The relationship between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government in Israel has nearly reached the breaking point. It is highly dysfunctional.
Other than a shared desire to eliminate Hamas as a factor in the region, there are few major policy thrusts the U.S. supports with regard to the Israel-Gaza war that are being supported by the Israeli government. Indeed, many have been directly undermined by Israel’s prime minister and his cabinet.
Nonetheless, the Biden team continues to travel to the region and to meet with the Israelis and neighboring countries because they harbor the belief that Netanyahu has passed his sell-by date and will in the not-too-distant future be pushed out of office. They harbor the hope—although they recognize the odds are not in their favor—that once Bibi is out of power, progress can be made.
In off-the-record conversations in which they struggle to mask their frustrations with the Netanyahu government, top U.S. officials with whom I have spoken believe that the events of the past several months may set the stage for a new chapter in Israel’s efforts to normalize its relations with its neighbors—one that finally includes a legitimate and sufficient focus on moving toward an independent Palestinian state.
It is fair to say that has been the silver lining of this horrific period of conflict: The long-term efforts of Netanyahu and those close to him to suggest or imply that the Palestinian issue was unimportant to the long-term stability of the region, that it could be paid lip service and effectively ignored, that Palestinians could be weakened and marginalized without a high cost, have proven to be catastrophically wrong.
The two-state solution, once derided as impossible, is once again recognized as the most desirable path to peace and security for Israelis, Palestinians, and all in their vicinity.
Israeli soldiers operate in Gaza amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas on Dec. 18, 2023.
It will not be easy. It will not happen soon. It may not happen at all. But it is a worthy—even essential—goal, however distant and improbable.
This impulse (which cynics might deride as the triumph of hope over experience) is important for several reasons.
First, it represents a goal that elevates the current conflict from being yet another in a series of Israel-Gaza related crises to being a possible step toward more lasting, strategic gains. That is important for an administration that has struggled to avoid the trap of many of its predecessors: letting the urgent overtake the important, to let momentary concerns supplant its pursuit of long-term goals. (See the Biden administration’s continued prioritization of the Indo-Pacific region and the complex relationship with China, their revitalization of U.S. alliances, and their emphasis on competitiveness and next-generation threats and opportunities, such as AI, as examples of this.)
Next, it provides a motivation, a reason to soldier on despite the almost abusive, pretty nearly toxic, relationship between the Biden team and Bibi and the extremist clique closest to him.
Finally—last but not least—it is the right thing to do, the right goal to pursue, no matter how difficult or impossible it may seem. As one senior official said to me, “Sometimes the most difficult moments precede unexpected breakthroughs.”
Speaking to a number of senior Biden administration officials as the year comes to an end, it is clear this crisis in particular has taken a toll. Top government jobs are often exhausting. But this crisis has been so emotionally fraught, so demanding of their time, and so horrific in its consequences that the wear on those with whom I had the chance to meet is visible.
Palestinians search for casualties at the site of an Israeli strike on a house in Rafah, southern Gaza on Dec. 20, 2023.
But time spent dealing with weighty and complex issues is not the only culprit here. It is apparent that dealing with a close ally that often behaves like an adversary is a particularly difficult test.
There is no question that, like Biden, his top aides see the relationship between the people of the United States and those of Israel as fundamental and inviolable. As for the relationship with the current government of Israel, not so much.
You can hardly blame them. From the outset of the crisis, the U.S. has urged the Israelis to exercise care to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza. As the Gaza civilian death toll nears 20,000, they clearly have not done so. Revelations that almost half the bombs dropped on Gaza have been “dumb,” not precision, weapons confirms this.
So, too, do reports of using advanced technology tools to create a “mass assassination factory” in Gaza.
So, too, does the wanton destruction of Gaza—where estimates are that perhaps 100,000 buildings have been damaged or destroyed.
The U.S. has urged the high intensity operations by Israel be brought to a close. The Israelis have indicated their operations in Gaza would continue for many months. The U.S. has said that after the war Israel should not control Gaza. Netanyahu has said the opposite. The U.S. has said that the Palestinian Authority must be at the center of a long term solution, empowered as a representative of the Palestinian people. Netanyahu’s response? Nope. The U.S. has had to fight and struggle to persuade the Israelis to provide more humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza.
In short, on an extraordinarily wide range of issues, the Netanyahu government has not only been a nightmare for the people of Israel and of Gaza, they have been extraordinarily difficult for the U.S. to work with—rewarding every act of U.S. support with argument, rejection, contempt, and contemptible actions that end up reflecting poorly on the U.S.
An Israeli strike in Gaza on Dec. 8, 2023 near the southern border of Israel.
That is why when U.S. senior officials talk about the conditions necessary for a political solution to the current crisis, they cite the elimination of Hamas, the elevation of a “revamped” Palestinian Authority, and the removal from power of the Netanyahu government in almost a single breath.
They understand that progress will not be easy even with a successor government. October 7 is acknowledged by U.S. officials who have traveled to Israel as a trauma unlike any other in the country’s history. The people of Israel are naturally deeply wary of proposed “solutions” that may perpetuate threats from Palestinians. But they also note that Israel’s long-standing Gaza policy has been a failure, its efforts to eliminate threats from the Palestinians have clearly not worked, and its plan to elevate Hamas while weakening the Palestinian Authority has been an unmitigated disaster.
Further, these grave errors have been compounded by West Bank policies that have included further theft of Palestinian lands and encouraged more Israeli “settler” violence, as well as by those that have further limited the rights of Palestinians within Israel.
A government change and major policy changes in Israel are, therefore, rightly seen as pre-requisites to any sort of progress toward peace and stability in the region.
That said, top U.S. officials expect that Netanyahu will continue to use every tool at his disposal—including drawing out the Gaza war—to try to remain in power and avoid trial. (He reportedly just asked a court to postpone his corruption trial out of deference to his job managing the war effort.) They do not discount the possibility that he might zero in on potential new threats from Iran (Hamas’ primary sponsor), such as nuclear enrichment, as a path for drawing out the crisis. They see the effort against Hamas as being protracted. They see poor odds in favor of Israelis mustering the public will required to support an actual two-state solution.
In short, while the Biden administration may call and work for a two-state solution, they are realistic about what is possible in the near to medium term. That said, they believe that the current crisis may have created an opportunity for a new, more constructive phase of regional normalization talks.
At the time of the Oct. 7 attacks, an Israel-Saudi deal seemed to be nearing reality. The next phase of discussions was to be about how to make progress for the Palestinians. But the metrics for that progress were considerably lower pre-attack than they are today. That means that if Israel wants to reap the benefits of regional normalization—a priority under Netanyahu—they will have to make further concessions.
Further, the only way regional powers will step up to help fund the reconstruction of Gaza is if a real plan for a Palestinian state (a plan including the three political steps cited above) is in place. They do not, according to U.S. officials, wish to repeat the mistakes of the past, funding progress when future reversals are inevitable. That is a big issue, because the cost of rebuilding Gaza will be immense and cannot be undertaken without the regional support.
Therefore, while progress even after Bibi goes will be tough, there are some factors that may make it possible, not least among these continued pressure for change from Israel’s number one aid provider, the United States. That—along with not wanting ever to face a challenge like this or the suffering it brings again—have senior officials in the Biden administration continuing to work on this problem day and night, despite having to do so with one of the most difficult “allies” with whom the U.S. has ever had to work.
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