With the Houthis’ attacks on Israeli-bound or Israel-connected maritime commercial ships compelling the US to forge a coalition of the willing to counter-attack Houthis in Yemen, a new dimension of warfare is on the horizon, the non-state actor’s ability to launch a conventional war.
The rise of non-state actors is not a new phenomenon in the 21st Century or even before that. While the US and its allies used entities like Blackwater in the Middle East and Afghanistan, a plethora of militias erupted in response like Taliban in Afghanistan, Russian Wagner Group in Ukraine, Georgian Legion sponsored by the western allies in Ukraine, Hamas in Palestine, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen.
Without going into the ideology and motivation of these non-state actors, this paper intends to analyse the efficacy of these groups in modern times and how they are changing the tactics and strategy of conventional warfare in the third decade of the 21st Century.
For brevity, two case studies are being presented in this paper to draw suitable conclusions.
The first is the Georgian Legion. Formed by Georgian mercenaries in 2014, the legion has morphed into nearly a brigade-size force. Its composition is intriguing as you find Indian, Israeli, American, Georgian, Ukrainian, British, German and even Taiwanese mercenaries forming part of this outfit, which has fought Russian forces in Donbass and east of Dnieper River. The legion specialises in hit and run tactics, has reasonably good firepower and is most probably funded by western intelligence agencies and the Government of Ukraine.
The second case study is that of Ansar Allah, or Houthis of Yemen. Houthis now control better part of Northern and Western Yemen. Unlike the Georgian Legion or the Wagner Group, Houthis are non-state actors with a state to run. They have become a daunting challenge to Israel, the US and the larger West.
Houthis have not only evolved from a rag tag militia into a modern warfare machine but have also proven their ability to punch above their weight, displaying a grasp over military strategy. The group has also displayed innovation in use of drone warfare by exploiting the choke points created by Bab-el Mandeb and the Red Sea. They have used indirect strategy to target Israel-linked maritime assets and large ships and put so much pressure on Israel and its major ally, the US, that the US had to announce the formation of a coalition under the banner of Operation Prosperity Guardian.
The innovative use of cheap drones by Houthis and extending their reach to break the myth of large platforms like aircraft carriers and naval armadas has actually given a lot of input for future maritime warfare. Those nations and states which don’t have large or modern navies and are confronted by adversaries with Aircraft Carrier groups and Naval armadas can learn a lot from Houthis’ use of drones to target these platforms.
Houthis have also used indirect strategy to gain disproportionate gains against formidable foes. One of the masters of 20th century strategy, Sir Liddell Hart had opined, “In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender’s hold by upsetting his balance.” Houthis strategy to attack maritime trade linked to Israel is drawn from a better understanding of the indirect approach.
Another important aspect of Houthis strategy is to dominate the battle of narrative, so important in the post-truth era. Despite censorship by the Western media, they have used social media and their non-traditional media outlets for strategic communication to the Arab world, Islamic World and the global audience. Houthis have effectively exploited the pro-Palestinian sentiment and have established their credentials in the Muslim World, especially the youth. Their video of capturing the Israel-linked ship Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea was a masterpiece regarding the battle of narratives.
What are the conclusions for Pakistan and Kashmir Freedom movement?
While it may be too early to analyse the efficacy of non-state actors in modern warfare, some important conclusions can be drawn from the two case studies.
When faced with a larger adversary in warfare, the human innovation and resilience will still dominate the battlefield. Despite advances in weapon systems and surveillance technology and the fact that Israeli and American militaries have some of the best military hardware today, the Houthis have displayed that tactics and strategy is not driven by hardware alone. Their employment of drones against Israeli and Western maritime trade has not only affected the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) but also put a caution on the use of Aircraft Carriers and large Naval armadas. Should Pakistan develop a strong drone warfare capability to check Indian Navy in the region? Indian SLOCs passing through Persian Gulf as well as Red Sea will remain highly vulnerable.
Houthis, along with the Axis of Resistance, have also dented Israeli Nuclear Capability. It’s very difficult to impose nuclear hegemony on such groups that are non-state actors, don’t fear anyone and have military capability equal to a conventional military.
There is a serious debate going on in Indian defence and security establishment that Hamas and Ansar Allah have taken on the Israeli Occupation Forces with innovation and employment of indirect strategy. Can Kashmiri freedom fighters, Khalistani and other oppressed groups under Indian occupation develop such capabilities as used by Hamas on 7th Oct and the Houthis in the Red Sea? For Pakistani security community, there is a need to analyse the ongoing war between Israel and the Axis of resistance in detail and draw suitable conclusions. Indian oppression against the innocent Kashmiris in IIOJK, its treatment of minorities in Indian North East and the rising call for Khalistan could trigger a limited war in the region. Pakistan needs to exploit Indian weaknesses in an asymmetric environment.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 31st, 2023.
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Non-state actors and the new form of warfare
91
2
31.12.2023
With the Houthis’ attacks on Israeli-bound or Israel-connected maritime commercial ships compelling the US to forge a coalition of the willing to counter-attack Houthis in Yemen, a new dimension of warfare is on the horizon, the non-state actor’s ability to launch a conventional war.
The rise of non-state actors is not a new phenomenon in the 21st Century or even before that. While the US and its allies used entities like Blackwater in the Middle East and Afghanistan, a plethora of militias erupted in response like Taliban in Afghanistan, Russian Wagner Group in Ukraine, Georgian Legion sponsored by the western allies in Ukraine, Hamas in Palestine, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen.
Without going into the ideology and motivation of these non-state actors, this paper intends to analyse the efficacy of these groups in modern times and how they are changing the tactics and strategy of conventional warfare in the third decade of the 21st Century.
For brevity, two case studies are being presented in this paper to draw suitable conclusions.
The first is the Georgian Legion. Formed by Georgian mercenaries in 2014, the legion has morphed into nearly a brigade-size force. Its composition is intriguing as you find Indian, Israeli, American, Georgian, Ukrainian, British, German and even Taiwanese mercenaries forming part of this outfit, which has fought Russian forces in Donbass and east of Dnieper River. The legion specialises in hit and run tactics, has reasonably good firepower and is most probably funded by western........
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