Andrew Hammond
The AUKUS security pact was originally announced by the United States, Australia and Britain amid relatively low expectations, and mixed reactions globally. Yet, it is assuming momentum with U.K. National Security Adviser Stephen Lovegrove calling it “the most significant capability collaboration anywhere in the world in the past six decades.”
The latest wave of interest in AUKUS has come recently with much speculation about Japan’s potential role in the so-called phase two of the alliance. However, the world’s third-largest economy is just one of several nations that has been mooted in the last couple of years as potential partners, including New Zealand, Canada, South Korea and possibly Singapore.
Last week, U.K. Defence Secretary Grant Shapps confirmed that consultations on future cooperation between AUKUS security pact partners and other nations will begin this year. Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore would all bring key assets to the table, but full membership of AUKUS is not yet mooted.
Japan is planning to double its military budget, which will soon be the world’s third-largest; South Korea has a capable military that has spent decades training and preparing for potential conflict with North Korea; while Singapore has well trained, high-tech naval and air forces. Deeper relationships with these Asian nations might include more clearly defined security guarantees, enhanced training and exercises, advanced weapons systems joint procurement and stronger collaboration in the ICT frontiers of warfare, including cyber-defence.
Yet, beyond Asia, further-flung nations including Canada and New Zealand, both members of the so-called Five Eyes alliance with the United States, Australia and Britain, are also potential partners too. Take the example of Canada, which two former British Prime Ministers Boris Johnson and Liz Truss previously backed for AUKUS membership “to strengthen the West’s collective defences."
Johnson has even said that Canada is the “most obvious next candidate,” in part because it had “fought, often heroically, for freedom” in the past. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said last Monday that he had already held “excellent conversations” with London, Washington and Canberra over joining the AUKUS alliance.
Beyond purely military considerations, supporters of Canada’s membership have pointed to the country’s huge supply of critical natural minerals. It is argued that this would allow Britain, United States and Australia to be less reliant on exports from China.
One key benefit for Canada of joining AUKUS is the need for new submarines (potentially nuclear) to protect the Canadian coastline. This is the longest Arctic coastline in the world, and under significant geopolitical scrutiny from an increasing number of nations.
The potential Canadian need for nuclear submarines relates back to the stage one founding of AUKUS in 2021 which is as a defense alliance focused on helping Australia acquire its first nuclear submarines. Building from this, the so-called next phase, second pillar of AUKUS is centered around advanced capabilities and sharing technologies in areas such as hypersonic, quantum computing and undersea.
A key challenge for collaboration, however, for Asian nations outside of AUKUS, are U.S. restrictions on sharing technological secrets. To try to combat this, Japan has said it will introduce economic security legislation to allow it to classify more information as confidential and ask employees at companies with access to it to undergo security clearance checks, and enhance cybersecurity, including a pledge to create a 20,000-strong cybersecurity force and write legislation that would allow it to engage in active cybersecurity defense aimed at eliminating potential online attacks.
The latest wave of phase two speculation concerning AUKUS underlines that, while some dismiss the importance of this deepening defense relationship, it is seen as hugely important in Washington, London and Canberra. While the three nations are separated geographically, they have deep historical ties that are being rejuvenated in the 2020s.
Take the example of the growing warmth between London and Canberra which is bringing new relevance to this longstanding partnership. This includes plans for Australia to regularly host two of the Royal Navy’s Offshore Patrol Vessels, in a move that's expected to lay the groundwork for future rotations of larger U.K. ships and submarines, and the possibility that U.K. military assets could be based permanently in Australia in the future. It is also possible that U.K. forces could undertake increased military training in Australia.
So while AUKUS is a new treaty, it is only the latest chapter in the long history of security and political cooperation. Take the example of the Five Eyes security alliance stemming from the remarkable intelligence relationship that the United States and Britain enjoyed in World War II which was institutionalized in the 1946 BRUSA (later UKUSA) Agreement. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as former U.K. dominions, began representing themselves in the intelligence pact in the late 1940s and 1950s which led to developments like the 1951 ANZUS treaty.
To be sure, there have been some ‘bumps’ in the road in recent years, including potential divergences over the use of Chinese 5G telecommunications technology. Australia, alongside the United States, have been the most vociferous in their opposition to such Chinese technology with both banning the Chinese-headquartered telecoms firms from supplying equipment to their 5G networks.
However, Britain, alongside other Five Eyes allies New Zealand and Canada, previously had more nuanced positions. The former government of Theresa May and indeed Johnson had considered allowing Chinese firms a limited role in building “non-core” parts of the nation’s 5G network. However, Johnson ultimately u-turned on this issue under pressure from Canberra and Washington. Had there been a big breach between Britain and Australia on this issue, intelligence sharing could have been curtailed, denting ties.
One sign of the fact that AUKUS is such a big political call for Britain in this context is the criticism from May, in her capacity as a former premier, who has questioned whether the pact means London could be enveloped in a war with Beijing over Taiwan given the longstanding U.S. security guarantees given to Taipei. This issue was fuelled by recent comments by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. He suggested that three U.S. submarines to be supplied to Australia could be deployed against China in any conflict over Taiwan.
Taken together, the AUKUS project is therefore assuming new momentum. While expansion of the alliance may be unlikely in the immediate term, collaboration with a range of partners in the Asia-Pacific and Americas appears increasingly possible.
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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