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Four months into the war between Israel and Hamas, the combatants, their allies, and their neighbors are closer than ever to reaching a cease-fire or even a settlement of their disputes—and are also equally close to seeing it spin out of control into a widening regional conflict.

They are tracing this thin line between negotiated peace and escalating mayhem along every front of the Middle East’s hot spots, which are intensifying, enlarging, and mingling with one another—a fact that makes it harder but also potentially more manageable to douse the flames.

On Friday, U.S. combat planes fired 125 precision-guided missiles and drones at 85 targets into seven facilities—command-control and intelligence centers, supply lines and storage sites for rockets, missiles, and drones, as well as other military targets—all run by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. (Officials now say that 84 of the 85 targets were destroyed or significantly damaged; 18 people were reported killed, most of them militiamen; a few civilians, and no Iranians, died, though Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers were in the areas attacked.)

The attack was in retaliation to a Jan. 28 drone strike launched by one of those militias in Iraq that killed three U.S. soldiers at a base in northeastern Jordan, near the Iraqi and Syrian borders. Militias had fired 165 drones or missiles at U.S. forces in the region since Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, but this was the first strike that killed Americans.

President Biden had a delicate task. He had to fire back with great force, showing Iranians and their proxies that they would pay a huge price for any lethal attack on Americans—but he had to do so without escalating the conflict. Part of that meant inflicting damage on assets that Iran values without attacking Iranian territory, or even, at least at this stage, killing Iranian officers—something that Biden knew would have crossed Tehran’s red lines.

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Iranian leaders have made clear, privately and publicly, that they do not want to wage war directly against the U.S. or Israel. Biden wants to keep it that way; the two aircraft carriers he sent to the Mediterranean soon after Oct. 7 were intended as deterrents to Iran getting involved in the war—and they probably had that effect. Iran has been playing a dangerous game, though: arming, training, and encouraging its allies, known as the “axis of resistance,” to wreak havoc in the region. Biden’s attacks on Friday—and some follow-on strikes over the weekend—were a way of telling Tehran’s leaders to rein in their proxies and certainly to keep their own powder dry.

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The balancing act seems to have worked, to some extent. Militias have fired rockets just three times at a U.S. base in Syria since Biden’s attack, and while no Americans were killed, six allied Kurdish troops were. What happens next? Will Tehran’s leaders stay contained? Or will they feel compelled to strike back harder still at American bases, to save face and to show they don’t cower amid danger? And how much do they control their proxies? Might one of the militias launch another deadly attack—and might it kill more Americans, whether deliberately or not? After Biden strikes back harder, which would inevitably happen, could the Iranians afford to stay out of the fight?

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U.S. officials say that Friday’s attack was the first but not the last response to the killing of the Americans. Though they didn’t say so, the size, scope, and targets of subsequent attacks might be shaped by what Iran and its proxies do or don’t do in the coming days.

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Biden did not mean Friday’s attack to escalate tensions with Iran. Quite the contrary. If Iran takes the message as intended and is able to respond accordingly, the conflicts along the region’s edges—Hezbollah’s threats from southern Lebanon, the Houthis’ attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea, and the militias’ shellings from Iraq and Syria—might even calm down a bit. But escalation is a tricky thing. With the aid of accidents, miscalculations, or misperceptions, it can easily slip the reins of even the most careful commanders.

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Meanwhile, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has begun his fifth round of shuttle diplomacy in the region since Oct. 7, this time hoping to firm up two big projects. First is an Israel–Hamas cease-fire, combined with an exchange of hostages and prisoners, negotiated by U.S., Egyptian, and Qatari diplomats. Second is a broader, possibly transformative arrangement by which Saudi Arabia would “normalize” relations with Israel in exchange for formal security guarantees, more arms sales, and even the supply of (supposedly peaceful) nuclear technology from the United States.

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There’s only one problem with these diplomatic breakthroughs: Israel and Hamas—the parties that have to stop fighting—haven’t signed on. Hamas’ leaders say that any cease-fire arrangement has to be permanent and that they will free the remaining 100 or so Israeli hostages only if Israel withdraws all of its troops from Gaza and frees thousands of Palestinian prisoners. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to keep fighting until all his objectives are met, including the elimination of Hamas as political ruler of Gaza and as a military force that can threaten Israel. There is also disagreement over the ratio of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners to be freed. Finally, the negotiating parties haven’t yet settled the question of who governs, rebuilds, and provides security in and around Gaza.

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In the end, Israel and Hamas may have to be budged off their most stubborn points of resistance by their biggest allies—Hamas by Qatar, Israel by the United States. Qatar holds a uniquely bizarre position, as a friend to both the U.S. and Hamas. President Biden has declared Qatar to be a “major non-NATO ally,” and it is host to the largest U.S. air base in the region. At the same time, Qatar is the major supplier of economic aid to Hamas-run enterprises in Gaza, and some Hamas leaders have lavish houses on Qatari real estate.

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The U.S., of course, is Israel’s largest military supplier. Biden has compelled Netanyahu to take certain moderating steps in the war—opening a humanitarian corridor, allowing a weeklong trade of hostages for prisoners. But he has had limited influence in getting Israel to scale back its attacks in Gaza or reduce civilian casualties—and no sway whatever in getting Netanyahu to take steps toward a two-state solution to the long-festering Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Biden could do more. He and his aides are reportedly mulling the option of simply declaring the existence of a Palestinian state, perhaps through a U.N. resolution. Many other world leaders have discussed this possibility, but U.S. presidents have rejected the notion, saying recognition must be the final step in such a process. For the U.S. to threaten passage of such a measure—perhaps on condition that the state’s territory (whatever its delineations) be demilitarized and that its leaders (whoever they are) recognize Israel’s right to exist—could exert tremendous leverage on Israel to get negotiations rolling.

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Along these lines, in recent days, there has been a very intriguing twist in possible moves toward Saudi–Israeli relations.

The Saudi royal family and the other Sunni Arab leaders have never materially cared much about the Palestinians’ fate, choosing to support them only rhetorically. And in recent years, the Sunnis have come to see Israel as a possible ally, both for trade and to shore up the alliance against their common foe, the Shiite mullahs and proxies of Iran. In pursuit of relations with Israel, the Sunnis were pushing the Palestinians steadily aside; a Saudi deal would have pushed their cause off the table entirely. The Oct. 7 attack put the cause back front and center. The Saudi and Egyptian populations are more radical than their leaders. The leaders had to voice sympathy for Hamas and suspend open dealings with Israel, especially after Israel’s bombing began. A few weeks ago, Saudi leaders said they were still interested in normalizing relations with Israel, but only if Israel took concrete and “irreversible” steps toward facilitating a Palestinian state.

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However, last week, according to reports in two leading Israeli newspapers, Haaretz and the Times of Israel, the Saudis changed their line. No longer were irreversible steps a prerequisite to normalization. A mere verbal commitment from Israel supporting the principle of a Palestinian state would be sufficient. Netanyahu has never done even that; and in the wake of Oct. 7, a still-traumatized Israeli population is not yet in the mood to discuss the idea of a two-state solution or any other peace proposals. Still, if paying lip service to the idea would bring about peaceful relations with Saudi Arabia—which could open the door to friendly ties with Muslim states around the world—even Netanyahu might agree to that.

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The trick is that all of these elements must be achieved almost simultaneously—a cease-fire, an exchange of hostages for prisoners, a toning-down (at very least) of rocket fire from Iranian proxies, and at least baby steps toward a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This last bit—the one that so many often well-meaning diplomats have tried to achieve over the decades—would also have to involve an agreement on how to repair the damage in Gaza, how to secure the Gazan borders (with Israel to the north and with Egypt to the south), and how to replace the aging, ailing leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

If Biden and the others can pull this off, it will be a triumph for the ages. If they can’t, it will be, at best, a return to normalcy—which, for the Middle East, means occasional eruptions of horrendous violence—and, at worst, a widening, deepening, and prolonged version of the savage war and constant danger flashing on all fronts today.

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QOSHE - What Biden’s Actually Doing With Those Drone Strikes in the Middle East - Fred Kaplan
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What Biden’s Actually Doing With Those Drone Strikes in the Middle East

9 10
06.02.2024
Tweet Share Share Comment

Four months into the war between Israel and Hamas, the combatants, their allies, and their neighbors are closer than ever to reaching a cease-fire or even a settlement of their disputes—and are also equally close to seeing it spin out of control into a widening regional conflict.

They are tracing this thin line between negotiated peace and escalating mayhem along every front of the Middle East’s hot spots, which are intensifying, enlarging, and mingling with one another—a fact that makes it harder but also potentially more manageable to douse the flames.

On Friday, U.S. combat planes fired 125 precision-guided missiles and drones at 85 targets into seven facilities—command-control and intelligence centers, supply lines and storage sites for rockets, missiles, and drones, as well as other military targets—all run by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. (Officials now say that 84 of the 85 targets were destroyed or significantly damaged; 18 people were reported killed, most of them militiamen; a few civilians, and no Iranians, died, though Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers were in the areas attacked.)

The attack was in retaliation to a Jan. 28 drone strike launched by one of those militias in Iraq that killed three U.S. soldiers at a base in northeastern Jordan, near the Iraqi and Syrian borders. Militias had fired 165 drones or missiles at U.S. forces in the region since Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, but this was the first strike that killed Americans.

President Biden had a delicate task. He had to fire back with great force, showing Iranians and their proxies that they would pay a huge price for any lethal attack on Americans—but he had to do so without escalating the conflict. Part of that meant inflicting damage on assets that Iran values without attacking Iranian territory, or even, at least at this stage, killing Iranian officers—something that Biden knew would have crossed Tehran’s red lines.

Advertisement

Advertisement

Advertisement

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Iranian leaders have made clear, privately and publicly, that they do not want to wage war directly against the U.S. or Israel. Biden wants to keep it that way; the two aircraft carriers he sent to the Mediterranean soon after Oct. 7 were intended as deterrents to Iran getting involved in the war—and they probably had that effect. Iran has been playing a dangerous game, though: arming, training, and encouraging its allies, known as the “axis of resistance,” to wreak havoc in the region. Biden’s attacks on Friday—and some follow-on strikes over the weekend—were a way of telling Tehran’s leaders to rein in their proxies and certainly to keep their own powder dry.

........

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