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In Europe, Russia’s war on Ukraine shatters the long-standing norm that borders should not be changed by force. In the Middle East, the war between Israel and Hamas threatens a dangerous radicalization of the region, with Iranian-backed militias fighting U.S.-backed allies from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq to Syria. And in Asia, China’s rise continues to unsettle the balance of power.

Each of these challenges has its peculiarities, but they have in common the need for a sophisticated mixture of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration has tackled them energetically, setting agendas, rallying allies and talking to adversaries. Success will depend on whether it can execute the policies it has adopted. Alas, that might depend on the United States’ domestic politics more than its grand strategies.

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In Europe, Washington has emphasized combating Russian aggression. This is easier said than done. Russia has an economy that was nine times the size of Ukraine’s before the war and a population today almost four times larger. That basic mismatch can only be addressed through continuous, large-scale Western assistance to Ukraine, coupled with pressure on Kyiv to develop a more manageable military strategy and to reform its politics and economics so that it can genuinely become a part of the West.

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In the Middle East, the challenge is more in the realm of diplomacy than deterrence. Israel has overwhelming power compared with Hamas; there really is no doubt that it will win in the narrow, military sense of the word. But to leave Israel more secure, with meaningful, new alliances with the Gulf Arab states, the United States must get Israel to address an underlying, unavoidable reality: about 5 million Palestinians live in lands occupied by Israel without political rights and without a state of their own.

China is the largest of the challenges and the one that, in the long run, will shape the international order — determining whether the open international system collapses into a second Cold War with arms races in nuclear weapons, space and artificial intelligence. The strategy the Biden administration has adopted is nuanced, emphasizing competition and deterrence while also trying to build a working relationship with Beijing. During the past few months, that strategy seems to have yielded results, including a more conciliatory tone from the Chinese. The shift undoubtedly has much to do with Beijing’s economic troubles, as well as the realization that Xi Jinping’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has backfired, producing animosity across Asia. But part of the credit goes to a U.S. policy that has pushed tough measures even as it has encouraged dialogue and diplomacy.

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Despite well-designed policy in each of these areas, the Biden administration confronts the reality that U.S. domestic politics could derail all progress. If U.S. support for Ukraine wavers, European resolve will also weaken, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin will be confirmed in his prediction that he can outlast the West. Large constituencies in both America and Europe still support Ukraine, but the United States is experiencing growing opposition from a newly isolationist right. And the Republican Party is poised to nominate Donald Trump as its presidential candidate, a man who has made no bones about his dislike of Ukraine and admiration for Putin.

In the Middle East, Biden faces Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is highly adept at pocketing U.S. support and resisting all advice. Since the days of the Oslo accords in the 1990s, Netanyahu has found ways to feign support for a peace process while actually gutting it. The last time Washington tried to pressure him, he made an end run around President Barack Obama and mobilized support directly through Congress. Perhaps recognizing this, the Biden administration seems instead to be trying to marshal Arab states — chiefly Saudi Arabia — to influence Israel.

With China, the Biden administration’s careful mix of deterrence and diplomacy can only work if domestic policy does not upend it. The politics of China policy remain overwhelmingly hawkish; there is no perceived downside to bashing Beijing. The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party just recommended even more severe measures against China, including a slew of tariffs that would, according to an estimate by Oxford Economics, cost the U.S. economy up to $1.9 trillion over the next 5 years and could lead to a broad rupture in the global economy.

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As I recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, “the most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States.” If America retreats, in each of these three areas, aggression and disorder will rise. 2024 might be a year in which the ugly, polarized politics on Capitol Hill ends up shaping the world in which we will live for decades to come.

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2023 has turned out to be a year that has seen a fundamental challenge to world order. The rules-based international system built by the United States and others over the decades is now under threat in three regions.

In Europe, Russia’s war on Ukraine shatters the long-standing norm that borders should not be changed by force. In the Middle East, the war between Israel and Hamas threatens a dangerous radicalization of the region, with Iranian-backed militias fighting U.S.-backed allies from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq to Syria. And in Asia, China’s rise continues to unsettle the balance of power.

Each of these challenges has its peculiarities, but they have in common the need for a sophisticated mixture of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration has tackled them energetically, setting agendas, rallying allies and talking to adversaries. Success will depend on whether it can execute the policies it has adopted. Alas, that might depend on the United States’ domestic politics more than its grand strategies.

In Europe, Washington has emphasized combating Russian aggression. This is easier said than done. Russia has an economy that was nine times the size of Ukraine’s before the war and a population today almost four times larger. That basic mismatch can only be addressed through continuous, large-scale Western assistance to Ukraine, coupled with pressure on Kyiv to develop a more manageable military strategy and to reform its politics and economics so that it can genuinely become a part of the West.

In the Middle East, the challenge is more in the realm of diplomacy than deterrence. Israel has overwhelming power compared with Hamas; there really is no doubt that it will win in the narrow, military sense of the word. But to leave Israel more secure, with meaningful, new alliances with the Gulf Arab states, the United States must get Israel to address an underlying, unavoidable reality: about 5 million Palestinians live in lands occupied by Israel without political rights and without a state of their own.

China is the largest of the challenges and the one that, in the long run, will shape the international order — determining whether the open international system collapses into a second Cold War with arms races in nuclear weapons, space and artificial intelligence. The strategy the Biden administration has adopted is nuanced, emphasizing competition and deterrence while also trying to build a working relationship with Beijing. During the past few months, that strategy seems to have yielded results, including a more conciliatory tone from the Chinese. The shift undoubtedly has much to do with Beijing’s economic troubles, as well as the realization that Xi Jinping’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has backfired, producing animosity across Asia. But part of the credit goes to a U.S. policy that has pushed tough measures even as it has encouraged dialogue and diplomacy.

Despite well-designed policy in each of these areas, the Biden administration confronts the reality that U.S. domestic politics could derail all progress. If U.S. support for Ukraine wavers, European resolve will also weaken, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin will be confirmed in his prediction that he can outlast the West. Large constituencies in both America and Europe still support Ukraine, but the United States is experiencing growing opposition from a newly isolationist right. And the Republican Party is poised to nominate Donald Trump as its presidential candidate, a man who has made no bones about his dislike of Ukraine and admiration for Putin.

In the Middle East, Biden faces Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is highly adept at pocketing U.S. support and resisting all advice. Since the days of the Oslo accords in the 1990s, Netanyahu has found ways to feign support for a peace process while actually gutting it. The last time Washington tried to pressure him, he made an end run around President Barack Obama and mobilized support directly through Congress. Perhaps recognizing this, the Biden administration seems instead to be trying to marshal Arab states — chiefly Saudi Arabia — to influence Israel.

With China, the Biden administration’s careful mix of deterrence and diplomacy can only work if domestic policy does not upend it. The politics of China policy remain overwhelmingly hawkish; there is no perceived downside to bashing Beijing. The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party just recommended even more severe measures against China, including a slew of tariffs that would, according to an estimate by Oxford Economics, cost the U.S. economy up to $1.9 trillion over the next 5 years and could lead to a broad rupture in the global economy.

As I recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, “the most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States.” If America retreats, in each of these three areas, aggression and disorder will rise. 2024 might be a year in which the ugly, polarized politics on Capitol Hill ends up shaping the world in which we will live for decades to come.

QOSHE - The U.S. is its own worst enemy on foreign policy - Fareed Zakaria
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The U.S. is its own worst enemy on foreign policy

27 46
15.12.2023

Need something to talk about? Text us for thought-provoking opinions that can break any awkward silence.ArrowRight

In Europe, Russia’s war on Ukraine shatters the long-standing norm that borders should not be changed by force. In the Middle East, the war between Israel and Hamas threatens a dangerous radicalization of the region, with Iranian-backed militias fighting U.S.-backed allies from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq to Syria. And in Asia, China’s rise continues to unsettle the balance of power.

Each of these challenges has its peculiarities, but they have in common the need for a sophisticated mixture of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration has tackled them energetically, setting agendas, rallying allies and talking to adversaries. Success will depend on whether it can execute the policies it has adopted. Alas, that might depend on the United States’ domestic politics more than its grand strategies.

Advertisement

In Europe, Washington has emphasized combating Russian aggression. This is easier said than done. Russia has an economy that was nine times the size of Ukraine’s before the war and a population today almost four times larger. That basic mismatch can only be addressed through continuous, large-scale Western assistance to Ukraine, coupled with pressure on Kyiv to develop a more manageable military strategy and to reform its politics and economics so that it can genuinely become a part of the West.

Follow this authorFareed Zakaria's opinions

Follow

In the Middle East, the challenge is more in the realm of diplomacy than deterrence. Israel has overwhelming power compared with Hamas; there really is no doubt that it will win in the narrow, military sense of the word. But to leave Israel more secure, with meaningful, new alliances with the Gulf Arab states, the United States must get Israel to address an underlying, unavoidable reality: about 5 million Palestinians live in lands occupied by Israel without political rights and without a state of their own.

China is the largest of the challenges and the one that, in the long run, will shape the international order — determining whether the open international system collapses into a second Cold War with arms races in nuclear weapons, space and artificial intelligence. The strategy the Biden administration has adopted is nuanced, emphasizing competition and deterrence while also trying to build a working relationship with Beijing. During the past few months, that strategy seems to have yielded results, including a more conciliatory tone from the Chinese. The shift undoubtedly has much to do with Beijing’s economic troubles, as well as the realization that Xi Jinping’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has backfired, producing animosity........

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