Way back in 1989, during the first Intifada (1987-93), former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban had stated that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) could not endanger Israel because the Jewish country possessed “540,000 soldiers, 3,800 tanks, 682 fighter-bombers, thousands of artillery units, and a remarkable electronic capacity” (Israel: A Country Study, 1990, P.xxxiii). A current reading of the statement might appear misleading. Whereas Israel continues to enjoy overwhelming military superiority, both in qualitative and numerical terms, this has not deterred the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other armed groups in the Gaza Strip from seriously threatening Israel’s civilian population. The October 7 carnage is the biggest proof.
These (non-PLO) Islamist groups have used the Gaza Strip as a launch pad to fire rockets at civilian areas in Israel since 2001. The range of these rockets has increased with the passage of time. Beginning from the Qassam rockets that had a range of 16 km, Hamas has attained a range of 150 km with R160. Israel had to undertake three broad-scale campaigns in Gaza – Operation Cast Lead (December, 2008-January, 2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012) and Operation Protective Edge (July-August, 2014) to unsuccessfully stem the tide in the past.
Earlier this year, the Israel Defence Force had to undertake Operation Shield and Arrow after Hamas fired at least 21 rockets towards Israel on May 2, 2023. Though Israel has a sophisticated rocket interceptor and warning system in the form of the Iron Dome, it has apparently not disincentivised Hamas from using rockets as a mode of assault. Israel claims Hamas has launched around 10,000 rockets since the start of the present round of hostilities. In 1988, in the backdrop of the first intifada, Israel had launched merely the first of its spy satellite Ofeq-1. Earlier this year, it launched advanced Ofeq-13 from its Palmachim Airbase. Not many commentators have examined this aspect in the “intelligence failure” of the October 7 carnage.
After six weeks of hostilities, Israel and Hamas are now in the process of exchanging prisoners and hostages in each other’s custody as part of a temporary truce. Only a few days earlier (November 21), Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while addressing the 8101 Reserve Battalion (Alexandroni Brigade) had stated that his first goal was the elimination of Hamas, and second, the return of the hostages. Previously, on November 7, he had claimed that Israel had eliminated thousands of terrorists both above and below the ground (an obvious reference to the Hamas’ bunkers). Netanyahu always placed the elimination of Hamas and cessation of the offensive ahead of the release of the hostages in his strategy. However, it appears that the war had not turned out to be the one he had in his mind.
In the wake of the present hostilities, the global biggies — US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong etc — have broached the two-state solution in West Asia. India has also favoured a two-state solution at a recent 2+2 ministerial dialogue with the US in New Delhi. Only Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani recently stated that the world needs to stop talking about the two-state solution and instead put forward practical proposals to make it work once the Gaza hostilities ended.
Paradoxically, the support for a two-state solution has ebbed in the region itself. Whether that is good or bad for the future of West Asia is a different issue. The main question is both about feasibility and acceptability. One only needs to examine why the two-state solution failed to fructify after being intensely pursued by the governments of Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1995), Shimon Peres (1995-96), Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-99) and Ehud Barak (1999-2001) with overarching support of the Bill Clinton administration. Arial Sharon, once a stout critic of any negotiation with the PLO, made the most substantial contribution in this regard. His government actually evacuated Israeli settlers and withdrew military presence from the Gaza Strip (2005) though he could not proceed with partial withdrawal from the West Bank. He even split his party Likud, to form a new political party Kadima (Hebrew for Forward), to further pursue his unilateral disengagement plan. However, soon Gaza became a nursery of terrorism, rather than a beachhead of peace.
On December 15, 1998, Bill Clinton had visited Gaza whereupon he addressed a meeting of the Palestine National Council chaired by Yasir Arafat. The Council unanimously, with a show of hands, voted to recognise the existence of Israel. Cut to June 15, 2007 – with Israeli presence withdrawn – Hamas established its control over Gaza after a military conflict with Fatah, the dominant faction in the PLO. It threatened to turn Gaza into Israel’s Achilles heel.
The two-state solution is far more complicated today than ever before. Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 has not been productive of any solution or peace. Gaza has become a sore spot for Israel’s security. Not surprisingly, Kadima, the Centrist political party founded by Sharon in pursuit of his further disengagement plan, and which emerged as the largest faction in the March 2006 Knesset elections, has few takers today.
Any two-state solution would involve Israel’s conceding full or partial control over the West Bank, which came under Israeli occupation after the Six-Day War, 1967. West Bank (5,879 sq km) is not only 15 times larger than Gaza (378 sq km) but located more precariously to Israel’s security. Moreover, it has almost half a million Israeli settlers, for whom it might be difficult to resettle within Israel. Thus complete withdrawal from the West Bank is not an idea even the stout-hearted politician could entertain. The West Bank becoming another Gaza, only much larger, would be the last thing any Israeli government would want.
The two-state solution predicates upon the co-existence of Israel and Palestine. The PLO, under Yasir Arafat, after renouncing terrorism, had accepted this principle. It was one of the governing principles of the Oslo Accord (1993), and the beginning point of subsequent agreements like the Cairo Agreement (1994), Taba Agreement (1995), Wye River Memorandum (1998) etc.
However, the complexion of Palestinian politics has changed completely since then. Whereas only the political parties inside PLO viz. Fatah (including its splinter parties), Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestine Democratic Union (PDU), Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) etc recognise this co-existence principle, the Hamas group parties do not. The latter group which includes Hamas, Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), Palestinian National Initiative (Al-Mubadara) etc do not recognise Israel’s right to exist. They have their military wings, and even after settling down in Gaza, have not given up acts of terror against Israeli civilians. The events of October 7, 2023, are its most recent proof.
Thus the two-state solution could be dangerous if the entire Palestine i.e. Gaza and the West Bank were to fall into the hands of the Hamas group. However, it is not an unlikely scenario either. Whereas the last legislative elections for the Palestinian Authority (PA) were held in 2006, the support for Hamas is believed to remain strong. Even Fatah-linked politicians have refrained from criticising Hamas during the ongoing hostage crisis.
The two-state solution idea lost its steam after the armed conflict within the Palestinian Authority erupted between Fatah and Hamas on government formation as a result of the legislative elections (2006). This conflict ultimately allowed Hamas to establish itself in Gaza, and Fatah in the West Bank in June 2007. Palestine itself was thus split into two, with the reconciliation process remaining inconclusive. Since then, no other legislative or presidential elections have taken place with the PA.
In the 2006 elections, Hamas, running as Change and Reform, had swept 74 of the 132 seats, pushing Fatah to a second spot at 45. It was a democratic verdict from the electoral perspective, even as the original UN Partition Plan i.e. UNGA Resolution 181 (II) dated November 29, 1947, had envisaged Jewish and Arab portions to democratic governments elected on adult suffrage.
Democracy, however, is not a solution in Palestine when applied to parties that are committed to the destruction of Israel rather than co-existing with it. Hamas, having established its control over Gaza, has not abandoned its policy of assaulting Israeli civilian targets. Therein lies the dichotomy between peace and democracy which are erroneously treated as two faces of the same coin. One might remember that the Muslim Brotherhood democratically came to power in Egypt in the June 2012 elections.
Though the two-state solution is broken, and currently pushed into the periphery of Israeli politics, a political quandary in West Asia is not a permissible option either. Whereas thousands of Palestinian civilians have perished in the Israeli bomb strikes, Hamas has not been eliminated. The Palestinian civilians need to come out against Hamas if they prefer their own well-being rather than the destruction of Israel. On the Israeli side, during the first Intifada, the cost of quelling the uprising was estimated at $132 million per month (Israel Country Studies, 1990, P.xxxii). The present Gaza War is costing an estimated $270 million per day, with a huge toll on the Israeli economy, let alone loss of tourism and business.
The writer is author of the book “The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India” (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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