP indicate regional parties' fear of marginalisation unless they become part of the Big B team?
Despite India being a multi-party democracy, political parties have traditionally not forged alliances on the basis of principles. I was fortunate to ask Modi a question or two about NDA's alliances when I was researching for the biography I wrote on him. In the summer of 2012, when the number of NDA's allies was abysmally low, I asked him how the party could win back estranged partners. He said when the party first formed a government in 1996, it got no partners except the Shiv Sena and the Akali Dal, and, as a result, the government bowed out of office in thirteen days. But in 1998, the party secured more pre-poll partners (and several more after elections) because its "winnability" was greater.
Modi said partners "come and go" because of their assessment of the BJP's winnability. "If allies become confident that by associating with the BJP they will win more seats, they will come and join the BJP. But if they think we are a burden and that they will save a few seats by contesting on its own, then they will not ally with the BJP."
Clearly, according to Modi, the BJP's own attitude towards allies depended on their assessment of the potential partner's prospects - on whether the party was on a strong wicket in the home state or region. The electoral strength of regional parties traditionally determines their equation with national parties - for instance, in Tamil Nadu, regional parties have since the late 1960s been the leaders of alliances, and the national players (the Congress previously, and now the BJP) take the back seat.
From the beginning, ideology played little role in political partnerships. Initially after independence, when the Congress was the nationally dominant party, anti-Congressism acted as the glue. In May 1963, major ideologically disparate opposition parties, including the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), jointly contested four Lok Sabha by-elections against the Congress, as an experiment. The trial was a success for they won three seats. In four years, this evolved into the Samyukya Vidhayak Dal (SVD) coalition governments in several states. This was the first experience with coalitions, and although they collapsed soon, a new era in Indian politics was heralded.
For the BJP or the preceding BJS, alliances were formed solely to enhance collective winnability. Like in 1977, when all non-Left opposition parties united and defeated Indira Gandhi. They joined forces in 1989 too to defeat Rajiv Gandhi, even though the BJP, the Janata Dal and other regional partners-including the Left-were ideologically hostile to one another. Anti-Congressism brought them together.
The BJP, in contrast, finds it problematic when non-BJP parties from different ideological stables get together, as it happened with the I.N.D.I.A alliance. This prompts us to assess the reasons behind the change in the BJP's outlook towards alliances between last May and today. The party's revived interest in regional and even sub-regional parties had initially to do with opposition parties trying to maximise their Lok Sabha wins with one-on-one contests, with a single opposition candidate taking on the BJP nominee.
At that stage, the BJP had even tried to outnumber the opposition bloc by getting smaller parties on board. And it did not change tack even after the I.N.D.I.A bloc itself started seeing fissures. That was when Modi decided to set the audacious victory target of 370 seats for the BJP and 400-plus for the NDA.
It is clear that the BJP wishes to have as many parties as possible in the NDA, especially those like the TDP, which it feels has better 'winnability' now than earlier. Unlike what Modi told me, today it is not only the allies who make a beeline for the BJP if they think their prospects would improve - the BJP, too, is wooing smaller parties when it stands to gain, especially in states where they are not a dominant force. Barring odd exceptions, the BJP's ties with its allies are based on political pragmatism today. It's a sea change from the L.K. Advani era, when the BJP basked under 'spendid-isolation'. Paradoxically, of the two oldest partners of the BJP - the Akali Dal and the Shiv Sena - one is not with the NDA anymore, while the other is represented by one of the factions that were formed after a bitter parting, aided in no small measure by the BJP.
The BJP's dominant character is unlikely to get diluted unless its tally takes a significant beating. Consequently, its allies face the risk of getting co-opted into the BJP or facing an over-bearing partner. In Maharashtra, ties soured with the united Shiv Sena because the BJP sought dominance over its partners. Likewise, sub-regional parties stand the risk of getting subsumed within the BJP if just a few leaders cross over.
No alliances are formed with a programmatic agreement - was the TDP aware that CAA rules would be notified? Or, has the Congress discussed the promises Rahul Gandhi has been serially making? No alliance is 'committed' to principles or ideology, and so, they remain transitory, changing from election to election. Every party will continue making choices solely on the basis of improving its own 'winnability'. We will know in possibly just two and a half months if siding with the NDA increased their collective 'winnability' or not.
PromotedListen to the latest songs, only on JioSaavn.com
Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay is a journalist and author. His books include 'The Demolition, The Verdict' and 'The Temple: The Definitive Book on the Ram Mandir Project'. He also wrote 'Narendra Modi: The Man The Times', and 'The RSS: Icons of the Indian Right' and 'Sikhs: Untold Agony of 1984'
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author.
login
who are we?
contact us
qosheapp
Toi Staff
Gideon Levy
Belen Fernandez
Andrew Mitrovica
Mort Laitner
Nikkei Editorial
Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Rami G Khouri
visit website
