Israel’s drone strike on Iran’s consular building in Damascus on April 1 killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers, including a brigadier-general. Not surprisingly, the strike has further ratcheted up tensions in the Middle East, a region already on the brink of general conflict since the October 7 Hamas attack and subsequent Israeli response.
With the presence of Hezbollah in the north and Houthis in the south (not to mention several Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria), horizontal escalation was already a factor. Fear is rife that the Damascus strike could force Iran’s hand and the spiral could lead to vertical escalation. How likely is Iran’s direct response?
Both the United States and Israel think Iran has already planned a reprisal and would execute the plan. In fact, statements made on April 11 suggested Iran would retaliate within a 48-hour window. That window, as this is being written on April 13, would close today at midnight.
Iran has good reason to retaliate. It also has good reasons not to retaliate directly or within the expected window in which its attack is being anticipated. Let’s consider both courses of action.
Case For Retaliation
Iran has so far avoided being sucked directly into the ongoing Middle East conflict. Nonetheless, it remains at the centre of that conflict in multiple ways. Iran has used groups affiliated with it, both operationally and politico-ideologically, to fight an asymmetric war with Israel. That war predates the current conflict by more than two decades but has been aggravated by the current round of armed conflict and horizontal escalation. Israel’s drone assassination strikes against Hezbollah commanders and now the Damascus strike against IRGC personnel are evidence of that escalation threatening to go vertical.
Iranian planners favouring retaliation are likely focusing on establishing deterrence against Israel through a reprisal attack. Their argument would be two-pronged. First, if Iran does not strike back, Israel will be emboldened into mounting other such attacks against Iranian interests outside and inside Iran. This argument would be supported by the prestige argument both in direct relation to Israel as also for Iran’s influence with groups affiliated with it. Second, inaction by Iran will affect the morale of groups are already in this fight. If they see that Iran has remained quiet even after Israel attacked it on its own soil (Iran’s consulate), deterrence will not be established, and prestige will be lost.
Rather Than Help Gaza, Iran And Pakistan Prefer To Attack Each Other Put another way, the proponents of a reprisal strike will focus on the costs of inaction, even taking into account the consequences of likely vertical escalation such as a direct Israeli attack on Iran and the explicit entry of the US into the conflict.
The economic costs of a broad conflict are also likely to lead the US to advise caution. War in the Middle East will lead to skyrocketing fuel prices, as well as prices of other international commodities. The world’s most important sea lanes of communication would become extremely hazardous for commercial vessels to traverse.
The proponents of a retaliatory strike will argue that the US is already spread thin because of its competition with China, the ongoing war in Ukraine and growing Sino-Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa. Further, the US’s Israel policy has been politically expensive for Biden, who is not only in an election year but lagging in most polls. Finally, given the end of the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there’s not much appetite within the US for another military adventure in the MENA region. Hence, the US would be extremely wary of further horizontal and vertical escalation and will therefore restrain Israel from responding to Iran’s retaliation.
The economic costs of a broad conflict are also likely to lead the US to advise caution. War in the Middle East will lead to skyrocketing fuel prices, as well as prices of other international commodities. The world’s most important sea lanes of communication would become extremely hazardous for commercial vessels to traverse. That would in turn have a severely negative impact on the economies of South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, Far East and Oceania.
“That,” one can almost hear the proponents saying, “would be enough for the US to ensure that this does not get out of hand. Because if this conflict did escalate, the situation would be like a stone in free fall.”
Case For Patience
Ironically, one can imagine opponents of escalation using the same arguments to reach a different conclusion. For instance, they would argue that deterrence cannot really be established in a low-intensity, indirect asymmetric war. They would point to the fact that Iran and Israel have been at war for nearly a quarter century with each trying to hurt the interests of the other.
NCRC Urges Immediate Action to Tackle Pakistan's Out-of-School Children Crisis The opponents of immediate retaliation would further point out that every setback has ultimately redounded to Iran’s advantage. For instance, Iran, which had no real cyber expertise before Natanz was hit, is today one of the world’s leading cyber powers. The Natanz attack was absorbed, lessons were learnt, and a capability acquired.
But what about Israel crossing the line with the Damascus attack? The response would be that Israel has mounted dozens of such clandestine attacks in Iran previously. They have assassinated Iranian physicists and engineers, IRGC commanders, destroyed years of work by Iran by introducing the Stuxnet virus into the Natanz nuclear facility and regularly attacked Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. The Damascus attack is thus nothing new.
The opponents of immediate retaliation would further point out that every setback has ultimately redounded to Iran’s advantage. For instance, Iran, which had no real cyber expertise before Natanz was hit, is today one of the world’s leading cyber powers. The Natanz attack was absorbed, lessons were learnt, and a capability acquired.
They would argue that the two biggest assets of Iran’s long-term strategy have been patience and focus. Despite crippling sanctions, Iran has developed its military and other capabilities brick by brick. It has emerged as the leading power in the MENA region, developed excellent relations with Russia and China, two primary competitors of the US, and spread its influence throughout the Middle East.
In short, Iran controls diverse ideological groups over wide geographies, a policy that has served its interests very well. Its patient and cautious approach has allowed it to draw blood without exposing itself directly to the ravages of a direct conflict of arms. The only time Iran chose to attack the US directly was when it targeted US bases in Iraq after a US drone strike killed Major-General Qassem Suleimani. Even then, it chose to hit those areas of the bases that did not house the US troops — resolve wedded to strategic caution.
The opponents of action would also argue, taking a cue from the proponents’ argument, that if the stone goes into free fall, if the SLOCs become hazardous, if the global economy goes into a tailspin, that development would be disastrous for Iran too. In short, the impulsive desire to seek immediate revenge could lead to the destruction of the capabilities so patiently built by Iran.
For First Time: US Allows Security Council To Adopt Resolution For 'Immediate' Gaza Ceasefire The strongest argument against a reprisal would be that the real issue is not about Iran’s retaliation. “We will retaliate; we always have. The question is, when and how."
Further, their argument would be that an angry response is precisely what Israel wants. In their words, “We must not walk into a trap. Israel wants us to believe that we have no option but to make a hugely disadvantageous move. We must disappoint it.”
They would also argue that Biden has consistently made it clear that the US stands by Israel. He has warned Iran against a strike by saying, “Don’t”. In the same breath, he spoke again of US’ ironclad support for Israel. The CENTCOM commander was dispatched to Israel to work out a joint strategy in case of an Iranian strike. The US has refused to condemn the Israeli strike on Damascus. It is structurally and strategically wedded to Israel’s defence. The assumption that in case of Iranian retaliation it will not help Israel is therefore wrong.
But the strongest argument against a reprisal would be that the real issue is not about Iran’s retaliation. “We will retaliate; we always have. The question is, when and how. It’s better to keep Israel guessing than to do the expected. Decades of wars have proved that we are at our best when we strike at the time and place of our choosing. That means forcing the enemy to fight on our terms and ground, not his. Israel is already in trouble. Benjamin Netanyahu wants a diversion and his perennial desire is to get the US to attack Iran. We must not help him.”
So, what will it be?
As a minor student of military strategy, I find more meat in the argument for patience than immediate retaliation. I also believe that Iran understands that the best way to heal the slow-growing rift between Netanyahu and Biden is to give Netanyahu and Israel this war. For the past twenty years, Israel has repeatedly tried to force the US into a direct confrontation with Iran — in vain. Biden is one president, a self-declared Zionist, that Israel can count on if Iran walks into a conflict directly.
The Case For Pakistani Students 'Staying At Home' Rather Than Looking For Greener Pastures Abroad That said, the histories of war tell us that leaders generally “sleepwalk into a war.” They also get caught in a commitment trap. As Graham Allison writes in Destined for War, John F. Kennedy avidly read Barbra Tuchman’s The Guns of August and promised to himself that he would avoid the mistakes that led to World War I. And yet, “Although he appreciated the dangers of his predicament, Kennedy repeatedly made choices [during the Cuban Missile Crisis] he knew actually increased the risk of war, including nuclear war.”
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