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By contrast, in the 1990s — before this demographic shift — Republicans won all five of the party-flipping special elections in the House.
Each of these elections had its own peculiarities. In the race to replace the expelled fabulist George Santos, for example, Suozzi benefited from a Republican opponent who campaigned less than he did. But the change in the composition of the parties has influenced all these outcomes.
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The old conventional wisdom held that high turnout benefited Democrats and hurt Republicans. Non-White and younger voters heavily backed Democrats but did not vote as frequently as White and older voters. Americans with college degrees were reliable voters and leaned toward the GOP; Americans without them voted for the Democrats but voted less often.
Both parties knew it, and their understanding has lurked in the background — and not always far in the background — of how each party thinks about ballot access and voter fraud. Not too long ago, it was believed that Republicans had a structural advantage in midterm elections and that Democrats had one in presidential elections for this reason: Reliable Republican voters would cast their ballots in every election, but in presidential years, millions of Democrats would show up, too.
Since then, though, a lot of voters with college degrees have left Republicans, while still being eager to wear those “I voted” stickers. It’s harder to get Republicans’ new voters to show up for elections. And that can make a difference in special elections, which usually have lower turnout than national and especially presidential elections. “The demographic climate has gotten more favorable for Democrats when it comes to special elections,” sums up Patrick Ruffini, a Republican pollster and the author of “Party of the People,” a book about his party’s remade coalition.
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The 2020 elections should have jolted both parties’ old assumptions. Voter turnout was high, but Republicans gained seats in the House and in state legislatures. But Trump kept Republicans from drawing the lesson that high turnout is compatible with a strong performance by them. He lost his own race, narrowly, because of his unpopularity and decision to discourage Republicans from using mail-in ballots. He cultivated the myth that widespread voter fraud had cost him the election. And by sabotaging two Republican candidates in Georgia, he handed control of the Senate to Democrats. All of this tended to reinforce the Republican tendency to fear high turnout. In the debates about election laws after 2020, the parties stuck to their customary positions.
Republicans’ recent losses in special elections might finally be starting the process of dislodging the old thinking. So might polls in the presidential race, which are beginning to suggest President Biden is doing better among likely voters than among registered voters — another reversal of the pattern that used to prevail. The dated assumptions about midterms vs. presidential elections might be next to go. This fall, it might be Democratic strategists who are crossing their fingers for low turnout.
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When Democrat Tom Suozzi won a special election to the House on Tuesday, Donald Trump made it about, surprise, Donald Trump. The Republican candidate had lost the race in New York, Trump said, because she had kept her distance from the former president. Trump’s primary rival, Nikki Haley, had a different theory: The Republican lost because Trump is so unpopular among swing voters.
Both remarks have enough truth in them to keep other Republican politicians doing their customary balancing act. They will calibrate just how Trumpy they need to be to win their primaries and keep the Republican base motivated without alienating too many anti-Trump voters to win the general election.
But Trump isn’t the whole story. Even before his 2016 campaign, Republicans had been shedding college-educated White voters while gaining among White voters without degrees. Trump accelerated both trends. Some of the consequences of that trade have worked well for Republicans. Michigan was a Democratic stronghold when blue-collar voters tilted left. Trump won it in 2016, kept it close in 2020, and it’s one of a handful of swing states in 2024.
Suozzi’s victory demonstrates one of the disadvantages of the new Republican coalition: It performs worse than it once did in special elections. Democrats have won three of the four special elections for the House during this Congress. Since the beginning of 2016, seven special elections for the House have resulted in party switches. With Suozzi, Democrats have now won five of those.
By contrast, in the 1990s — before this demographic shift — Republicans won all five of the party-flipping special elections in the House.
Each of these elections had its own peculiarities. In the race to replace the expelled fabulist George Santos, for example, Suozzi benefited from a Republican opponent who campaigned less than he did. But the change in the composition of the parties has influenced all these outcomes.
The old conventional wisdom held that high turnout benefited Democrats and hurt Republicans. Non-White and younger voters heavily backed Democrats but did not vote as frequently as White and older voters. Americans with college degrees were reliable voters and leaned toward the GOP; Americans without them voted for the Democrats but voted less often.
Both parties knew it, and their understanding has lurked in the background — and not always far in the background — of how each party thinks about ballot access and voter fraud. Not too long ago, it was believed that Republicans had a structural advantage in midterm elections and that Democrats had one in presidential elections for this reason: Reliable Republican voters would cast their ballots in every election, but in presidential years, millions of Democrats would show up, too.
Since then, though, a lot of voters with college degrees have left Republicans, while still being eager to wear those “I voted” stickers. It’s harder to get Republicans’ new voters to show up for elections. And that can make a difference in special elections, which usually have lower turnout than national and especially presidential elections. “The demographic climate has gotten more favorable for Democrats when it comes to special elections,” sums up Patrick Ruffini, a Republican pollster and the author of “Party of the People,” a book about his party’s remade coalition.
The 2020 elections should have jolted both parties’ old assumptions. Voter turnout was high, but Republicans gained seats in the House and in state legislatures. But Trump kept Republicans from drawing the lesson that high turnout is compatible with a strong performance by them. He lost his own race, narrowly, because of his unpopularity and decision to discourage Republicans from using mail-in ballots. He cultivated the myth that widespread voter fraud had cost him the election. And by sabotaging two Republican candidates in Georgia, he handed control of the Senate to Democrats. All of this tended to reinforce the Republican tendency to fear high turnout. In the debates about election laws after 2020, the parties stuck to their customary positions.
Republicans’ recent losses in special elections might finally be starting the process of dislodging the old thinking. So might polls in the presidential race, which are beginning to suggest President Biden is doing better among likely voters than among registered voters — another reversal of the pattern that used to prevail. The dated assumptions about midterms vs. presidential elections might be next to go. This fall, it might be Democratic strategists who are crossing their fingers for low turnout.
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