THE animosity between the two states with incompatible ideologies can be traced back to the time of partition. Throughout history, the South Asian region has experienced instability and prospects for stability remain improbable. The changing security landscape between India and Pakistan is characterized by increasing instability which affects their strategic agendas. India and Pakistan’s security is hampered by unresolved territorial disputes, growing military competition and an increased likelihood of war. Most importantly, the absence of control mechanisms between the two states decreases the possibility of improving the situation and increases the probability of an armed conflict. Deterrence and coercion have taken precedence over cooperation since both regimes prioritize using force to accomplish their national security objectives. This article intends to examine the approaches of India and Pakistan towards disarmament and arms control and evaluate the prospects for disarmament and arms control between the two.
Before publicly declaring itself to be a nuclear weapon state, India sought equal recognition with other major nuclear powers. This influenced its approach to international arms control and disarmament treaties. Pakistan, which cannot afford to compete with India in nuclear affairs, wished to restrict regional atomic rivalry. Both countries are not part of any prominent treaties focusing on disarmament, arms control and nuclear testing. India did not agree to be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), claiming them to be discriminatory. India’s stance post-1998 is that it would only disarm if other nuclear powers do so first. However, India’s threat was Pakistan’s only resistance to becoming a party to these treaties. According to Adil Sultan (2019), during the pre-nuclearization stage, Pakistan supported these treaties as long as they prevented its hostile neighbour from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Similarly, both states refused to accept the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Pakistan maintains that a Fissile Material “Cut-Off” Treaty would perpetuate regional asymmetries and potentially permanently disadvantage Pakistan against India. This is because India began producing fissile material much earlier and is thought to have a significant quantity of unprotected inventory of fissile material. It is also important to note that India enjoys leverage in the international community. India has room to continue developing its nuclear capability with assistance from the US and other major western powers. As a result, this lessens India’s motivation to participate positively in any international agreements that may limit its goal of becoming a regional or global force.
The history of India and Pakistan’s hostile relations has proved that there is a need for disarmament and arms control mechanisms. According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, India and Pakistan were at the brink of a “nuclear conflagration,” referring to the Indian strikes in Pakistan in 2019. According to Ijaz Haider (2023), the strike was an election tactic on Modi’s part as elections were coming up in India. Moreover, as both states are unwilling to budge from their hardline stances, there is also little chance for resolution of the ongoing Kashmir issue, which is a significant cause for continued hostility. The decision taken by the Indian Government in February 2019 to annex Kashmir has also intensified tensions and weakened strategic stability. Ijaz Haider (2023) further ascertained Pakistan’s deterrence strategy, regional peace, and the fragmented global order are significantly impacted by India’s modernization and expansion of its nuclear weapons and the BJP’s antagonistic stance towards Pakistan and China. Thus, both sides are advancing nuclear and missile arsenals when there is little framework for communication between the two. This does not make the situation any better either. History has proved that for every Indian action, there is a Pakistani reaction. What spurred the initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear program was the Indian threat. The cause behind Pakistan not being party to major international arms control and disarmament treaties is again India’s self-exclusion from the treaties. The same goes for the active build-up of arsenals by Pakistan which is a response to India and there are numerous other examples when looking into the past. The deeply rooted hatred and lack of communication between the two have always limited the chances of developing an arms control and disarmament mechanism. In the current global order, the probability of an arms race between nations has increased. It is unrealistic to imagine cooperation between India and Pakistan, especially, with the upcoming elections of 2024 in India as Modi’s Government could target Pakistan as it did in 2019.
The current global situation also proves that international cooperation and disarmament regimes have severely weakened, especially looking at the ongoing Ukraine War and genocide in Gaza. Keeping the historical events and current global situation in view, the prospects of disarmament remain unlikely not just between India and Pakistan but globally, as the regime has weakened. As mentioned previously, Pakistan mimics the behaviour of India and unless India takes an initiative towards bilateral or multilateral cooperation, one cannot hope that the situation will change. In today’s world, the advancement of technology and the development of nuclear and conventional weapons are on the rise. Therefore, prospects of disarmament remain low and the risk of nuclear war is looming on the horizon.
—The writer graduated in Politics and International Relations from the University of London’s International Programme. ([email protected])
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