For many Americans, hearing that the United States had engaged in a military action like Friday morning’s joint strikes with the British against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels must trigger a degree of anxiety, call it “Post Forever Wars Stress Disorder (PFWSD).” Some part of our brains says, “We have seen this movie before and it does not end well. Sometimes, it seems like it does not end at all.”
But, not all military actions are the same. The late night raids undertaken by the U.S. and the U.K. (with the support of Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands) against the Houthis that had been terrorizing international shipping in the Red Sea, were actually the kind of step that is more likely to limit the risk of further engagement by the U.S. military in the Middle East.
In fact, despite the early reaction of many on social media, the steps taken by the U.S.—in conjunction with our allies, as parallel to a much broader effort to limit the risks associated with the Houthi attacks, following extended diplomacy and work in the United Nations—were dramatically different to the hubristic unilateralism of the U.S. military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the wake of those wars, there was a natural instinct among many to be extremely reluctant to ever use U.S. force anywhere and, in particular, in the Middle East. This is a healthy reaction, no doubt. Conflict should always be the last resort. But it also led to circumstances during the Obama years in which the U.S. was too slow to react effectively (see standing up to Assad in Syria or to Putin in Ukraine). Sometimes, limited uses of force in conjunction with active diplomacy, are necessary to keeping the peace.
The 27 Houthi attacks on international maritime vessels that precipitated the attacks could not continue unaddressed. They had impacted—per President Joe Biden’s official statement on the attacks—shipping from more than 50 countries and over 2,000 ships. They were taking a major economic toll and disrupting a vital international trade route. Further, they were escalating—with the largest attack to date taking place earlier this week targeting U.S. ships.
Multiple international initiatives had failed to stop the attacks—including the U.S.-launched Operation Prosperity Guardian that brought together 20 nations to defend against the attacks. There were condemnations from twice that many nations and a clear warning issued by 13 nations, including the U.S., that the attacks must stop or consequences would result. Finally, on Jan. 10, the UN Security Council called upon the Houthis to stop the attacks.
A ship transits the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea on Jan. 10, 2024.
This was not some effort by a cowboy U.S. administration to turn a localized problem into an excuse for military overreach as we saw in the first years of this century. The U.S. was not quick on the trigger finger. The U.S. exhausted all other available means to reduce the risk of attacks. The U.S. did not act alone. The U.S. action, involving over 70 air and naval attacks on carefully selected Houthi rebel military targets in Yemen, was proportional. The Department of Defense assured that the attacks were undertaken with special care to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Had the U.S. and our allies not undertaken this action, Houthi missile, drone, and other attacks on international shipping seemed headed for a moment when they might claim a higher toll than they have to date, a substantial loss of life that would have resulted in the escalation of the current conflicts in the Middle East—a circumstance the Biden team has been intent on avoiding.
There is no guarantee, of course, that this joint U.S.-U.K. intervention will stop the Houthi attacks once and for all. Biden’s statement ended with the warning that he “will not hesitate to direct further measures to protect our people and the free flow of international commerce as necessary.” The Houthis are used to living under attack—as was the case during their protracted war with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. They continue to receive support from Iran and, as a consequence, remain a real threat.
But a clear message has been delivered to them and to Iran, as well. Provocations will be met with force. We do not want to escalate. But we also do not want to allow the Houthi or other attacks by Iranian proxies to increase the risk of accidental or intentional escalation. Once all other means to stop those reckless and illegal attacks have failed, we will not hesitate to act again swiftly and decisively.
An RAF Typhoon aircraft returns after striking Houthi military targets in Yemen.
With this overnight military action, the point has been made by not just the U.S., but the international community as well, that we not only want to avoid an escalation, but that our adversaries should not want one either—as it will come at an exceptionally high cost.
When assessing this action, observers should not neglect the even more important efforts at reducing regional risk that are being undertaken by Biden Administration officials who are urging the Israeli government to wind up the current phase of the war in Gaza. Nothing will do more to restore stability to the region than a dramatic reduction or (better yet) a total cessation of hostilities in Gaza.
Absent the ability to persuade Israel to stop its actions altogether, limiting them to much narrow special operations that target with greater precision Hamas leadership and logistics hubs, is the single most important step to reducing tensions in the Middle East. The administration, moving forward, will promote greater stability by helping to facilitate a revamped Palestinian political leadership, pushing for real talks towards a lasting political solution, and assist in the rebuilding of Gaza.
Importantly, it seems the U.S. has gone from the overkill and self-destructive folly of the War in Iraq—or the futile “nation-building” efforts in Afghanistan—into a period of through the strategic drift and hesitancy to do what was necessary to work with regional and international partners to promote stability. Now, the U.S. is taking a more sensible approach. It is measured, multilateral, heavy on diplomacy, informed by an awareness of both our strengths and our limitations and, importantly, pursued with a clear eye to our more important global and domestic priorities.
In other words, what took place last night was not a step toward another Gulf War, it was a clear sign that we have learned some of the lessons of our past (gigantic) errors. Maintaining our focus on moving toward a just peace and stability between Israel and Palestine is a bigger test in this regard—and one on which further intensive work must be done.
But we are not the America of 2002…and that is a very good thing.
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