After 13 games last season, Carlton had just four wins and a draw and sat in the bottom four. They struggled to move the ball and Harry McKay couldn’t kick straight. The faithful were apoplectic, and wanted heads on plates, in the customary Carlton manner.

The transformation of the Blues from that embarrassing nadir to a team that made the preliminary final was astounding and one of the stories of the season, as was the slightly less surprising recovery of Greater Western Sydney under Adam Kingsley.

Harry McKay catches his breath during Carlton’s round 13 loss to Essendon.Credit: Getty Images

The Giants had four wins and eight losses at round 12 and, at the end, they were unluckily within a point of a grand final berth against the Brisbane Lions.

Consider what those clubs might have done if a) they’d lost another game when they reached their nadir and b) if there had been an established mid-season trading system that gave the 18 clubs the freedom to offload or gain players in that June period.

For argument’s sake, let’s imagine that the Blues were one win the worse (3-8 and a draw) and that while the club hierarchy had backed coach Michael Voss to continue in 2024 without reservation, they were willing to explore some aggressive trading to fast-track their move into contention.

Melbourne, who were in the top four and very much in contention, would be in pole position to win the premiership if they had a high calibre key forward to support Jacob van Rooyen.

McKay and the Blues turned their season around and made it all the way to the preliminary final.Credit: Getty Images

So, the Blues make the radical call to trade McKay to the Demons, in return for two first-rounders (at that point, the Dees had Fremantle’s first), plus van Rooyen or another younger Demon who suits their needs, under a largely unfettered mid-season trading regime.

Yes, this is an AFL version of magical realism, but it’s a way to illustrate the obvious pitfalls and dangers inherent in the “inevitable” march to mid-season trading.