By Andrew Hammond
One of the defining features of COP28 has been the fast-growing influence of the so-called "Global South." This is reflected in the issues being discussed, and the deals being made, for instance, a landmark "loss and damage" agreement on the opening day of the summit.
While the concept of the Global South dates back decades to the 1960s, the term’s usage has grown significantly recently, including following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. During this time, there has been much commentary on perceptions within many Global South nations of double standards of the West’s moral clamor against Moscow’s actions, yet strong support for Israel’s military offensive following the Hamas terrorist attacks in October, despite thousands of innocent Palestinian casualties.
The salience of the Global South badge, which some have compared to the rise of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, has grown as other more economically-defined terms to describe this bloc of nations like "emerging markets," appear to have declined in usage in comparison. The concept of the Global South is a more politically loaded term that is often defined by perceived unfairness of the global order, and the continued preponderance of the West or Global North.
Outside of global climate summitry, the Global South’s growing power has also been manifest in much wider global debates in recent times. This includes the Ukraine war where much of the South is not aligned in public with Russia or the West. For many countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, such nonalignment has significant appeal, not least as a wide number depend heavily on trade, aid, investment and/or weaponry both from both Western powers and from China, if not also from Russia.
Another dynamic that highlights the politically charged nature of the Global South is the growing rivalry for leadership of this group. This includes moves by China, India (the current chair of the G20) and Brazil, which is the next chair of the G20.
It is in this hugely dynamic context that moves are afoot to bring greater organizational identity to the South. To be sure, there have long existed forums such as the G77, founded at the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade, to promote a more equitable world order in the face of continuing economic inequalities that are raising increased global concern.
However, the G77 is widely seen to have been surpassed by the BRICS as the premier forum for the Global South. The prestige of the BRICS club, which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, was shown at the latest annual group summit when it was announced there had been over 20 formal requests, plus over 20 informal ones, to join the club from other Global South nations.
This led the five-nation bloc to invite a new cohort of members which has been carefully chosen, geographically and politically, to include Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These six nations will significantly increase the bloc’s clout with it, collectively, accounting for around 30 percent of global GDP plus over 40 percent of global oil production.
Despite this economic strength, BRICS have tried to emphasize in recent years their political cooperation, leading some in the West to worry about the group becoming an anti-Western club, not least with China and Russia (plus now Iran) among the membership. However, there are in fact significant tensions within the body.
Take the example of India and China which have longstanding disagreements, including over border issues, plus India is part of the so-called anti-China Quad of powers comprising the United States, Japan and Australia. More recently, New Delhi and Beijing have disagreed over the Gaza conflict too with India having a much more pro-Israel view than China.
With its huge economy, China under President Xi Jinping sees itself as the natural leader of the Global South, in general, and the BRICS in particular. Unsurprisingly, it therefore favors the most rapid expansion of the bloc to try to create a Beijing-friendly hub.
However, both India and Brazil also have burgeoning leadership credentials in the South. This is despite their greater cautiousness about BRICS expansion than China.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who polls indicate will win in 2024 a third term of office, leveraged his chairing of the G20 to showcase India’s global leadership. Part of the reason that New Delhi believes it has such claims to global leadership of the South is that many demographers believe the country may now have the world’s largest population, surpassing China in 2023.
For Brazil, meanwhile, its leadership of the South comes under the second era of leadership of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Brazil 2024 takes over the chair of the G20 from India, and Lula is looking to use this powerful platform to project further his nation’s return to the international stage after years of self-inflicted international isolation.
Taken together, this highlights the multiple ways in which politics is at the fore of the resurgence in usage of the Global South term. As the tectonic plates of international relations shift further, with an increasingly multipolar competitive landscape, this may only continue apace in the second half of the 2020s.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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