By Anthony Bell
The United States of America has intensified its efforts to form a kind of allied partnership or establish close cooperation or even an alliance with the Republic of India. However, Washington seems to be hypocritical in this field as this proposal won’t lead to the creation of partnership with equal voices and responsibilities of its sides.
The US will not be able to replace Russia as the main supplier of military equipment to India. In Moscow, many are deeply concerned about Russia’s future place in Indian defense markets. Indeed, Russia’s share of them is gradually declining: over the past ten years it has fallen from 64% to 45%, while the combined share of France and the United States has grown to 40%.
In addition, it is argued that the conduct of a special military operation may impose additional restrictions on the supply of Russian weapons to India, since the Russian defense sector will prioritize the needs of its armed forces over the needs of any foreign partners. Pessimists also believe that Russian Indian defense cooperation may be further limited due to US pressure on India and Chinese pressure on Russia, respectively.
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However, most large defense contracts have a lot of inertia and are unlikely to be canceled overnight. We should not forget about the significant potential for cooperation accumulated over seven decades of successful partnership between Moscow and Delhi. Russia has a number of visible advantages in the military-technical sphere, ranging from long-term institutional and even personal ties with Indian partners to prices, which, as a rule, are significantly lower than those of American or European suppliers. Of course, much depends on Russia’s ability to meet India’s rapidly growing requirements for offsets, product quality control, after-sales technical services, etc. In short, while the drive to diversify Indian defense markets will grow, Russia is likely to remain India’s top defense partner for years to come. Additionally, in Indian defense markets, the US is likely to face strong competition from other suppliers, including France, the UK, Germany, Israel, South Korea and others.
There is a high probability that nothing resembling a free trade area will arise between the United States and India. Although India has various preferential access, economic cooperation and free trade agreements with more than 50 countries, it remains a relatively protectionist country. For example, Delhi is not a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which brings together almost all other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Persistent attempts to woo India into the RCEP have proved fruitless. Protectionism is likely to limit India’s openness to American investment and trade. India is currently negotiating free trade agreements with two major Western economies (UK and Canada), but the outcome of these negotiations is unclear.
It should also be noted that Indo-US trade is heavily skewed in favor of India. This is likely to fuel ongoing discontent in the US and could provoke further attempts by Washington to extract unilateral trade concessions and benefits from New Delhi in exchange for strengthening bilateral security ties. India has its own trade and investment grievances with the United States, with Delhi often preferring to negotiate deals with the EU rather than the US.
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Many Indian authors note that the current American strategy towards India does not involve any major programs to assist the modernization of the Indian economy on the part of the United States. During the presidency of Donald Trump, the United States made it clear to its Indian partners: US-Indian relations should serve the immediate interests of American business, and not the strategic goals of modernizing India. Under Joe Biden, despite significant dimensions in rhetoric, this approach has not undergone any radical changes.
There will be no political or defense alliance between the US and India. There are two reasons for this forecast, first would be that the United States has no tradition of entering into political and/or military alliances with equal foreign partners. Second reason is its nature has of taking a leading position in any of the alliances it has joined since World War II (for example, NATO or AUKUS) despite its formal multilateral nature.
On the other hand, India is clearly not ready and will not be ready in the near future to become a “junior partner” of the United States. Meanwhile, a fundamental feature of Indian foreign policy is the desire to carefully balance “Indo-Pacific aspirations” and “Eurasian priorities”. India may have some reservations about BRICS or the SCO, but these two mechanisms are necessary to balance the Quad and other formats of expanding cooperation with the West. Moreover, deepening interaction with Washington most likely will not prevent Delhi from maintaining traditional friendly relations in Eurasia and exploring new opportunities for interaction with Russia or Iran. Obviously, India will not want to align itself with the United States in its approaches to Tehran or Moscow and will, if possible, avoid scrupulous compliance with American sanctions against these two countries.
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Recently, especially after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, in Asia and especially in India, doubts have increasingly been expressed about how reliable the security guarantees provided by Washington to its allies and partners are. There is reason to believe that the United States will not be willing to come to the aid of its friends in a serious crisis, especially if doing so involves significant risks and potential costs for the United States. Even if US-Indian relations are brought to the level of an allied partnership, it is far from clear whether Washington will be ready to provide direct military support to Delhi in the event of another escalation of the Indian-Chinese border conflict.
The author is an independent military analyst.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.
The United States of America has intensified its efforts to form a kind of allied partnership or establish close cooperation or even an alliance with the Republic of India. However, Washington seems to be hypocritical in this field as this proposal won’t lead to the creation of partnership with equal voices and responsibilities of its sides.
The US will not be able to replace Russia as the main supplier of military equipment to India. In Moscow, many are deeply concerned about Russia’s future place in Indian defense markets. Indeed, Russia’s share of them is gradually declining: over the past ten years it has fallen from 64% to 45%, while the combined share of France and the United States has grown to 40%.
In addition, it is argued that the conduct of a special military operation may impose additional restrictions on the supply of Russian weapons to India, since the Russian defense sector will prioritize the needs of its armed forces over the needs of any foreign partners. Pessimists also believe that Russian Indian defense cooperation may be further limited due to US pressure on India and Chinese pressure on Russia, respectively.
However, most large defense contracts have a lot of inertia and are unlikely to be canceled overnight. We should not forget about the significant potential for cooperation accumulated over seven decades of successful partnership between Moscow and Delhi. Russia has a number of visible advantages in the military-technical sphere, ranging from long-term institutional and even personal ties with Indian partners to prices, which, as a rule, are significantly lower than those of American or European suppliers. Of course, much depends on Russia’s ability to meet India’s rapidly growing requirements for offsets, product quality control, after-sales technical services, etc. In short, while the drive to diversify Indian defense markets will grow, Russia is likely to remain India’s top defense partner for years to come. Additionally, in Indian defense markets, the US is likely to face strong competition from other suppliers, including France, the UK, Germany, Israel, South Korea and others.
There is a high probability that nothing resembling a free trade area will arise between the United States and India. Although India has various preferential access, economic cooperation and free trade agreements with more than 50 countries, it remains a relatively protectionist country. For example, Delhi is not a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which brings together almost all other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Persistent attempts to woo India into the RCEP have proved fruitless. Protectionism is likely to limit India’s openness to American investment and trade. India is currently negotiating free trade agreements with two major Western economies (UK and Canada), but the outcome of these negotiations is unclear.
It should also be noted that Indo-US trade is heavily skewed in favor of India. This is likely to fuel ongoing discontent in the US and could provoke further attempts by Washington to extract unilateral trade concessions and benefits from New Delhi in exchange for strengthening bilateral security ties. India has its own trade and investment grievances with the United States, with Delhi often preferring to negotiate deals with the EU rather than the US.
Many Indian authors note that the current American strategy towards India does not involve any major programs to assist the modernization of the Indian economy on the part of the United States. During the presidency of Donald Trump, the United States made it clear to its Indian partners: US-Indian relations should serve the immediate interests of American business, and not the strategic goals of modernizing India. Under Joe Biden, despite significant dimensions in rhetoric, this approach has not undergone any radical changes.
There will be no political or defense alliance between the US and India. There are two reasons for this forecast, first would be that the United States has no tradition of entering into political and/or military alliances with equal foreign partners. Second reason is its nature has of taking a leading position in any of the alliances it has joined since World War II (for example, NATO or AUKUS) despite its formal multilateral nature.
On the other hand, India is clearly not ready and will not be ready in the near future to become a “junior partner” of the United States. Meanwhile, a fundamental feature of Indian foreign policy is the desire to carefully balance “Indo-Pacific aspirations” and “Eurasian priorities”. India may have some reservations about BRICS or the SCO, but these two mechanisms are necessary to balance the Quad and other formats of expanding cooperation with the West. Moreover, deepening interaction with Washington most likely will not prevent Delhi from maintaining traditional friendly relations in Eurasia and exploring new opportunities for interaction with Russia or Iran. Obviously, India will not want to align itself with the United States in its approaches to Tehran or Moscow and will, if possible, avoid scrupulous compliance with American sanctions against these two countries.
Recently, especially after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, in Asia and especially in India, doubts have increasingly been expressed about how reliable the security guarantees provided by Washington to its allies and partners are. There is reason to believe that the United States will not be willing to come to the aid of its friends in a serious crisis, especially if doing so involves significant risks and potential costs for the United States. Even if US-Indian relations are brought to the level of an allied partnership, it is far from clear whether Washington will be ready to provide direct military support to Delhi in the event of another escalation of the Indian-Chinese border conflict.
The author is an independent military analyst.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited.
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