It is inevitable that much of the discussion in Washington, D.C. regarding the drone attack on a small U.S. military base on the Jordanian-Syrian border on Sunday that left three U.S. service members dead and as many as 40 injured is focused on how to retaliate.
President Joe Biden immediately indicated the U.S. would strike back. And naturally—D.C. being D.C.—Republicans immediately called for a “bigger response” even before they knew what the administration’s plans to hold those responsible for the attack were.
But the debate over the response to the attack, apparently made possible when the drone launched by an Iran-backed militia group dodged the base’s defenses by following a homeward-bound U.S. drone that was returning to the “Tower 22” outpost, is itself a trap. Debating tactics in the midst of complex, rapidly evolving conflict in the Middle East that has broader ramifications here and the U.S. and worldwide, often ends up being a distraction from bigger more strategic issues.
Republicans calling for massive attacks against Iran and its proxies—like Sens. Tom Cotton, Roger Wicker, Lindsey Graham, and John Cornyn—argue that this attack was just one among over 160 that have targeted U.S. personnel stationed in the region, arguing that U.S. deterrence strategies have been unsuccessful.
That said, calls for direct attacks against Iran, long a goal of Iran hawks, must be weighed not against past grievances, but against the consequences those attacks would have.
Such attacks could trigger a full-scale region-wide war that would put thousands of U.S. forces at risk and could necessitate deployments that would put even more members of the U.S. armed services in harm’s way. The U.S. and our allies must also be cognizant of the fact that an ill-considered or badly timed response could cause Iran to seek to derail talks between its proxy, Hamas, the Israelis, the U.S,. and intermediaries like Qatar.
Because the war in Gaza is the proximate cause of much of the heightened tension in the region (although admittedly far from all of it) and, therefore, because producing a ceasefire or moving toward a longer-term settlement in that war is one of the best ways of reducing risks to U.S. troops and facilities—as well as those of our allies—and because we appear to be at a very delicate point in negotiations to release Israeli hostages that might produce at least a ceasefire of some meaningful duration, the wrong kind of response could produce the opposite of the effect we seek.
If you want proof of that thesis, ask yourself why so many Iranian proxies—like Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria—seem to be eager to provoke a broader conflict with the U.S. and its allies right now.
Palestinians inspect destruction after an Israeli bombing of Omar bin Abdul-Aziz Mosque in Rafah, Gaza on Jan. 25, 2024.
What Iran fears most is what the U.S. is seeking diplomatically: an end or meaningful pause to the conflict in Gaza followed by a region-wide effort to produce a peace process that has even a glimmer of hope of succeeding.
Again, remember that it was the prospect of an Israeli-Saudi deal that was one of the factors that pushed Hamas to undertake the Oct. 7 attack. Regional amity among its rivals is not in Iran’s interests. Removing the Israel-Palestinian issue as a flashpoint is not either.
Not that a lasting Israel-Gaza peace is imminent or even likely. After all, it is not something that Israel’s current government appears very eager to promote. But the release of hostages and any meaningful kind of ceasefire at all would have a variety of positive effects.
First and foremost would be an end to the horrific killing of civilians and the destruction in Gaza. As important would be—with the return of hostages—a chance for each of them, their families, and Israel as a whole to begin a healing process. In addition, of course, it would be a constructive step toward reducing tensions in the region and creating room for discussions about finding an acceptable leadership alternative for the Palestinians (not Hamas or the current superannuated leadership of the Palestinian Authority) and exploring ways to move Israel toward the new elections and new government it so desperately needs and deserves.
There is no better way to create the opportunity for ending or dramatically reducing the Houthi attacks on shipping or attacks on U.S. forces in the region than a ceasefire of an extended duration in Gaza.
As we have seen, while retaliatory attacks against Iran’s proxies or Iran itself may serve some deterrent function, undertaken alone they will not achieve the greater stability goals that we, our allies, and the international community at large seek. These are important in their own right, and because such stability is a pre-condition toward gradually reducing America’s presence in the region and ramping up local responsibility for keeping the peace.
That is not to say that we will ever be able to turn our backs on the Middle East—as tempting as that may be to those who remember and were scarred by our “forever” wars. But the goals of this administration to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region, repelling Russian aggression in Ukraine, strengthening our alliances, and addressing emerging threats—including those tied to new technologies—are both sound and require us to resolve the Israel-Gaza situation as soon and as effectively as possible.
There are no perfect solutions here. So, we must seek the best options that can be implemented in practice.
Search and rescue efforts continue at the area in Az Zawayda town of Deir Al Balah, Gaza after an Israeli airstrike on Jan. 29, 2024.
Frankly, although the administration has vowed not to let politics color its decisions regarding their response to the drone attack or to the situation on the ground in Gaza, the consequences of the latter, in particular, have caused great division and strife here in the U.S. And the only way to begin to heal is, again, to move toward some kind of ceasefire to be followed by even more lasting progress toward a just outcome in Gaza—that guarantees the security and human rights requirements of Palestinians and Israelis alike.
Do the deaths of U.S. service people demand a tough response? Yes.
It is probably one that kinetically targets those directly behind the attacks, but finds ways to punish their Iranian sponsors meaningfully and proportionally. Cyber will be a useful tool in the latter regard. Covert actions—perhaps timed not to interfere with the hostage talks—will be as well. Iranian drone manufacturers who are also supporting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine seem a tailormade target, although how such factories are targeted requires careful consideration. Perhaps going after the support Iran provides its proxies—up to and including the Iranian spy ship that has been assisting Houthi attacks on shipping—could make a difference. (The administration has very reasonably noted that the response to the drone attacks will involve “several rounds of action” and given the aforementioned negotiations, timing is just as important as target selection.)
But it is vitally important that such retaliation takes place in service of our longer-term goals. It is one of those cases in which bigger and sooner, albeit more satisfying, is not always better.
Thwarting Iranian plans by advancing the cause of a just and lasting peace in Gaza is a much better (albeit vastly more complex and time-consuming) objective. We have much history that illustrates how dangerous it is to get caught up in the seemingly endless cycle of conflict in the Middle East.
By now, it is to be hoped that we have learned that options that require the most in terms of discipline, vision, diplomacy, and patience are typically the ones most likely to achieve our objectives, and to meaningfully impede our enemies from accomplishing theirs.
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